THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

Wednesday, May 23, 2012

Lack of hustle during a game

Good for Bochy, to chew him out, but delay any punishment.

The way I see it, a game is at least as important as practice drills.  When you do drills, you go all-out.  You go all-out in drills not because you want to win at that moment (after all, there’s nothing to win in a drill), but to condition yourself so that when the moment comes in the future, you will naturally go all out.

The same applies in a real game: even if you think you can’t win at that moment, you should then shift into “drill mode” and go all-out: not to win at that moment (because the chances are that you may not increase your team’s chance of winning), but to condition yourself so that when the moment comes in the future, you will naturally go all out.

You should never put in less effort in a game than in a drill.  To do that, you are simply being myopic, only considering the immediate cost/benefit of going all out relative to increasing your chances of winning.  You have to think like a drill, and treat a real game as a simulated game or drill, and go all-out.  Again, it’s all about the future benefit, not the immediate one.

Sunday, May 20, 2012

Lincecum the catcher

Here’s Lincecum covering home plate.

The runner was pretty nice to him on the slide.  My question: had the runner launched himself at Lincecum, and taken him out (and likely injured him), would anyone have a problem with that?

How do you incentivize a power hitter to bunt?

I was emailing with a couple of former players, trying to understand the reluctance of the power-hitting LHH to bunt.  The basic theme eventually led to money: they are paid to be power hitters, not bunters, much like we’ve heard in the past about power hitters hitting the ball and not taking a walk.  Now, we’ve incentived the power hitter to take a walk by (a) rewarding the value of the walk and (b) realizing that if a player is more selective, not only will it increase his walk total, but he may end up hitting better overall too.

So, these power hitters are not learning to bunt, because there’s little incentive to do so.  While this may be a team game, players are paid for individual production.  As long as it looks like bunt singles don’t help them too much, they are not going to waste their time bunting.  The defense knows this, and are exploiting this inefficiency by over-shifting.  The response to the over-shift is to bunt, and this will quickly force the defense to not overshift so much.  But, the power hitters are not doing it, and the managers are not forcing them to do it.  (You’d hate as a manager to order a hitter to bunt, when said hitter doesn’t have the confidence to lay one down.)

Now, how do you incentivize the power hitter to better appreciate that bunting will not only drive up his batting average, but will eventually lead to the defense having a fielder alignment that will help him as a hitter when he does swing away?

MLB doesn’t allow bonuses, except at the team level.  I was thinking that if you create a reward system so that you overweight the thing you want them to do, they will quickly move to that area.  If for example you tell the hitter than any bunt will count as a double in contract negotiations, then this would appeal to the hitter because he gets to increase his “extra base hits” totals.

How do you get it through their heads so that it becomes a natural thing for a power-hitting LHH(*) to bunt in the face of an over-shift (contrained by current MLB guidelines)?

(*) Carlos Pena excepted.  Maybe teams can hire him as a motivational speaker.

Thursday, May 17, 2012

Is the Shift actually working?

First of all, I’d like to see the data.  Dewan posted another article that tells us the frequency of shifts, but he doesn’t show us the outcome when a shift is on.  Why not?  I have no idea.  But, clearly, we need this data in order to have an intelligent conversation.  And I don’t just mean batting average on groundballs when the shift is on.  I mean THE ENTIRE SPLIT LINE when the shift is on.  I want to know what the K, BB, and HR rates are.  I want to know how often a ball is put in play with the shift on.  I want to know the out rates not only on groundballs, but on airballs as well.

Why do we need that?  Becauase players are not automatons.  They REACT differently given different stimulii.  (Is that the right word? I don’t know, and I’m too lazy to look it up.  It’s a word now!).  So, the pitcher is probably throwing it inside more, the hitter is being pitched to differently.  This is going to cause some change in hitting approach, and some change in the rate at which a ball is put in play.  It’s going to cause the spray angle and launch angle to change once the ball is contacted.  EVERYTHING potentially changes.  That’s why we need that data.

