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Girardi ordered three IBBs late in ALCS Game 2 last night:
- Top 11th (1 out): Abreu, after Figgins singled in Matthews Jr. & advanced to 2B on the throw home
- Top 12th (2 out): Izturis, after Mathis doubled
- Top 13th (1 out): Abreu, after Aybar was sac-bunted to 2B by Figgins
In the 11th, the strategy was presumably to 'set up the double play'.... which the Yankees actually wound up getting (5-4-3). Girardi may also have wanted to set up a RH-RH matchup (Alfredo Aceves on the mound, Torii Hunter the batter), and avoid the more potent bat v. RHP in Abreu.
In the 12th, I'm not sure what to make of the IBB issued to Izturis. The next batter, Matthews Jr., has a career line v. RHP (in this case, Dave Robertson) that's nearly identical to Izturis's. So I have to assume the idea was to 'set up the force at any bag'. Robertson wound up striking out Sarge Jr.
In the 13th, it also looks like Girardi was 'setting up the double play', & again avoiding Abreu against the RHP (still Robertson)... again choosing to go after Hunter instead. Hunter grounded out, but both runners advanced, creating a PA for Guerrero with two runners in scoring position. Vlad grounded out, however, for the third out.
I understand the unintentional-intentional BB of Teixeira in the bottom of the 12th (w/runners on 2B & 3B) to load the bases -- the extra baserunner has no potential consequence for the visiting Angels, and creates the chance for getting the 3rd out of the inning at any base.
However, in the Yankees' case, obviously the extra baserunners would/could have mattered. Was I wrong to be pulling my hair out at all the IBBs Girardi ordered? It seemed he was putting an extra potential run on base far too often. Was playing the same-handed matchups & hoping for the double play (& trying to set up the force at any bag in the 12th) worth the risk? Of course, the results worked out in Girardi's favor, so I doubt he could be convinced he was taking too many risks in any event.
One last thought (I apologize for the long post... I wanted to provide context for each IBB): by putting extra runners on base in the hopes that you 'induce the double play', aren't you (at best) really playing comparable odds to seeing an extra-base hit as an outcome? For example, in 2009 Torii Hunter grounded into 9 double plays, while belting 49 XBH (506 PA). Even if you include line-drive double plays, I'd have to guess the average MLB hitter would more frequently deliver an XBH.
"That is why sabermetrics will someday play a big part (I think) in how players play and managers manage the game."
I sure hope so. I think you're right, but cripes does it feel like it's a looooonnnnng way off. I get so sick & tired of hearing the same baseball 'truthinesses' regurgitated every bleeping season by coaches & announcers alike.
I know there are players that seems to appreciate newer & more accurate statistical analyses, but beyond simple things like not sac bunting as much & valuing OBP, I'm not sure there are any managers that actually utilize sabermetrics correctly in their in-game strategies. Hell, we still have to hear most managers explain that they pinch-hit with so-and-so because he was 8-24 (or any other small sample) lifetime against the pitcher.
Ah, good point -- thanks for thinking of what I should have. Just another reason to question IBBs.
I am going to tell you why managers like Francona do dumb things like IBB Hunter... (TLB) —
Girardi ordered three IBBs late in ALCS Game 2 last night: - Top 11th (1 out): Abreu, after Figgins singled in Matthews Jr. & advanced to 2B on the throw home - Top 12th (2 out): Izturis, after Mathis doubled - Top 13th (1 out): Abreu, after Aybar was sac-bunted to 2B by Figgins In the 11th, the strategy was presumably to 'set up the double play'.... which the Yankees actually wound up getting (5-4-3). Girardi may also have wanted to set up a RH-RH matchup (Alfredo Aceves on the mound, Torii Hunter the batter), and avoid the more potent bat v. RHP in Abreu. In the 12th, I'm not sure what to make of the IBB issued to Izturis. The next batter, Matthews Jr., has a career line v. RHP (in this case, Dave Robertson) that's nearly identical to Izturis's. So I have to assume the idea was to 'set up the force at any bag'. Robertson wound up striking out Sarge Jr. In the 13th, it also looks like Girardi was 'setting up the double play', & again avoiding Abreu against the RHP (still Robertson)... again choosing to go after Hunter instead. Hunter grounded out, but both runners advanced, creating a PA for Guerrero with two runners in scoring position. Vlad grounded out, however, for the third out. I understand the unintentional-intentional BB of Teixeira in the bottom of the 12th (w/runners on 2B & 3B) to load the bases -- the extra baserunner has no potential consequence for the visiting Angels, and creates the chance for getting the 3rd out of the inning at any base. However, in the Yankees' case, obviously the extra baserunners would/could have mattered. Was I wrong to be pulling my hair out at all the IBBs Girardi ordered? It seemed he was putting an extra potential run on base far too often. Was playing the same-handed matchups & hoping for the double play (& trying to set up the force at any bag in the 12th) worth the risk? Of course, the results worked out in Girardi's favor, so I doubt he could be convinced he was taking too many risks in any event. One last thought (I apologize for the long post... I wanted to provide context for each IBB): by putting extra runners on base in the hopes that you 'induce the double play', aren't you (at best) really playing comparable odds to seeing an extra-base hit as an outcome? For example, in 2009 Torii Hunter grounded into 9 double plays, while belting 49 XBH (506 PA). Even if you include line-drive double plays, I'd have to guess the average MLB hitter would more frequently deliver an XBH.
More foolishness from the "smart" ex-players and managers... (TLB) —
"That is why sabermetrics will someday play a big part (I think) in how players play and managers manage the game." I sure hope so. I think you're right, but cripes does it feel like it's a looooonnnnng way off. I get so sick & tired of hearing the same baseball 'truthinesses' regurgitated every bleeping season by coaches & announcers alike. I know there are players that seems to appreciate newer & more accurate statistical analyses, but beyond simple things like not sac bunting as much & valuing OBP, I'm not sure there are any managers that actually utilize sabermetrics correctly in their in-game strategies. Hell, we still have to hear most managers explain that they pinch-hit with so-and-so because he was 8-24 (or any other small sample) lifetime against the pitcher.