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Wednesday, December 08, 2010
Posting system: foreclosure of collusive bidding, part 2
Last month, I posted a great paper from Duane Rockerbie on the posting system. And he made a decent argument for the reason the system is the way it is. He notes that the current practice is effective and costless, but that one alternative (making the team pay a non-returnable fee) could prevent a team from wanting to bid if they think the player’s demands may be excessive.
The Japanese player’s agent sounded off.
So, I ask you, readers, who have always had great ideas: what is the alternative?
Let me offer you one: if a team makes an offer, and the player doesn’t accept that offer, you are precluded from the market for the next five years. The player, as it is, if he doesn’t accept the team’s offer, is precluded from the market for one year (until he hits free agency the next year). The team needs to have some disincentive, but it doesn’t have to necessarily have a direct monetary impact.
Another alternative: if you can’t sign the player, the penalty is as if you did sign a Type A player. So, that means losing your 1st or 2nd round pick in the June draft.
Another alternative: the next future bids would be hit with a 20% penalty in terms of value of the posting. If let’s say you post for 20MM$, and another team posts for 17MM$, the second team wins, because your post would only be valued at 16MM$. The penalty stays in effect until you actually win a posting. (You can’t for example post for 1MM$ and hope to “get out of jail”.)
You can also pay to “get out of jail”, with the price being half of whatever the player actually ended up signing for the following year with a different team. So, if the player signs for 30MM$, the team that bid for him the previous year has the option to pay 15MM$ to remove any penalties from above.
Just throwing stuff out there. What do you guys have?
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