Until I actually have that data, then I’ll have to make due with the limited data we have been given.  Dewan shows five teams that shifted zero, once, or twice this season.  Here are their DER, on ALL BIP (shifted or not) as tracked by the incomparable Fangraphs:
.273 Whitesox
.292 Cards
.297 Phillies
.298 Reds
.327 Rockies (historically, Coors leads to highest BABIP in league)

League-median this year is .283.  (Note: From 1994-2010, the league BABIP hovered around .300.  Prior to 1993, and for decades before that, the league BABIP was .280.  It seems that the tide has turned, and the juiced ball/bat/strikeZone era may be over.  It is such a quick turnaround over such a short period of time, that it almost necessarily points to a sudden change to something, which almost usually means the ball, the bat, or the strike zone.)

So, of the teams that don’t shift, only one is better than the median.

Dewan also notes the top 10 teams that do shift.  In order, here’s how they are doing (again, overall, because I don’t have the data otherwise).
#1 Rays, .284 So the team that shifts by far the most also happens to represent the median.
#2 Orioles, .274
#3 Indians, .278
#4 Jays, .257, and by far MLB best in DER
#5 Royals, .310
#6 Yanks, .314, and 3rd worst in the league in DER
#7 A’s, .273
#8 Brewers, .323, 2nd worst in league, and if we adjust for Coors, would be worst
#9 Redsox, .300
#10 Rangers, .271

The median of these 10 teams is .281, or matching the overall league median.

That leaves us with the other 15 teams who neither shift alot nor a little, including the #2 in DER Nationals (.267), #3 in DER Dodgers (.268), and #4 Padres (.269).  And of course at the other end: .311 for 4th worst Tigers, 5th worst Mets and Braves at .310.

Basically, all that Dewan has showed us is that there is a huge change in the number of shifts, but no indication that the shift is actually effective.

And as I said in the other thread, if the shift is going to be part of the fielding alignment, then big bopping LHH better learn to bunt.  That’s the only way to keep them honest and stop the overshift.

Monday, May 14, 2012

When two runners converge toward the same base

I did not see the play, and I have a hard time believing the account here is accurate.  While I can believe that in the heat of the moment, a fielder is so befuddled that he doesn’t know to first tag the runner and then tag the base, I have to believe that as time goes by, it becomes obvious to the announcers of the game, especially if it’s Keith Hernandez.  Is there more to this story than the account suggests?

I looked up the rule, just to make sure there hasn’t been some recent change like a “base is yours until you give it up, no matter what” or something, like when you are playing tag at school.  Rule 7.01 says in part:

“He is then entitled to it until he is put out, or forced to vacate it for another runner legally entitled to that base.”

So, even if you want to stay on the base, you no longer are allowed to that base.  Again, it’s such a basic rule that I can’t believe the account in the blog is accurate, that something else must be going on.

Can someone confirm the account?

Tiger then Albert: is Pujols a changed hitter?

Poz says the swing change of Pujols is obvious.

Even if it is, does it really mean anything?  Some players used to be famous for constantly changing their swings.  Obviously, no one actually believes that Pujols talent is hanging on a batting stance thread, that would turn him from arguably the best hitter in the league to the worst in the league.

Anyone want to chime in with anecdotes, or data?

Monday, April 30, 2012

Strikeouts of our discontent

Bill James has a good article about the reason that strikeout rates are what they are. 

Strikeouts, over time, always increase, for this reason.  Strikeout pitchers are more effective than pitchers who don’t get strikeouts, therefore teams are always looking for pitchers who can get more strikeouts, and also looking to deploy those pitchers they have in such a way that they will get the most strikeouts.  This effect would be offset by the tendency of teams to look for hitters who don’t strike out, if hitters who did not strike out were also better hitters.  However, hitters who strike out are generally not less effective than hitters who do not strike out; hitters who strike out are generally just as effective as or more effective than hitters who don’t strike out.  Thus, there is no pressure to find hitters who don’t strike out.  This asymmetry pushes strikeout totals higher over time.

His basic point is that in eras when high-K pitchers are so much better than low-K pitchers, there’s an underlying pressure to find more high-K pitchers.  And in eras when neither high-K nor low-K pitchers dominate, then there’s no reason that more high-K or low-K pitchers will enter the league disproportionately.

Similarly, in eras when high-K hitters are much better than low-K hitters, then there’s a pressure to look for great hitters and not worry about their K rates.  And in eras when low-K hitters are better than high-K hitters, then the league will try to avoid high-K hitters in the future.

