THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

The IBB’ing of Ruiz was really inexplicable given that Hamels was at 117 pitches. There was no way that Garcia was going to see anything but a RHH.

IBB to Ruiz was worse imho.  Francisco might be a better hitter against LHP than Ruiz, but the pinch hit penalty probably evened things out to some degree.  But the extra base runner came back to haunt the Cardinals on the three run HR.

That GDIP by Allen Craig was sure a killer for the Cardinals with Pujols on deck.  It’s one of those at bats where you say to yourself, “Please! Anything but a double play.”

I am not doubting that Francisco may have been a worse hitter than Ruiz in that situation.  That is not nearly enough to warrant an IBB.  Typically, the next hitter has to be MUCH worse to warrant an IBB, depending on the game situation of course.  Without consulting The Book, I am guessing that the expected wOBA of Ruiz has to be at least 120% of that of Francisco, which was obviously not the case.

Even from a conventional managing perspective, why would you issue the IBB there?  In fact, one of the subtler benefits of pitching to Ruiz, the much slower runner, is that you can play your infielders further back and give them a better chance of knocking down a ground ball hit in order to save a run from scoring.

BTW, has anyone ever IBB’d a batter in order to pitch to Howard, when it was not in the 9th or later innings?

Yeah, but if Tony doesn’t IBB Ruiz, and Ruiz makes an out, then Hamels keeps pitching. Tony achieved one of the Cardinals Keys To Victory: get the game to bullpens with a three-run or less deficit.

Hamels had already thrown 117 pitches.  Either he doesn’t keep pitching or the Cardinals are glad he keeps pitching…

But.....but....that would make LaRussa’s in-game management questionable.

Didn’t mind letting Garcia bat, given the state of the Cardinal’s bullpen this year and how well Garcia was pitching.  The IBB was very strange considering that Hamels was already going to be taken out. LaRussa said his decision was “easy” since Ruiz “always kills us”, but LaRussa never was a big fan of sample size.

Of course if the Cardinals did not strand 14 baserunners, it may not have mattered.  Tough loss. :(

"has anyone ever IBB’d a batter in order to pitch to Howard, when it was not in the 9th or later innings?”

I believe the answer to this question is yes… I think it happened once earlier this season, in fact (Utley maybe?), though I’m not sure how to track that down.

Yes:
http://www.baseball-reference.com/boxes/PHI/PHI201106100.shtml

Utley was IBB’d by Zambrano in the 7th inning, with a runner on 2nd, one out (after a sac bunt). Then Howard walked.

(Rollins followed with a HR, so that’s pretty funny.)

I should have said, “With 2 outs,” since managers will sometimes IBB just about anyone and pitch to just about anyone in order to set up the DP....

"Didn’t mind letting Garcia bat, given the state of the Cardinal’s bullpen this year and how well Garcia was pitching.”

Pleas throw out some reasonable numbers there, and then we’ll see how much you don’t “mind” it.

Start with this:

Cardinals WE (win expectancy) with runners on 1st and 2nd, 2 outs and the pitcher batting (decent lefty pitcher versus an excellent lefty pitcher).

WE with a pinch hitter.

Better actually to use RE since you can then figure out how many runs you have to make up if you take out Garcia.

For example, the difference between a pinch hitter and Garcia batting is likely around .35 runs.  That is a lot.

Say that Garcia is expected to pitch another 1.5 innings on the average.  His expected RA per 9 would have to be greater than 2 runs better than whoever would pitch for him over those 1.5 innings.  That would be Garcia facing the lineup the 3rd time through the order versus a reliever facing the lineup for the first time.

I have news for you.  There is no staring pitcher in the history of baseball, let alone Garcia, who is 2 runs per 9 better than a reliever, any reliever, when that starter is facing a lineup the 3rd time through the order.

And the RE likely understates the importance of that PA since the game is tied and the inning is the 6th.

