THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

Right, but a 2-0 count in an IBB situation is not the same as a normal 2-0 count.  In an IBB situation, the BB part of the OBP doesn’t matter as much.  And a lot of the improvement in OBP at 2-0 is because of the walks.

So if you want to walk the 2-0 guy, it shouldn’t be because if you don’t, he might draw a walk.

If the guy hits better at 2-0 even after considering the walks, it’s probably because you’re giving him better pitches to hit in order to avoid the walk.  In this situation, you wouldn’t.  So there’s no real gain to the IBB because of the 2-0, is there?

I had this same argument with Andy when he was writing his chapter.  Let me quote what he wrote… be back in a sec…

This is what Andy said (p. 307, The Book), which echoes Phil:

In reality, the player’s tendency to draw unintentional walks is totally irrelevant to the question of whether or not to intentionally walk him, seeing as any type of walk has the same impact on the game. So, in terms of pitching to the hitter vs. walking him, we are trying to balance the potential positive (a strikeout or out on a batted ball) with the potential negative (a hit or error). So if we really want to get this right, we should remove walks (and hit by pitch) from consideration and compute the batter’s wOBA for his other plate appearances. Multiplying this non-walk wOBA by 1.12 will scale it to the normal wOBA scale

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And, insofar as Pena is concerned, walks are not his strength.  If he had an average walk rate, then his walk-eliminated scaled-up-wOBA would be exactly the same as his normal wOBA.

So, it really doesn’t matter, but if you want to follow Andy/Phil’s line of thinking, then remove the walks, and then scale up the wOBA by 1.12 to get it to the correct scale.

I think I’m wrong.

The point being made is that in certain situations, the WIN expectancy of a situation prior to the PA and after the PA is almost identical (i.e., IBB situations).

So, what we really need to do is come up with the game-state-specific wOBA (or Linear Weights), and pick out all those places where the win value of the walk is virtually zero.

THEN, ask this question: do pitchers behave in such a way that they pitch on a 3-0 count as if it’s the same as a 0-0 count?  The win value of a called ball must be zero all the way through to the walk, so why wouldn’t they be treated the same.  So, we should expect the 0-0, 1-0, 2-0, and 3-0 counts to all be identical, right?

Something tells me the answer to that can’t be right.

Help me out…

>Do pitchers behave in such a way that they pitch on a 3-0 count as if it’s the same as a 0-0 count?

Yes, I think they would, in a situation where the walk won’t hurt them.  I’d argue that the only reason they pitch differently on a 3-0 NORMALLY is that they’re afraid of the walk.  In this case, they’re not afraid of the walk, so they have no reason to pitch differently.

It’s like defensive indifference on the steal.  I’d bet pitcher won’t pitch differently (or make a pickoff throw) on the DI pitch because he doesn’t care if the runner goes.

I was watching this game and the first two balls were pitch outs and then they decided to intentionally walk him, so they weren’t pitching him to begin with.  I guess my point is they never tried to throw Jalapeña strikes to begin with, which was quite amazing.

I understand the basic issue, but still trying to prove it.  Let’s say we accept that a ball at 0-0, 1-0, 2-0, 3-0 are all the same: worth zero wins.

But, what about a ball at 0-2, 1-2, 2-2, 3-2?  At this point, the ball has to be worth something negative.  At 0-2, that’s better for the pitcher than 0-0, but it’s also better than 3-2; at 0-2, he’s got a few chances to still get him out, but at 3-2, he’s limited.

And so, if a pitcher has Bonds 0-2, that can’t be the same as having Vlad at 0-2.  So, a guy’s ability to lay off a pitch will still have value here.

So, let’s go back to 2-0.  If that’s the same as 0-0 and 3-0, then what happens if that 2-0 count becomes 2-1?  Then 2-2?  We’ve already decided that 0-2 is different from 3-2.  So, 2-0 must be different from 0-0, right?

2-0 is better than 0-0 for three reasons:

-- more chance of a walk
-- less chance of a K
-- more chance of getting a fat pitch to hit if the pitcher tries to avoid a walk

In this situation,

-- by assumption, #1 is worth zero
-- at 2-0, the chance of a K is much reduced
-- by assumption, a walk is worth zero so there will be no fat pitches to avoid walks.

So the only disadvantage of 2-0 over 0-0 is the reduced chance of a K.  That might be enough to make the IBB a positive choice whereas at 0-0 it was neutral.