And then he goes ahead and does his Bill James thing, and looks at this historically.  It’s great stuff, and you should give it a read.  He concludes:

High-strikeout pitchers in today’s game are dramatically more effective than low-strikeout pitchers, while high-strikeout batters are also somewhat more effective than low-strikeout batters.  We are where we have always been, only worse.  Strikeouts, in my opinion, will continue to go up.

Bill didn’t talk about it, but I wouldn’t be surprised if the shift toward shorter relief outings (and more relief innings) also contributes toward the high-K phenomena of the last few years.  In my day, it was a huge deal when a pitcher threw 95mph, and it would earn Clemens a name like Rocket (though never having it usurped from Maurice Richard, and thankfully we didn’t have to deal with Rocket Ismael for too long).  But now?  How many dozens of relievers are there out there that average touching at least one 95mph pitch per outing? And how many more in the minors?

Pitchers are bigger today than in years past.  Pitchers are stronger today than in years past.  Pitchers today train more today than in years past.  The end result?  They’re going to pitch faster than in years past.  (Don’t worry you golden agers… pitchers of yesteryear are still better because they locate better, have more movement, and sequence better.  I have no idea if that’s true, but I don’t want to spoil your beliefs.)

So, how do we stop this train wreck?  What’s the ideal rate of contacted balls per pitches thrown?  For every 300 pitches thrown each game, how many of those do you want the batter to connect on (either as a BIP or as a foul ball)? 10%?  15%?  20%?

Here’s some crazy ideas… go down to three balls and three strikes?  K rates would drop 20%… but walk rates will go up 78%!  So, that’s not going to work.  Any other ball-count combination will lead to ever fewer contacted balls. 

What if a foul-pitch is a “let"… at any count (not just 2-strike counts)?  Hitters may be more aggressive, knowing that he doesn’t get a strike if he can at least nick the ball.

I’d like to hear more crazy ideas from you guys.  And, consider your position that “everything is fine, nothing to change here” already being duly noted.  Thank you for that inertial comment.

Thursday, April 19, 2012

Are all these strikeouts your kind of baseball?

Neyer points out that strikeouts keep going up and up and up.

Suppose you have 39 PA, regardless of style.  Would you prefer 12 K+BB+HR+HB and 27 BIP, or 9 non-BIP and 30 BIP?  That is, an increase of 33% more non-BIP at the expense of 10% fewer BIP.  Is that a good tradeoff?

I’m old school, and I prefer non-BIP to be closer to 20% than 30% of all PA.  I prefer runs per game to be in the high 3s or low 4s, and to be able to have a run environment where I can’t tell if the base-stealer or the power-hitter is the better overall player.

Saturday, April 07, 2012

You can’t let yourself get beat by your second (or third, etc.) best pitch!

You’ve all heard that refrain from commentators (and sometimes players and managers) lots of times.  And most of you know that it is a nonsensical statement, because it doesn’t really mean anything. It is usually just “post-hoc” whining after a pitcher throws a pitch and the batter gets a somewhat crucial or at least a run scoring hit. Often the pitcher misses his location on the pitch, so it “looks” like a “bad” pitch, or maybe the batter happened to be looking for that pitch or it appeared as if he did.

Today in the 4th or 5th inning of the Yankee, Tampa game, the Rays were leading 4-0with 2 outs, a runner on second, and David Price pitching. He threw a 3-2 change up (I didn’t see where the pitch was), the batter got a hit and the runner scored to make the score 4-1.

The radio commentators went on and on about how, “With a runner in scoring position and 2 outs, you have to throw your best pitch,” presumably his 96 mph fastball.

There are so many things wrong with that statement, besides the fact, that again, it is meaningless. I’ll touch on a few of them.

First of all, there is no one pitch in almost any situation that is the “correct” pitch to throw, as most of you know. Pitching involves game theory, or making the batter guess, as much as possible what pitch is coming. Rarely is it correct to throw a certain pitch (and location) 100% or 95% of the time. If it is, then the batter (presumably) knows that that pitch is coming, in which case it is probably not going to be that effective (it is no longer a pitcher’s “best pitch"). There are exceptions, like 3-0 counts to pitchers and weak hitters in certain situations, or a pitcher that primarily throws one pitch, like a Rivera (his cutter is extremely effective even though the batter knows it is coming). But, by and large, most pitchers, including Price, must throw all or some of their pitches a certain percentage of time, randomly, in almost all situations whether the count is 0-2 or 3-2. Obviously at 0-2 most pitchers are more likely to throw an off-speed pitch and at 3-2, they are more likely to throw the fastball, depending on the score, inning, outs, and the batter.

