Wednesday, August 06, 2008
The 9th inning reliever
This article by Caple has it all. A couple of wrinkles:
I asked Red Sox closer Jonathan Papelbon whether the definition for save situations could be improved, and he said no. “A save is what it is. You save the game. It’s a situation in which the tying run is at the plate or on deck and the game is on the line.”
If only that were true, we wouldn’t have much of a problem here. Caple doesn’t even correct Papelbon. Entering the 9th inning with a 3-run lead and bases empty means that the tying run is not at the plate and is not even on deck. He’s still on the bench. And I think at one point the save rule was limited to the “on base, at bat, on deck”. It’s all the darn exceptions that kill the save rule.
The answer is yes, of course, he can, especially if roughly two-thirds of his save opportunities continue to come with a two-run or more lead. K-Rod has yet to appear before the ninth inning.
He’s talking about KRod breaking the saves record. K-Rod’s “gmLI” (LI when entering the game) is 2.15, which is on the high end for relievers. His “inLI” (LI when entering each inning of the game) is 2.20, which is also on the high end. His “pLI” (LI at the start of each PA) is 2.55, which is very very high. The third number is more influenced by himself, in that he probably put himself in a tough position by walking batters then getting himself out of a jam. This seems to be his career pattern by the way. His LOB rate is very high (82.4% career, 83.0% this year). Even Mariano Rivera has a career of only 79.4%.
I don’t even have to check the split stats, as I can only imagine how KRod pitches: bad with bases empty, comes in with high LI, puts runners on base, gets an even higher LI, then punches out the side. Here, I’ll check anyway… gimme a sec....
.191 .273 .324
.177 .263 .263 (after removing IBB)
Yowza, what a high-wire act. Maybe he shouldn’t be pitching from the stretch. And he definitely shouldn’t sign with the Mets. Their fans hate closers like that.
Anyway, back to Caple’s main concern: since KRod’s gmLI and inLI are above average for a closer, he was not the best case to use. Billy Wagner and Papelbon are probably the worst-used of the closers. Though Wagner has so many blown saves (7 already), it’s hard to say that the Mets were wrong in his case. Hard to have as many BS as that, if he doesn’t come in much in high LI situations.
I may be totally out to lunch, but I disagree with this article, and what apparently is the current saber position on closer usage.
IIRC, the studies suggest that the modern bullpen pattern does not improve the team W/L over what it was in the past, with say the ‘fireman’ usage pattern.
But, that implies that it does not make it worse, either. Furthermore, there is an effect of everyone adopting the same strategy, which would mute the impact, even if it were better in the abstract.
Pitching, in the modern game, is a very demanding activity. Pitchers seem to benefit, both physically and mentally, from increasingly better defined patterns of usage. If you can accomplish that without any real loss of W/L effectiveness, then you are probably ahead of the game.
So, I think that the modern bullpen pattern, while probably not optimal, is better than anything from the past.
IIRC, Beane in the article implies that it will go back towards the fireman scenario, as soon as there are some managers with stones. I disagree. I think this trend towards roles/usage over momentary leverage will continue, because it is probably more optimal overall.
In 20 years, maybe we’ll see 3 pitchers per game, pitching 3 innings each, regardless of the game situation (with ties being awarded after 9 innings). The question will then be, do you want the best of the 3 in the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd shift. In relay races, they seem to want the best runner in the final slot, AFAIK. Maybe correct, maybe not.