So, yeah, good point: the ball does have a very small negative effct.  It’s probably very *very* small, because the pitcher wasn’t likely to throw strikes anyway, and the batter showed he wasn’t likely to chase a pitch. 

Actually, if you knew in advance that the batter wouldn’t chase, then a strikeout has probability zero, and you’d probably walk the guy in the first place.  So the 2-0 is exactly the same as the 0-0.

In that light, the strategy makes sense: walk him if he only hits good pitches, and pitch bad pitches to him otherwise.  At 2-0, it became obvious that he only hits good pitches, so they shrugged their shoulders and switched to the walk.

Look at it this way. Let’s say that we knew for a fact that an IBB and pitching to the batter had exactly the same WE.  IOW, it didn’t matter what you did - walk him or pitch to him.

Now, let’s say that you pitch to him and the count is 0-2.  Now, do you think that this is still a break even situation?  Does it matter now whether you walk or pitch to him?  Of course it does!

So if overall, pitching to a batter is worth zero as compared to walking him, all possible counts in that PA have to add up to a net loss/gain of zero (relative to the IBB).  So if 0-2 is a plus for pitching to the batter, then all other counts, including 2-0, HAVE to be a minus, in order for all counts to sum to zero.

In almost all potential (in the mind of the defensive manager) IBB situations, it is a MISTAKE to IBB the guy.  However, in almost any close situation, it is BETTER to start pitching to the guy, and then re-evaluate the net gain/loss based on the count.

If it starts out at break even, then if the first pitch is a ball, it is now correct to walk.  If it starts out as correct to pitch, it might take a 2-0 or 2-1 count to then make it correct to issue the IBB.

But, the value of the IBB definitely (it has to) changes with the count, if only because all counts haver to sum to whatever the net value is for the whole PA!

I am a big fan of Poz, and he is one of a number of sportswriters that you can count on one hand who actually does not continually spout drivel and nonsense, but he is a little over the top here.

First of all, I am not sure if he is arguing against the IBB because he does not “like it” for asthetic purposes (which is fine) or that he thinks that it is often or generally used incorrectly.  I think a little bit of both, but he is not real clear about that, and they are two completely different arguments.  You may not like the fact that managers can change pitchers any time they want, or that pitchers can throw over to first as often as they want, etc., but you can’t argue that doing so is incorrect (obviously SOME pitching changes are incorrect).

The other general thing is that without “running the numbers” it is really hard (pretty much impossible actually) to figure out when an IBB is correct or not.  In the case in question, it might be that because they were already down 1 run in the 8th, it was more important to have no runs score (although the IBB only increases that chance by a slight amount, BTW). I don’t really know.

Here are some other quotes from Poz which are just plain wrong:

I appreciate that there are times for it, and I expect that it ”works“ more often than it fails because pitchers get outs more often than they allow hits and walks.

I don’t know what he means by “works.” If he means that the next guy gets out more often than not, of course that is true.  And so would the guy being walked, and everyone else for that matter.  I don’t think anyone will argue with that.

If he means “works” as in it reduces the batting team’s chances of winning the game, he is incorrect, and if he were correct, then he is saying that it is generally correct but he just doesn’t “like it,” and who cares what he likes or not?

When managers were walking Barry Bonds every day, it was infuriating to watch, sickening to watch, pathetic to watch, but I at least understood — Bonds had, for any number of reasons, crossed some line where he was officially too good.

“Understood” as in he understood why managers would do it (because they are chickenshit?) or that he “understood” why it was correct?

Managers walked Bonds WAY too often.  That should have been so obvious that it was laughable how often they walked him.  It was almost like a contagious drug addiction (doing something clearly bad only because everyone else is doing it).

Still. I abhor the strategy in almost every instance except the most obvious ones.

Again, does he not like it for “asthetic” reasons or because he thinks it is usually wrong (increases the batting team’s chances of winning the game)?  I have no idea what he means, and if he means that it is generally wrong, how does he know that?

It goes counter to every single thing I believe about baseball. The game is about challenging people. The game is about pitcher vs. hitter. The game is also about entertaining millions of fans — let’s not get away from that.

O.K., so he wants managers to do things that might be wrong (decrease their teams chances of winning the game) because baseball is entertainment?  That is a legitimate point of view I suppose, but I think it is counter to a lot of his past writings and arguments.

And finally, I’d say most of the intentional walks I see are INCREDIBLY STUPID strategic moves. The kind that make my teeth hurt.