In this particular case, or with a runner in scoring position, a base open, and 2 outs in general, the announcers had their “logic” (whatever logic there is in their statement) exactly wrong. If you are mostly a fastball pitcher, while it is likely to be correct to throw the fastball with a 3-2 count, it is LESS likely that you would and should throw the fastball in that exact situation, 2 outs, a runner in scoring position, and a base open. The reason should be obvious to anyone who played baseball or watches baseball and has half a brain (and these guys do this for a living). The ONLY reason you are more likely to throw a fastball with a 3-2 count (or 3-0, 3-1, and 2-0), in general (again, it depends on the batter and the pitcher’s repertoire, among other things), is because the off-speed pitch is more likely to result in a ball and thus a walk. However, in that situation, the gap between the walk and the hit is large, such that the fastball is least likely than at other times with a 3-2 count.

So, their logic and statement of, “With 2 outs and a runner in scoring position (and a base open, which they did not mention),” is completely wrong and completely backwards.

Finally, there really is no such thing as a pitcher’s “best pitch,” at least in context.  In any given situation, game theory tells us that all of a pitcher’s pitches must have the same win value. We have discussed this before and many of you have probably read about this before. In case you are not familiar with this concept, I’ll give you a brief primer/illustration.

Let’s say that you are a fastball/slider pitcher only. And let’s say that in a vacuum (no game context), your fastball is much better than your slider. There are many pitchers like this.  What this means is that if there were an equal chance of the batter getting either pitch or you told the batter what pitch you were throwing and the situation was neutral (the win value of all offensive events were league average), the fastball would yield a better run value (for the pitcher) than the slider. So, you could say that the fastball was this pitcher’s “best” pitch.

So why not throw it all the time? For three principle reasons: One, in certain situations where the value of the offensive events were not league average, the win values of the two pitches would not be the same. For example, in the situation above the win value of the walk goes down and the win value of a hit goes up. Those values actually change all the time, with the score, count, inning, runners, etc.

Two, obviously the strengths and weaknesses of the batter will change the value of those pitches too.

But, let’s say that in a certain situation, the fastball is still the “best pitch.” Again, why not throw it all the time in that situation?  Remember I said that it is rare that any one pitch is correct 100% of the time. Why is that? That does not seem to make sense. That is because if it were correct to throw a certain pitch all the time in any given situation, the batter would know that. So, the value of that pitch would include the fact that the batter knows it is coming. We all know that there are very few pitchers who can throw a certain pitch effectively when the batter knows it is coming.

So what happens in this confrontation? Well, when the pitcher throws his “second” or “third best” pitch, it becomes a surprise. So, even though in a vacuum, it is not a great pitch, it is going to have a nice win value to the pitcher if the batter is sure that he is getting something else. Typically, if a batter thought that he was getting a fastball at a 3-2 count, and he gets an off-speed pitch in or near the zone, he is not going to be very successful, and thus the value to that pitch is going to be great, perhaps more than the value of the fastball, since the batter knows that the fastball is coming (if indeed the fastball still has greater value when the batter knows it is coming and will be completely surprised at an off-speed, then the pitcher becomes a one-pitch pitcher, in which case this analysis is moot).

So now, if the surprise off-speed is a “better” pitch than the “known” fastball, the pitcher should throw the off-speed more. What would happen if he did? The batter is now less surprised by the off-speed but more surprised by the fastball. So the value of the off-speed goes down and the value of the fastball goes up. As you can probably guess, what happens is that the pitcher throws more and more off-speed until the value of both pitches is exactly equal! That is called the Nash equilibrium and that is why there is no such thing as a pitcher’s “best pitch” in any given situation once context and the percentage of time each pitch is thrown is taken into consideration.

I suppose you can call the pitch that is thrown with the most frequency the “best” pitch, but you MUST keep in mind that all pitches in that situation will yield exactly the same win value (unless the pitcher is making a mistake in utilizing the precepts of game theory, which is entirely possible).

