from Amazon
Monday, July 17, 2006
The Book at the All-Star Game
Scott Soshnick at Bloomberg looks into The Book
Let’s see what he says, and what should have been done.
Carlos Beltran, in the bottom of the 3rd, with the two outs, and tie game, is on second base. He tries for third base. Their chance of winning with him on second base is .537. If he gets to third base, it’s .542. If he goes home on an error, it’s .628. If he’s out, it’s .500
So, let’s work it out. Let’s say that when Beltran is safe, he makes it to third base 90% of the time, and 10% of the time, he’ll score on a wild throw. In that case, if he’s safe, his team’s chance of winning is .542 * .90 + .628 * .10 = .551. If he’s out, it’s .500.
So, on a safe play, he goes from .537 to .551, or +.014 wins. If he’s out, that’s .537 to .500, or minus .037 wins. The breakeven point is 73%. That is, 73% of +.014 is equal to 27% of -.037. So, The Book says “Way to go, Beltran!”.
However, are we being too optimistic about the chance for errors? In this specific case of Beltran, Halladay, curve balls, non-Jay catcher? 10% may seem right. If you think it’s something lower like only a 5% chance of something bad going to happen, then the breakeven point shoots up all the way to 80%. That makes it a tougher play to accept. But Beltran is 12/15 this year (80%) and 221/253 (87%) for his career.
The Book would say: if you are one of the greatest percentage stealers of your time, go for it. Beltran fits the bill.
Now, the other play that Soshnick talks about is With his team leading 2-1 in the top of the ninth inning Hoffman, of the San Diego Padres, had two outs and nobody on.
The chance of the home team (NL) winning here is .961. A single brings this down to .918, a double brings it down to .884, and a triple to .869. An out means that the NL wins (1.000). What to do?
Let’s say that, when you cover the hole, that in 660 plate appearances, you get 110 singles, 30 doubles, and 3 triples (and 440 outs). But, if you guard the line, let’s make that 130 singles, 18 doubles, 1 triples (and 434 outs). That is, you give up more singles, get fewer outs, but much fewer extrabase hits. What happens?
So, .918 x 110 + .884 x 30 + .869 x 3 + 1.000 x 440 = 570 wins.
And, .918 x 130 + .884 x 18 + .869 x 1 + 1.000 x 434 = 570 wins.
(Note that in both cases, since the HR and walks would cancel out, they are not included in the calculation.)
A wash. Whether you play to cover the line or not, the overall result is the same. So, you take your chances either way.
Of course, if you think that guarding the line produces numbers different than what I have (not 18 double, but say 8 doubles, or not 130 singles, but 160 singles, etc, etc), then that’s something you have to work out, with just a little bit of research.
Scott is right that the manager should throw out the old book. The Book may say something else.
Well, I don’t know if I would have wanted to be interviewed for this article or not (I called the author. left a message, and he did not return my call). It is a worthless article; I am not even sure what the author’s point was. In fact, I have no idea.
I don’t know that you can say anything about the Beltran steal other than if he had a 75% or 80% chance of success, he would have been correct to go, as Tango says. Only Beltran knows for sure (well, not for sure of course) what kind of chance he had. Stealing third is not like stealing second. Most of the time you can estimate a player’s chance of being safe at second using his general base-stealing ability/speed and the catcher/pitcher combination. Not so with 3rd. Every situation is different. You often have a 90% chance of success if the pitcher is not paying proper attention or mixing up his looks properly and you get a good jump. You do not have to be fast.
The axiom of “never making the 3rd or 1st out at third” is stupid of course. You should see 1st and 3rd outs at third base 15 or 20% of the time (something less than 1 minus the average BE point).
What managers should teach at all levels of course is:
“If you are trying for third base with 0 our 2 outs, make sure you are going to make it most of the time. With 1 out, you can be a little more aggressive, as long as you still make it more than you get thrown out (ballpark figure).”
“When going home (although that is almost always the 3rd base coach’s decision), with 0 out, you need to make it almost all the time, with 1 out, treat it like 0 or 2 outs and going to third, and with 2 outs, go if you have any chance at all (25% or so).”
That is what should be taught, more or less, not, “Never make the 1st or 3rd...” Boy is that dumb. Surely some managers must realize how dumb that axiom is.
And I agree with Tango that the guard the lines thing is probably close enough that it is fine ether way. I’ve never seen any research on it, but it would be hard to do since we don’t really know where the fielders are playing. I’m sure which way to do depends a lot on the batter and the pitcher.
BTW, here is something you almost never hear or see. It is the last inning and the batter is not the tying or go-ahead (or winning) run. Where should the OF be playing? They should be playing shallower than usual. And the 1st and 3rd baseman should be playing OFF the lines more than usual.