THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

Maybe not, but young Brennan is 4 for his last 46. I don’t think it matters who pitches to him at the moment.

Of course it worked out in the Rays favor and the Baseball Tonight guys lauded him for the move.

Cam, please read the chapter in The Book on hot and cold streaks, like Bosch’s 4 for 46…

You are thinking in terms of win probability.

Madden is trying to balance win probability with avoidance of criticism. So what is correct to you is not necessarily correct to Madden. Winning the game might come secondary to self-preservation.

Well that would imply that he is being an intentionally sh-tty manager.  I think MGL would like that even less.

I was watching this game Tuesday night when the move was made.  As soon as it happened, I knew we’d see a post fro MGL.  I agree with MGL that, on the surface, this move, and particularly the IBB, doesn’t even pass the sniff test.  In both cases the move advanced the tying run from 2nd to 3rd and the go ahead run from 1st to 2nd.  Oddly, the color analyst mentions that this is a no-brainer with 1st base open (which it is), but points out that either way, you have a base open (3rd as opposed to 1st), so what’s the difference.  I immediately smacked my forehead with that one.

This is really just a case of Maddon choosing to pitch to a cold-hand in Boesch, in spite of the situation.

In Tuesday’s game Maddon actually replaced Choate with Balfour specifically to face Boesch.  The choice of the righty Balfour over the lefty Choate, was supported by the fact that Boesch has demonstrated a reverse platoon split in the majors this year.  This, however, is not the case for his career in the minors.

It should be pointed out that Balfour retired Boesch both times to end the inning.  That Maddon is a mad genius!!!

I don’t think that not issuing an IBB with runners on 1st and 2nd will get you too much criticism, if any, so I don’t think Brian’s argument in #4 has much merit.  I also doubt that Maddon cares about what the fans and media think of his moves.

I also don’t think any batter has a true reverse platoon split.  Pitchers yes, batters no.

It’s just Maddon being Maddon, which in my opinion (supported by evidence of course) is just Maddon being stupid.

“Oddly, the color analyst mentions that this is a no-brainer with 1st base open (which it is)...”

I am not sure that it is a no-brainer with first base open. It might be a no-brainer if you bring in a lefty (or a very good righty with a small or reverse platoon split) to pitch to Bosch.  But IBB’ing Cabrera with a regular righty on the mound to get to Bosch?  I am not sure that is even correct, let alone a no-brainer.

MGL, I’d love to hear more of your opinions on Maddon. Being so close to the situation on a daily basis can make it tough to remain objective about players/managers, and so it’s interesting to hear someone else’s perspective for once.

I had no idea what to make of this move. It worked, but that doesn’t mean anything - it still seemed like an odd process choice. I haven’t regressed splits for both Balfour, Choate, and Bosch, but my only thought is that Grant Balfour has been more effective than Choate so far this season and Choate has struggled a bit in recent appearances. Those don’t seem very convincing, so I’m left just figuring it was a poor choice that luckily worked out for the best.

Most of the time with Maddon, I assume that there’s a lot going on behind the scenes that we don’t know about. He loves piling over numbers and platooning not just on handedness but by batted ball profile as well, so most of the time I’m okay with his seemingly odd choices...there’s a good process at work behind it and he gets numbers from the Rays’ FO, so I find it difficult to have a problem with him overall. But if you have a different opinion of Maddon, I’d love to hear it because I wouldn’t be surprised if I’ve become a bit blinded over the season.

@MGL #7:

My mistake. I thought 1st base was open, in which case most people would criticize him if Cabrera were allowed to hit. My brain refused to believe that he issued the intentional walk with 1st and 2nd occupied!

Steve, I don’t have any more information on Maddon.  I have written about some specific moves he has done in the past which I thought were ridiculously wrong, especially in the post-season 2 years ago.  You can Google that article - I forgot where it was published (maybe THT).

I think he is very smart and yes, the FO analysts probably give him him some good information and insight.  Yet, I think he thinks that he is smarter than he is (sabermetrically speaking) and consequently makes some horrible plays.  We all know people that do stupid things because they like to be “different” and they think they are really smart in doing so. I think that Maddon is like that.  Not always of course.

I think he just elected to pitch to the inferior hitter both times.

The strange part about the situation is that the IBB advanced all runners, 2 of them in scoring position.

When the Cards had a league worst production at the 4 spot with Ankiel/Duncan/Ludwick (post-Edmonds and pre-Holliday), I would not be surprised if this type of thing happened to Pujols, but not in back to back nights.

I wonder what affect it had mentally on Boesch. His confidence had to be down before that, and now he has to be, as a rookie, completely demoralized.

I think it just comes down to the ol “Don’t let the Big Bat beat you” thing.

Kudos to Balfour for not walking in a run. That’s certainly happened enough (seemingly) when a manager puts a guy on w/ 1B open to load the bases.

Ya have to wonder how much thought actually went into this. He does not trust the P enough to “pitch around” Cabrera, but trusts him enough not to fall behind Boesch and serve something up. My experience makes me think he was just thinking “Miggy ain’t gonna beat us” and “let’s make the kid prove he can”. Sometimes managers, even smart ones, are not that “deep”.

It will be interesting to see if other teams do the same thing in similar situations, especially if MC has burned em earlier in the game.

It could also be pointed out that Cabrera is leading the world in WPA, and by a good amount. So., it’s eviednt that he’s been getting, not just a ton of production, but key production in determining the outcome of games.