Keep in mind that if you were to check whether pitchers are indeed mixing up their pitches optimally such that the win values of all pitches are equal in a certain situation, you must bucket the pitches into situations and then check the win values of each pitch in each bucket/situation, and see if they are equal. The “situation” should include the identity of the batter, or at least similar characteristics for the batter.

Overall the win values of all of a pitcher’s pitchers will NOT be equal. A simple example will explain why. Let’s say that a pitcher’s off-speed pitch is his dominant pitch. He is not that accurate with it but it is so good that when it is in or near the zone, the batter almost never gets a hit.

And let’s say that a very weak pitcher is at the plate and the count is 3-0. Let’s say that this is the ONLY time that the pitcher should throw the fastball and increase his chances of throwing a strike. The assumption is that no matter what pitch is thrown, if it is in or near the zone, the batter/pitcher is likely to make an out when he swings or it is likely to be a called strike (the batter/pitcher will obviously be taking anyway) . You can see how the otherwise bad fastball might be the correct pitch a high proportion of the time (maybe even 100%, but we will assume less than that).

Now, if we look at this pitcher’s pitches for the year, we will see 99% off-speed and 1% fastballs (only on 3-0 counts versus weak hitting pitchers). Will the value of all the fastballs and off-speed pitches be the same? Not necessarily and probably not. But, the value of the off-speed and fastballs in this exact situation, a weak-hitting pitcher and a 3-0 count, should definitely be the same.

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Evolution of Adrian Gonzalez, or adapting from Petco to Fenway?

Bill’s first of a two-parter.

Thursday, March 15, 2012

DH, again

Here are my questions:

1. Is there any way that for the next 20 years, we’ll have two different rules (NL no DH, AL with DH)?
2. If we have to consolidate to one rule, is there any way that it will be with the pitcher forced to bat?
3. What are the alternatives?

My answers:
1. No.  If inter-league play will eventually increase from 10% of the schedule as it is currently to 20-25% of the schedule (like it is for the other three leagues, NFL, NBA, NHL), AND that the 15-team leagues forces year-round inter-league player, then it will be impractical to have DH and no-DH rules throughout the year.  It will be a logistical nightmare.

2. MLB cares about attendance, and runs does that the easiest.  As much as we love the 4-3 game, the fans prefer the 5-4 game.  Baseball usually creates rules that increase run scoring, not decrease it (up to a point).  I think they prefer a game with 9 to 9.5 runs per game, and I don’t think they want it higher than 10 runs per game.  And I doubt they want it anything under 8 runs per game.  If you take out the DH, you risk having it back on the table in a few years, and history will repeat itself.  The DH is an eventuality.

So, all you traditionalistas have another year or three to wax off your most poetic anti-DH rants, because after that, no one is going to listen to you about it.

3. (a) One alternative is to have 8 batters.  You simply skip the pitcher’s turn at bat.  No DH and no pitcher.  This keeps both sides happy.  There’s plenty of reasons to not wanting a one-dimensional DH, and there’s plenty of reasons to not wanting to see a pitcher bat. 

Of course, now instead of having 38.25 PA per game split among 9 batters (average of 4.3 PA per game), you now have those PA split among 8 batters (4.78 PA per game).  Personally, I don’t have any problem with giving every batter an extra 12.5% PA for the season.  I also wouldn’t have a problem with the NFL increasing from 16 to 18 games (12.5% more games).  I know this will set new standards for records, etc.  So, what.

(b) You could couple that with one less inning, so that keeps the standards intact.  Which pitcher will have the one less inning?  Maybe we see less of that 11th guy from the bullpen?  Or maybe we see starters pulled on inning earlier?  I don’t know.  I do know that’s one less inning of baseball, which is not really a good idea.  I’m all for decreasing running time, but I’d prefer it by decreasing dead time, not action time.

(c) We could do a “home manager rules”, and let the home manager dictate whether the DH is in effect or not (or let the pitcher bat).  It’s a fun rule, it’s a story rule, it’s guaranteed to be a topic of discussion every game.  It will force managers to be a little flexible, because they know they can’t count on David Ortiz on the road all the time.  It’s basically the World Series rule, but instead of dependent on the league, it’s dependent on the manager.

Anyway, keep this thread POSITIVE.  Don’t tell me why I s-ck, or someone else s-cks.  Tell me about what you think in a positive sense.  What you want to see.

***

Related article.

Is it bragging if you can back it up?

Bryce Harper.