Again, he only says “thinks” (rather than he KNOWS for sure), but still, I ask, how does he know which ones are correct and which are not?

But facts is facts: Tony Pena Jr., at this moment and time, is the worst everyday Major League hitter I’ve ever seen. I mean the worst. There are numbers to back this up — .148/.172/.164 would be three of those numbers — but this is truly a case where seeing is believing.

What “facts” is he talking about?  The “fact” that he looks like the worst hitter in baseball?  The “fact” that he is currently hitting .172/.164?  By that argument, Andruw Jones is also one of the worst hitters in baseball.  And Sheff.  And whoever else is hitting terribly so far.

Actually, I couldn’t find anyone who has a worse current hitting projection than Pena, other than Royce Clayton, and I don’t know if he is on anyone’s roster right now.  Ausmus comes close.  Pena is projected at -37 runs per 150!  Wow!  A replacement SS as a hitter is around -28.  So Poz is right about Pena.

It is kind of odd that the worst hitter in all of baseball would be issued an IBB in the 8th inning, and it was probably incorrect, but I am not 100% sure by any means.

In general, I think that the entire TOR organization is a disaster though.

There was an IBB situation in the Yankees-Indians game the other day that I really wondered about. Top of the sixth, Indians trailing 1-0; Jeter is on third, one out, Alex Rodriguez batting, Sabathia pitching, third time through the order. The interesting bit, though, is that Shelley Duncan is on deck (New York LOVES him). Morgan Ensberg is in the hole.

I would guess the dropoff from Rodriguez to Duncan is HUGE and I was shocked when Cleveland pitched to him. For what it’s worth, Sabathia struck out both Rodriguez and Duncan to get out of the inning.

Anthony, Duncan is a very good hitter.  I have him projected at +16 per 150, with A-Rod at +42.  So I don’t know what you want to call that, but I don’t think you want to call it huge (if it is huge, then what is it between A-Rod and everyone else who is worse than Duncan - double huge?).

Anyway, the IBB is probably almost NEVER correct early in a game. I doubt it was correct there.

I did a detailed analysis of the IBB which I am waiting to be put on THT.  I did not find any evidence that ANY IBB was correct early in a game (IOW, using RE as a gauge).

Putting another runner on base just adds too much to the RE no matter who the hitters are.  Putting another runner on base (even a great one like A-Rod) to pitch to a very good hitter like Duncan, now that I think about it, is probably not even close to being correct in the third inning.

It wouldn’t be all that hard to figure the approximate RE for Duncan with runners on 1 and 3 and 1 out versus A-Rod (followed by Duncan) with runner on 3 and 1 out.  I can’t imagine in a million years that the RE is going to be lower with Duncan and 2 runners on.  That is nearly impossible.

What happens, with less than 2 out at least, is that you are going to face the next batter anyway, so even if he is a poor batter, relative to the batter you are considering walking, or just poor in general, if you don’t issue the IBB, you get to face that batter anyway.  With 2 outs it is a little different, in that you likely only have to face one batter.  But with 2 outs, then the RE of the next inning comes into play as well (which is why it is rarely correct to IBB the #8 hitter in the NL to pitch to the pitcher).

As far as “setting up the DP,” unless it is mandatory to allow no runs to score (and even then, the chance of scoring no runs after an IBB is only slightly less than without the IBB), the RE after the IBB already includes the chance of the DP, and is almost always MUCH higher than before the IBB.  So the idea of the IBB in order to set up the DP, which is often the justification for the manager, is usually folly, since even with the DP, the RE is usually a lot higher!

Interesting point about the number of outs. Thanks for that explanation.

I’m just shocked Duncan rates that well. I would’ve never pegged him as +16 with the bat.

Of the forecasters listed here:
http://www.fangraphs.com/statss.aspx?playerid=2722&position=OF

Marcel is the most optimistic, with a wOBA of .369, which is +17 runs per 650 PA (roughly 150 G).

As for not having him pegged that high, that’s probably the reason that he didn’t make the Clutch team, as he was shunned in favor of a Molina.

Tango, isn’t the Duncan in question Shelley (NYY) not Chris (STL)?

Yowza.  Where the heck was my head?  (Probably the same place Shelley’s normally is.)

Wow, believe it or not, I did the same thing!  Chris, now, has a projection of +14 and Shelley +3.  My opinion on the IBB still stands.  You are rarely, if ever, able to reduce your RE by walking a player, especially with Bonds out of the picture.  That is especially true with 1 out, for the reason I already articulated.