Basically you are thinking like a manager - “It seems like a good idea to leave Garcia in there.  After all, he is pitching so well and has only thrown 75 pitched.”

Unfortunately that kind of decision making process does not necessarily lead to the correct decision. How can it?

If you actually do a rational, cogent analysis (i.e. use the scientific method, which is what sabermetrics is all about), I believe you will come to the conclusion that the decision is not even close - pinch hitting for Garcia is the only correct decision.

Before anyone throws out the usual - what about all the “intangibles” that your analysis does not consider, like taxing the bullpen, one less pinch hitter for later in the game, etc., my answer is the same as I always give, and I believe correct.

When you do a competent analysis, but you do not take into consideration EVERYTHING....

If your answer is not even close, one way or another, then the “intangibles” don’t matter.  If your answer is close - i.e., the results of both alternatives are relatively close, then the intangibles might swing the decision one way or the other.  It’s sort of like Tango’s IBB Bonds chart from many years ago. If the decision is close, he says, “Go with gut.” If it’s not even close, he doesn’t care about the intangibles, and correctly so…

"I should have said, “With 2 outs,” since managers will sometimes IBB just about anyone and pitch to just about anyone in order to set up the DP.... “

Right, of course.

(Btw, not that it matters here, but I misread the play log, it was Polanco who followed with a homer, not Rollins.)

Sorry for a little hijack here, but I’m still upset that Tito let rt handed Larvanway hit in the 8th inning with one out and the bases loaded and Josh Reddick on the bench.

Any thoughts on this?

My thoughts are this:

If I could give a manager a piece of paper with the answer to all of these decisions, I would be correct 90%+ of the time and a lot more than the manager would.  A lot.  I would miss some of the intangibles for sure, but those would pale in comparison to the “numbers” behind my decisions.  I would add at least one win a team’s WE, thus I should be paid 5 mil or more…

I should have said that I didn’t mind letting Garcia pitch “as much.” Trust me, I was not not thrilled with the decision, but was really upset about the IBB.  I would be interested in seeing the win probability of that decision compared to the IBB to Ruiz.

Matthew, I don’t think it is even close. Letting your starting pitcher hit in a late game high leverage situation is almost always, by far and away, the most egregious and costly mistake a manager can make.  That is especially true in the post-season when you should not be worrying too much about over-working your bullpen…

Typical LaRussa. He always overmanages, probably because he wants to come across as a genius, which obvioulsy he isn’t…

If you haven’t read Three Nights in August, don’t, but if you did you learned LaRussa:
-obsesses over what count is best for the hit-and-run
-thinks his closer is his most important pitcher
-carries around index cards with pitcher-batter matchup stats
-demands that his players expand their strike zones with runners on base. 

Dude’s the most successful manager of his era and he has no idea how baseball games are won and lost.

I’ve read it.  Number 4 is correct, as walks are worth less with runners on base.

There were two motivations behind walking Ruiz and facing Francisco, who was on deck and overtly ready to hit. First, it assured that Phillies starter Cole Hamels was out of the game, a fait accompli. Second, it navigated Garcia around Ruiz, who hit 8-for-24 (.333) and slugged .500 this season against the Cardinals and has hit .310 in 33 games vs. them with what players called “memorable” hits.

“If you follow our club with Ruiz over the years, he’s gotten as many big hits as the guys in the middle of the lineup,” La Russa said. “He terrorizes us, and he’s already hit two balls hard. (That’s) the matchup we liked. I liked. I made the decision.”

...“You pick your poison sometimes,” infielder Skip Schumaker said. “(La Russa) trusts his gut. A lot of guys are afraid to make moves. The guy has 117 RBIs. But you have to have guts to play this game and to manage. Tony does not lack guts.”

I feel bad for the people in the front office that I know.  Their heads must be spinning…

The biggest problem with the IBB and managers (and broadcasters and players) is that they literally think that if the guy you are pitching to is worse than the guy you are thinking about IBB’ing, that means you issue the IBB. The extra guy on base and filling up the open base is an extreme afterthought.

