THE BOOK cover
The Unwritten Book is Finally Written!
An in-depth analysis of: The sacrifice bunt, batter/pitcher matchups, the intentional base on balls, optimizing a batting lineup, hot and cold streaks, clutch performance, platooning strategies, and much more.
Read Excerpts & Customer Reviews
If you are a media member and would like a review copy of The Book, please contact Kevin Cuddihy of Potomac Books.

Buy The Book from Amazon

MOST RECENT ARTICLES
MAIL : You ask | We say

Advanced


THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

<< Back to main

Friday, August 15, 2008

The Game Inside The Game

By Tangotiger, 02:32 PM

Love this stuff about Papelbon, Holliday and the Sox coaching staff:


Gordon Edes, excerpted from the Boston Globe, Oct. 26, 2007:
…The Sox won their sixth straight Series game and fifth straight of this postseason with one never-before-seen wrinkle. Papelbon, who had not picked off a runner since he broke into the big leagues in 2006, nabbed Matt Holliday straying off first base to close out the eighth inning. Holliday had nearly taken out both Papelbon and second baseman Dustin Pedroia with a line single up the middle, his fourth hit of the night. The ball appeared to glance off Papelbon’s leg and caused Pedroia, who gloved the ball with a sprawling spot, to writhe in pain after he landed heavily on the left shoulder he’d dislocated already once this postseason.

At the plate was Todd Helton, the signature player in Rockies history. But he never saw a pitch in the eighth, as Papelbon whirled and picked off Holliday.

”Probably will go down as one of the biggest outs of my career,” Papelbon said.

It was not happenstance. Holliday was intending to steal - he confirmed so after the game - and the Sox had a strong suspicion he was going.

They knew that the Rockies were scouting them in the Division Series against the Angels, when Howie Kendrick stole second and third unchallenged against Papelbon in the eighth inning of a tie game.

”If you were advancing us, you would have said the same thing, that Pap is 1.8 [seconds] to the plate, and he doesn’t pick,” Mills said. “But it was a different situation in the game against the Angels. We didn’t care if he stole, because we had confidence in Paps getting the hitter and we didn’t want to take anything away from him to try to get the runner on that situation.

”We know they’re advancing us, they’re watching it. That night I was talking to Pap in the shower about that exact thing, and about what was to come. [Bullpen coach] Gary Tuck was talking to him about it, [pitching coach] John Farrell talked to him about it, about different things we were going to do.”

When manager Terry Francona went out with trainer Paul Lessard to check on Pedroia, Mills noticed that Glenallen Hill, the Rockies’ first base coach, never stopped talking to Holliday. Mills also had a color-coded chart he keeps on every player, that showed that Holliday likes to steal on the first pitch with two outs. “It was right there in my pocket,” Mills said.

Indeed, it was right there on the chart, multiple steal attempts Holliday had made on the first pitch with two outs.

”You put all those things together, and it comes up, ‘Hey, we’re going to pick once to see where he’s at, and then we’re going to slide-step.’

”And, we were watching. I got a big lump in my throat because he kept inching, inching, inching off, and Pap did a great job of holding the ball, letting him get off there. And then I’m sitting there, with a lump in my throat, hoping he doesn’t throw [it] away.”

Papelbon made the play, Mills said. “He made the great pick.”

But while it was nowhere as dramatic as Kirk Gibson knowing that Dennis Eckersley was going to throw a backdoor slider on a full count before Gibson hit one of the greatest home runs in Series history, it was a stunning example of how inside knowledge and paying extraordinary attention to detail can turn a Series.

”There are a lot of times we don’t want him to throw over,” Mills said. “But in this situation with Helton and [Garrett] Atkins coming up, we couldn’t afford it, and it just happened to work out.”

#1          (see all posts) 2008/08/15 (Fri) @ 16:23

I met Gordon Edes at a fundraiser for the Huntington’s Disease Society of America last Friday.  Seemed like a real nice guy; he ran the trivia contest.

Always surprises me, the difference in approach between going after a .250 hitter and a maybe .310 hitter like Helton.  Why were the Sox so content to let a guy walk over to second and then third in a tie game against a .250 hitter, but very much interested in trying not to have to face a .310 hitter?


#2    MGL      (see all posts) 2008/08/17 (Sun) @ 03:57

It is really a silly story.  First of all, you don`t “know” you are going to get anyone out, of course.  And you don’t “let” anyone steal, if you can help it.

And you are never supposed to get picked off whether you are going to steal or not, and basestealers rarely do against a RHP.

And pickoffs are not really designed to get a runner out, like, say, a pitchout.  They are designed to keep a runner from getting too big a lead and/or from leaving too early.  If you throw a lot to first base, you will get some pick-offs accidentally, especially if you have a quick move.

Some pitchers don’t like to throw to first often because they just don’t like it, for whatever reason, because they are slow to the plate anyway so that it won’t make much difference, or they don’t have a good move so that it is a waste of time.  ALL pitchers have to throw to first at least occasionally, which they do.  For example, the idea that Maddux does not throw to first is not true.  It is just that he does not like to for whatever reason, he does not have a good move to first, and he is slow to the plate.  The idea that if you are a good pitcher, you don’t have to worry about basestealers is a stupid one (of course).  Yet you hear that all the time.  In fact, in a low run environment, such as with a good pitcher on the mound, basestealing is MORE important.

And if you can’t throw to first because it distracts you from the batter, that is your problem (as a pitcher) and you need to work on it, or suffer the consequences - a slightly higher steal and success rate against you.

The silliest part of the whole story is that if Boston truly had a good idea that Holliday was going on the pitch, they would have pitched out and NOT thrown over.  You don’t expect to get an out when you throw to first and you are encouraging the runner NOT to steal as you are letting him know that you are cognizant of him possibly stealing.  If you are X sure that a runner is going (I don’t know OTTOMH what X has to be), the correct response is to NOT throw over and pitch out.

So the moral of the story could just as easily be that Boston did the wrong thing and just got lucky.


Page 1 of 1 pages


Name (required)
E-Mail (optional)
Website (optional)

<< Back to main


Latest...

COMMENTS

Nov 21 17:29
Sabermetric Moves of the 2009 Pre-Season

Nov 22 06:40
The New Triple Crown

Nov 22 06:24
Chance of Scoring by Base/Out, Retrosheet Years

Nov 22 02:48
How good are the Fans in evaluating fielding?

Nov 21 20:13
Runs Produced

Nov 21 19:27
Marcel 2009 is here

Nov 21 16:43
Nate Silver: hero to interviewers

Nov 21 10:57
New BBTN

Nov 20 20:34
ABSO-lutely… not!

Nov 20 19:23
R.I.P. Tom Boswell, sabermetrician; P.A.L.L.(*) Tom Boswell, human being