I kinda like the move. I know that the base out state that it gives the team 0.3 runs (but hey, when you have a 1-run lead, you can give the team 0.3 runs *grin), but those base states are also “on average”, which includes the production of elite hitters, average hitters, and horrible hitters, and everything in between ... it would be reasonable to me that the run expectancy is greater across the board with an elite hitter at the plate, not just good, but elite.

Boesch has been pretty good this year, but I’d still want to face him with the game on the line, than Miggy.

I would be interested in seeing the probability math on the situation. If Iknew how, I’d it.

"Whom do you want to face?” is not the proper question. 

For example, if you were leading a game by 1 run, would you rather face Prince Fielder with no one on base or Craig Counsell with the bases loaded?

What about with a 2-run lead?  What about with 0 outs?  What about with 2 outs?  What about with pitcher A? Pitcher B?

It matters who the batters are, who the pitchers are, the score, the inning, the runners on base, the outs, etc.  “Not letting so-and-so beat you,” or “Facing A rather than B,” are simply talking points or sound bites that offer little insight into which alternatives give your team a better chance of winning given the inning, score, outs, bases, and pitcher.  To get that insight, one needs an analytical framework.

“I would be interested in seeing the probability math on the situation.”

Sometimes things are so clearly in favor of one side or another that one does not have to “do the math” to determine which of several alternatives is correct or not.  And that clarity often comes from “doing the math” hundreds of times over many years, as I as well as many other analysts have in fact done.  While you should not just take my word for it, take my word for it - facing anyone in that situation with runners on first and second is better than facing anyone else (other than a pitcher or the equivalent) with the bases loaded.  Miggy Cabrera is not Barry Bonds in his hey-day, and Bosch is not Neifi Perez in his low-day.  And even then, I doubt that walking Bonds to pitch to Neifi would be correct either.

I figured the math was against the move, and I wasn’t challenging that in any way. I do take your word for it.

I kinda liked the move from a “ballsy” and “unconventional standpoint, well and for the entertainment value. That it worked on back to back nights just adds to the intrigue.

I also wonder how many managers will copycat the move? I imagine, from experience, someone will and if it doesn’t work it will be removed from the playbook with a “forget that crap” comment.

I do appreciate the comments. Thanks.

Of course it is going to “work” 70% of the time or so.  Managers like to do things that “work” more often than they don’t, which is why you see so many poor IBB’s.  One reason is that they will typically “work” (the batter makes out) 65% to 75% of the time. Of course, whether thew “work” or not (or have “worked” in the past) is irrelevant to the decision making process.  The only relevant question is which alternative gives the pitching team the best chance of winning.  We don’t know for sure the exact distribution of likely outcomes are from a particular batter/pitcher matchup, but we can estimate them from out knowledge of the pitcher’s and batter’s projected attributes.  Now, some may say that a manager, coach, or scout, may have more insight than “we” do about whether a particular batter/pitcher matchup is good or not from one or the other team’s perspective (not counting historical trends, like so-and-so is 3 for 20 against so-and-so), and I am not discounting that possibility.  The thing is, a particular strategy can be so bad, that even some brilliant insight by the manager cannot make it right.  Walking the bases loaded with runners on 1 and 2 is likely (I don’t know 100% for sure) one of those instances.

I have said this many times, and I am sure that Tango will agree:

If several alternatives appears to be close on paper, let the manager use whatever extra insight or wisdom he may have (or even thinks he has) to choose one or the other. If the decision is not even close “on paper”, no amount of extra-sabermetric wisdom or knowledge will make it right.

Right, I agree with MGL’s last paragraph.  Basically, my level of uncertainty is 20 points in wOBA.  So, if a guy is .320 and another is .335, and the manager prefers the former, I’ll let him have that one.

YOU GUYS also think this way, because when I ask you about clutch players, you pretty much treat as breakeven as the .350 clutch players being your preference over the .370 average-clutch player.

So, I always give a “go with gut” on things that are this far apart (even if reasonably, the manager should only be given 5 or 7 wOBA points of insight, and not 20).

I always liked Tango’s Bonds IBB chart, where he had “go with gut” if it were close.

20 sounds like a large spread to me. I’d give a manager 10, but probably not 20.

And it would definitely depend on who the manager was and his rationale, if I knew what it was.

If the manager’s only explanation (and he doesn’t have any other unstated good reason) is, “I don’t want so-and-so to beat us,” then I’ll give him 5 points at most.

If his answer is, “I like (or don’t like) the matchup (presumably due to something reasonable),” then I’ll give him 10 points.

If his reason is, “So-and-so is 5 for 7 against so-and-so historically,” or, “so-and-so is hot (or cold),” then again, I’ll give him at most 5 points.

Sabers are not as stubborn and unreasonable as many mainstream people make us out to be.  In fact, some of us (probably not me) give managers and GM’s (and coaches and scouts) too much credit.

Yeah, I should say that I will give him 20 wOBA points of slack if he uses something that I am not aware of.  So, I give him 0 wOBA points of slack if he says “8 for 13” or something like that.  I will give him 20 wOBA points of slack if he says “he’s great against RHP sinkerballers” (over and above whatever handedness platoon advantage he’d get).

I’ll give him the 20 wOBA slack if he says “he was hitting great in batting practice”, or 20 points the other way if he says “he wasn’t feel on today”.  (I mean, really I could go to 100 wOBA points on the downside to account for nagging injuries or late night partying, etc, but, I can’t start giving 100 points of downside so that he gets to use that excuse all the time.)

In summary, MGL’s position (5-10 points) is much more reasonable than mine (20 points), but I don’t want to argue too much, so I’ll just leave it at 20 points.