***

When Gretzky was 20 years old, and already made his mark in the NHL, there was still some doubt in 1981.  Guy Lafleur had come off six sensational years (his Koufax years) through 1980.  And in 1981, he was still pretty good.  When the reporters asked the Canadiens about Gretzky when the two teams were in the playoffs, the players said “Guy will put him in his back pocket”.  The young Gretzky did not answer.  Instead, he had a great series, and all he did when he skated past the Canadiens bench was tap his butt with his glove ("*I* am the one who’s got Guy in my back pocket, is what he showed without saying it.)

And that’s how you brag.  You don’t say it before you do it, and you don’t go out of your way to say it.  You make your point quick and at the appropriate time, and then you move on.

And even when asked throughout his career about his own talent, Gretzky would just go as high as to say “I’m a pretty good hockey player.” And, he’s always acknowledged his teammates.  Even at his retirement press conference, he went out of his way to talk about Darren Langdon.  Langdon you should know was a young “nobody” goon with the Rangers, but to Gretzky he was someone special.  How many superstars on their retirement conference point out a guy like that?

(I’ve said it before, but I love saying this part too.  At that same conference, after it was over, TSN, which is the Canadian ESPN, then had their two gasbags talking about Gretzky.  Gretzky in the background starts walking through all the empty chairs, and eventually sidles up next to the two gasbags, slaps them on the back and says, “Ok, let’s talk to Canada.” It was great.  One of the two gasbags by the way was a reporter who was hugely critical of Gretzky back in 1993, when the Kings were playing the Leafs in the semi-finals, and he said that Gretzky was playing like he had a piano on his back.  Gretzky promptly went out and had one of the best games of his career.  And that’s as close as the Leafs would come to make the Stanley Cup.)

***

Glove-slap: Repoz.

Sunday, March 11, 2012

How much can a manager leverage speed and OBP with his lineup?

I was going to address this in the Kinsler thread, but I decided to start a separate one. I have always thought it ridiculous for a team to concern itself with finding someone for a particular lineup slot, as in, “We really need a leadoff hitter,” or, “We are so happy with this acquisition because we now have a proven leadoff hitter,” or some such nonsense like that.

You get the best player you can and then you construct the best lineup from what you have. It really doesn’t matter whether you have a “true leadoff hitter” or a “true cleanup hitter” or not. It doesn’t matter at all.

I am not even sure what that means anyway, so let’s try and be more specific in terms of what question(s) we want answered.

I’ll pose two specific questions which we can answer, more or less, quantitatively and which relates to this issue.

1) If we have someone who has lots of speed, or doesn’t have lots of speed, how much can we leverage that attribute (or lack thereof) by placing him strategically in the lineup?

For example if we want to acquire a speedy player that is worth exactly 2 WAR, how much more would he be worth if we plan on putting him at the top of the order versus the bottom of the order, and in doing so, we don’t affect anything else?

One way to answer that is to see how many runs per game we gain when we go from a slow runner to a fast runner at the top of the lineup versus how many runs we gain when we go from a slow runner to a fast runner at the bottom of the lineup. This is very similar to how we figure LI in a game. We compare the impact of a good player or good event to a bad event in terms of WE, at various points and situation in the game.

I took a typical Rangers lineup from last year and ran my sim with Elvis Andrus either batting second or batting 8th, as a great base runner (which he is, so I left his base running projection alone) and as a terrible base runner, like a Prince Fielder. I actually use a 1-5 scale in my sim, so I went from a 5 to a 1. This is not including SB/CS - only advancing on hits and outs by following hitters when on base. I cannot remember if it includes advances on potential WP and PB. My sim probably captures 90% of the value of base running.

I ran 500,000 games of the Rangers playing a team with a RHP. It doesn’t really matter who they played or who the opposing pitcher is. It might matter a little that it was the Rangers with a good middle of the order.

Anyway, with Andrus batting second, as a fast runner, they scored 4.167 rpg.  As a slow runner, 4.101 rpg, for a difference of 9.9 runs per 150 games. That is around what we expect from the difference between a great and poor base runner in general (an average slot in the order), so I suspect that my sim is undervaluing base running a little, or maybe it will find around the same difference in any slot, in which case, it is probably capturing most of actual base running value in real life.

Nope.