For example, how often do you hear from a broadcaster, after an IBB loads the bases, “The only problem with is that it now forces the pitcher to have to throw strikes,” again, as if that is an afterthought.  A mild inconvenience.

No, that IS the problem, not to mention that you might give up an extra run.

So the batter you are pitching to has to be A LOT worse than the batter your are IBB’ing to make up for those “mild inconveniences...”

the IBBs that drive e nuts are the ones in the 6th inning where the team is down a run.  The idea is that the run that would put the team down 3 does not matter.  I wish I had a nickel for every time I’ve seen this backfire.

MGL- do you think that hitters should be more aggressive with runners on base because of the change in the relative value of a walk v a hit?  I don’t.  I think it’s asking a lot of the hitters and that the increased run expectation from BIP on borderline ptiches is probably pretty marginal.

#18

I disagree.  I believe Tony believes 100% that what he is doing will give his team the best chance to win - even if he is way off.

I do not believe he is going against what he feels is most beneficial just to boost his perception.

If relative value changes, the pitcher is aware of that.  If he knows that a walk is not that costly, he’s going to the edge more.  The batter has no other choice than to respond.

As for “pretty marginal”, I don’t think you appreciate what that really means.  What is the difference between a pretty good hitter and an average hitter?  0.05 runs per PA.

What is the difference between a strike and a ball?  0.15 runs per pitch.

Everything about baseball is about the control of the strike zone.  It may seem “marginal”, but everything is “marginal”.

Tango, so what do you think?  If I’m the manager, I want Ted Williams to do his regular Ted Williams thing and Wade Boggs to do his regular Wade Boggs thing.  To name two guys that were criticized for not changing their approach based on the situation. 

My point with “marginal” is that I’m not sure it would really be beneficial to have your hitters swing at more borderline pitches.  And I’m not sure the hitters and pitchers are really good enough for any of this to make any sense except in theory.

I’m not going to accept that Wade Boggs did not change his approach regardless of the base-out state.

well, maybe he did.  The criticism was that he stubbornly refused to do this, but who knows if it was actually true.  It would be very interesting to look at his swing rates and results for different situations.  If anyone was ever capable of successfully executing this strategy, it would be him.

I agree with Tango.  I would think that virtually all batters, especially the smart, successful ones, change their approach to conform more optimally to the situation, including being more “aggressive” when appropriate.

“I disagree.  I believe Tony believes 100% that what he is doing will give his team the best chance to win - even if he is way off.

I do not believe he is going against what he feels is most beneficial just to boost his perception.”

Of course he doesn’t do it consciously.  He doesn’t say to himself, “I am deliberately going to do something sub-optimal in order to be perceived as a smart manager.” That would be ridiculous.  He appears to have a large ego and appears to get some degree of satisfaction from doing unconventional things and being perceived as an unconventional manager, and in some circles a “genius.”

He may be very arrogant in thinking that he has special insight to the game that nobody else has which causes him to do unconventional things, but I still think that trying towin is by far more of a motivational factor than wishing to boost his image.

Unfortunately, his unconventional-ism costs him some times.

of course being unconventional is not the issue - many sabermetric proven ideas for winning are unconventional.  The issue is that many of his ideas go against win expectancy.  I would be interested in seeing if he really does more of these types of things than other managers, or if it is a reputation issue.

Speaking of the free pass from hell, what about Leyland issuing one to Cano last night to load the bases with one out, down by two, and A-Rod on deck?

I don’t see that as a bad move for Leyland.  At the time you’re down 3-1.  Walking Cano loads the bases and gives you a chance to get out of the inning, plus the platoon advantage.

Doing that probably gives the Tigers the better chance at holding the score at 3-1, even if it increases the Yankee run expectancy if A-Rod gets a big hit.

I’d leave it to the managers and scouts to take a guess as to how much of A-Rod’s terrible second half numbers are small sample size fluke, and how much they reflect him not being 100% physically.