THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

I can’t read enough about WPA and RE/24 these days. I really wish those stats were more prominent in discussions online.

To me, this post is just right.  Nice job.

I asked these questions about WPA ("Clutch", especially) without feedback a while back.  I thought I would give it another shot after reading this article since it is about pitching and WPA:

1.Since pitchers change their approach in different situations (going right after hitters in blowouts/with men on base vs. expanding their zone in close games, etc.), it would seem that pitchers have more personal impact over “clutch” than batters would.
2.  If this were true, why do we see career batting leaders with much larger “clutch” numbers, positive and negative?  It looks like the top “clutch” batters are near +20, but the top career pitchers are around +10.  Is it as simple as the number of opportunities?
3.  I know I have seen a 5,000 PA r=.5 point for batters and “clutch” somewhere.  Has any research been done to determine when r=.5 for pitcher “clutch”?
4.  If “clutch” is something that we can quantify for long-career pitchers, can we include it into WAR?  Since Smith’s WAR already “includes” situation pitching to some degree by using RA (which should capture LOB%, for example) - do we need to weed out the runners-on-base situations in “clutch” before adding it to WAR if we chose to do so? 

Thanks!

I wouldn’t take it as a given that pitchers have more control over their clutch than hitters, but either way, pitchers probably show less variation in clutch ratings at least in part because pitcher usage is linked more closely to leverage index than hitter usage is.

Starting pitchers get a disproportionate number of their opportunities early in games when LI is less extreme, and the decision of when to pull them is based in part on the LI at the time.  Relievers usually have roles tailored to specific types of leverage (i.e. top relievers get used disproportionately in high leverage situations, worst relievers in low leverage situations).  Most regular hitters, on the other hand, just come up whenever their spot in the order is due regardless of LI.  As a result, individual pitchers will have less variance in their leverage index than individual hitters will, which would correspond to less opportunity for “clutch”.

@3:
2. Might be explained at least in part by platoon splits.

Tony Gwynn had very good clutch numbers and narrow L/R splits.

Darryl Strawberry had weak clutch numbers, but it probably had something to do with his large splits and facing lots of LOOGY’s in those situations.  (Arguably, he was also a good breaking ball / low ball hitter who perhaps didn’t matchup quite as well as other hitters of his stature against flamethrowing closers)

http://remarque.org/~grabiner/fullclutch.txt

Thank you - very helpful.  Any ides on #3 or #4?

Appreciate the kind words, Tom.

Is it possible that Oliver is getting used in higher-leverage situations this year?  Even if his inning deployment remains the same, is the team generating narrow leads in those innings more than previously?

Put another way, if a reliever gives up one run while the team had a one-run lead, he’s a failure in popular perception.  If he gives up one run with a three-run lead or deficit, he’s fine and goes unnoticed.  Same performance, same inning, opposite reaction.