As a #8, the difference between Andrus as a great (5) and terrible (1) runner is only 4.65 rpg.  So yes, you can leverage base running with batting slot, but, this is the most extrme situation possible. My guess is that for an actual team making a decision about a player based on where they think he will bat in the order, or what other players that have slotted in the lineup, we are only talking about 1-3 runs per season.

For example, if a team is indeed looking for a lead-off or second place hitter, and player A has the same value/projection as player B, but player A is a speedster and player B is just average (and assuming that their hitting profiles are the same), how much more should they pay for player A. I think Player B is probably going to be worth only 1 to 1.5 runs more than Player B given that you are leveraging him the leadoff or second slot. I think that most teams is going to way overvalue that speedster. IOW, you should pretty much forget about the fact that you are looking for a player to fill a certain lineup slot. Like many things (clutch, batter/pitcher matchups, etc.) Use it as a tie breaker only.

2) Same question as #1, but what if we changed a player’s OBP by 20 points by adding walks only?  How much can we leverage that by batting him lead off rather than 8th? We’ll use the same method.

I did the same thing with the sim. This time I used Kinsler in the leadoff slot or the 8th slot and I ran the sim (500,000 games each) for his normal projection at the end of last year and with his OBP jacked up by 20 points by adding around 10 walks per 500 PA.

Kinsler batting leadoff, normal OBP: 4.146
Kinsler leadoff and an OBP 20 points higher: 4.201.
Gain: 8.25 rpg (Tango, how does that compare to what you would expect for an average player on an average team in an average slot?)

Kinsler batting 8th, normal OBP: 4.163 (why you don’t bat him 8th, BTW - you lose 6 runs a year!)
Kinsler leadoff and an OBP 20 points higher: 8.55 rpg.

Wow, interesting. You cannot leverage his OBP by batting him at the top of the order. I am not sure why. When my computer frees up, I’ll run some more game. Maybe I’m getting too much random fluctuation in 500,000 games. My guess is that 1 standard error even in 500,000 games is still like 5 runs per 150 games, so really, a comparison of 8.55 to 8.25 doesn’t really tell us anything.

I’ll try and run some more games with the speed thing too.  Even though the results seem reasonable, there is too much sampling error there too for the difference to be reliable to any degree…

Sunday, February 26, 2012

McCarthy: get groundballs

McCarthy’s dream: read Fangraphs, get groundballs, then get the girl.

Platooning: but not by hand

In The Book, we’ve discussed platooning by GB/FB tendencies.  It’s not as big a thing as hand, but it’s there.  So, if you do have some extreme situations, that should be considered.

Platooning by pitch locations, pitch distributions, spray patterns, etc., those are all in play as valid considerations for platooning.

New-age manager Dusty Baker is at the forefront here.

Friday, December 16, 2011

MLB Network oddball videos

These are my favorites.  My second favorite is the best-fielding plays.  Give me those two, and I’ll be sitting in front of channel 790 all day. 

The one shocking one that I saw, was a game with Pascual Perez, where he was standing on the very edge (or even outside) of the batter’s box, and the Padres pitchers were throwing at him… all 4 times he was at bat.  It was rather revolting, not to mention cowardly on the pitchers’ part.  It’s one thing for players to self-police, but it’s another when it’s a tit-for-tat kind of situation, where one side gets to throw a punch (via throwing a baseball), while the other guy’s defense is to run away (via trying to avoid getting hit by a moving pitch).  And then, his response is to do the same, or, have everyone get into a brawl.

What is a better way to avoid beanball wars?  And please, don’t dismiss others’ ideas as being unworkable.  This is a brainstorming session.  All voices will be heard.

Friday, October 28, 2011

Was Cruz not deep enough in the 9th inning?

In this article, Tom Verducci, not an intellectual giant when it comes to sabermetrics, said this:

There is a universal rule in baseball about playing the outfield with a lead, especially a two-run lead, and three outs or fewer from victory. Under no circumstance can the ball be hit over an outfielder’s head—not unless it’s flying all the way out of the ballpark. It’s called no-doubles defense. The outfielders have to station themselves deep enough to make sure the ball cannot get over their head.
This is how center fielder Josh Hamilton and left fielder David Murphy played the ninth inning. I saw Cruz early in the ninth inning playing too far in and said aloud, “He’s not back far enough. A ball can get over his head.”

