Monday, October 02, 2006
Misunderstanding Win Expectancy
Via studes’ blog, I ended up here, at Crawfish Boxes, who says:
Now, fairness compels me to state that the WPA contraption does not see a big difference between a man on second and a man on third with two outs there. And it says that the play cost us a little over 70 points of win probability.
But I say that’s bullshit.
I thought putting out a book that explains how it all works would stop me from explaining how it all works. Let me explain how it all works.
In the Crawfish example, it’s the bottom of the 9th inning, tied, with a runner on 2b, and 1 out. This version of a win expectancy table has the win probability at .703.
Now, Crawfish says:
I don’t think you can overstate the importance of hitting the ball to the right side in that situation, and I don’t think you can understate the damage a K there would have done.
He’s dead-wrong about the K. You can’t understate the damage of a K, with less than 2 outs, with a runner on THIRD. The reason is that the runner has a huge change of scoring with less than two outs from 3B, 86% with no outs, and 66% with 1 out. That plummets to 26% with 2 outs. A strikeout in this situation is terrible! But the runner needs to be on third base.
With a runner on 2B and 1 out, he will (eventually) score 40% of the time. With 2 outs, that’s 22%.
Remember those two numbers. Using real-life data, a guy will score with 2 outs from 2B 22% of the time, and frmo 3B 26% of the time. It’s not a big deal. It’s why the old adage of “don’t make the 3rd out at third base” is real. The value of being on 3B with less than 2 outs is that a flyball scores you.
Now, why are the chances of winning from 2B, 1 out 70%? What do I consider? If you read the Crawfish entry, you’d think win expectancy considers little. In fact, win expectancy (as I implement it) considers EVERYTHING. Not everything. But, EVERYTHING. Anything that has ever happened on a baseball field from 1999-2002 is considered, and weighted, by the frequency in which it occurred.
When you’ve got a guy on 1B and 1 out, I already said the chance that he’ll eventually score (and win the game in the bottom of the 9th) is 40%. That 40% includes any possible way you can think of, to get that guy to 3B and home plate. So, 40% of the time, the game ends with a win for the Astros. The other 60% of the time, the game goes to extra innings, of which the Astros will win half the time. 40% + half of 60% equals..... 70%. Empirical data from Walk Off Balk, 1979-2004 bears this out: .703. This is reality. You have a 70% chance of winning with a guy on 2B and 1 out.
Now, what about 2 outs, and the guy either on 2B or 3B? Again, go through the same logical process. 2B and 2 outs means the runner will eventually score 22% of the time. 22% + half of 78% = 61%. 3B and 2 outs means the runner will eventually score 26% of the time. 26% + half of 74% = 63%.
It’s a 2% difference. It’s not 10, it’s not 20. Walk Off Balks’s empirical data says it’s 3.8% difference. But, the sample size is very low with the guy on 3B (just 521 times in 25 years!). One standard deviation is 2%, which shows how insignificant the empirical data is. Regardless, 2% is our best estimate.
The win expectancy model is extremely simple to model. It needs the frequency of all possible events at every state, and it needs to know all the possible places the batters/runners end up following the event. It’s as simple as it sounds. Human intuition, however, tries to process things in a different way. Human intuition is superb if you have a model with alot of holes that needs plugging. Win expectancy is not such a model.


Can you post the above as a reponse on that website? Not that the guy is going to change his mind and admit the error of his ways. People have an incredible ability to dig their heels in even when they are wrong.