There are so many things wrong with that segment, I don’t know where to begin.  I won’t actually.  Except to say that the article thoroughly evinces the “either/or”, “black/white,” digital rather than analog approach that managers and even journalists apply to baseball decision-making.

Oh, and the ridculous title of Verducci’s article is:

Cruz’s unforgiveable defensive gaffe proves costly to Rangers

In this case, according to Verducci, you simply play so deep that no ball can ever be over your head and stay in the park. As if a single in front of you is tantamount to an out.  And as if by playing deep you are not forgoing some catches on short fly balls.

BTW, if you simply watch the replay of that non-catch, it is obvious that Cruz WAS playing rather deep, and of course it was an eminently catchable ball, not that is HAS to be catchable in order for his positioning to have been correct…

Thursday, October 27, 2011

Baseball is about driving the first good pitch you see, not waiting to get into a hitter’s count

So says Tony Larussa.

“You watch your productive hitters in the big leagues, and they get a chance to drive in a run, they look for the first good strike, and the better the pitching, especially this time of the year, you get that first strike, that may be the last one that you get to see. So you’d better be ready to swing early. It’s not sitting up there and taking strike one, strike two so that you can work the count.’’

How come MLB managers don’t manage their bullpen that way?  They get a high-leverage situation in the 8th inning, and that may be the last one they see: how come they don’t bring in the ace reliever?

***

Anyway, Chipper Jones agrees with Larussa.  Chipper has said that he can’t try to give up a decent pitch waiting for an even better one, because he may not get one any longer.  The pitcher is ahead 0-1, he works the edges, he gets to 0-2, and now Chipper is at their mercy.

I totally agree with these guys.

At the same time, guys who CAN’T drive the ball simply are better off waiting, because we know that pitchers aren’t that good at locating their pitches.

The only thing I know is that every hitter is different, and he should hit in his own optimal manner.  Never would I think to change the batting approach of Vlad or Pujols or Chipper because I think they should be able to get more walks, or think that Rickey Henderson and Barry Bonds and Adam Dunn walked too much.  Everyone has his own individual approach, and if they are highly successful, it would be presumptive of me (or us) to think we can make them even more successful.

I remember Larry Walker saying that Felipe Alou had his hitting philosophy, and would keep insisting to Walker (and the rest) to hit a certain way.  Walker of course was highly successful because he followed the Larry Walker hitting philosophy.

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

Was Craig running in the 9th on the 3-2 count correct?

The overwhelming consensus on BP, FG, this blog, and lots of other sites I have visited is, “No!” How did all these people come to that conclusion?  Because it failed and it “cost” the Cardinals a good chance to tie or win the game.  Does that make any sense?  Of course not.  Not in a rational sense.  Can the outcome of a play that swings the percentages one way or the other maybe 1 or 2% inform us of the “correctness” of the play?  Not in one single instance and not enough that a human being could possibly discern even after dozens or even hundreds of such plays. But people are irrational beings.  When it comes to sports, they are out of their minds irrational.

So, can one determine whether running was correct in that instance without “running the numbers?” Not a chance.  One can take a guess and be right 50% of the time, I guess.  If you are a good sabermetrician, you might be able to do some quick mental calculations and maybe come up with the right answer with some degree of certainty, as long as the actual answer is not particularly close (i.e., the WE from each alternative is not a dead heat).

So what are all those people doing with their, “opinions?” I have no idea.  To me, opinions should be reserved for ice cream flavors, what color car you like, and whom you would choose for your dream date. To me, there is no such thing as an “opinion” on which of two strategies yields the highest win expectancy.  That is a matter of fact.  That seems to be lost on 99.7% of the population.

So what is the right answer?  I’m not going to tell you because I don’t know.  I could know if I “ran the numbers” but I don’t want to deprive some aspiring sabermetrician of doing the work and making a name for himself.

OK, in all honesty, I can’t “know for sure” because I can only estimate the value of the requisite variables.  Some more than others.  But when the smoke clears, I could tell you one of three things with almost exactitude:

1) It is clearly a “run.”

2) It is clearly a “no run.”

3) It is close, depending on the exact values of all the variables, so we’ll just call it a draw.

Nowhere does my opinion matter…

Saturday, October 22, 2011

Managing the 2011 World Series: Game 3

Here we go again, in Texas!