THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

Was just thinking about this exact play. My initial reaction was that it didn’t seem obviously right or wrong, which seems to be Michael’s conclusion after doing the math.

One other factor that I thought he might have brought up was the speed of Pagan and Reyes. It seems to me like their far above average speed adds a decent amount of value to the 1st/2nd 0 outs state than it would in the 2/3rd 1 out. Still, it probably moves the needle about as much as Wright being down 1-2. Seems like a wash just about any way you slice it.

Did anyone catch the “traditionalist” view on it? I thought I heard Mookie saying he would catch it.

cf- Dustin Mohr

“The Giants closed in on the division leading Los Angeles Dodgers in the last month of the season. In the second to last series of the season, against the San Diego Padres, Mohr was injured as he tracked down a foul ball in right field. He tripped over the bullpen mound as the ball tailed towards the stands. He held on to the ball, and the Padres scored the game’s winning run. He did not play during the season’s final series against the Dodgers.” (and was then released)

Those mounds in foul ground always seemed dangerous to me. Not to mention the catcher has his back to the action. How hard is it to build a stadium with a bullpen in the OF?

Another way to think about it is that that situation might be a good sac bunt situation.  If bunting a guy from 1B to 2B MIGHT be a good situation in a small-ball setup with one run being the winning run, then what of the situation of bunting a guy from first to THIRD (1b,2b to 2b,3b essentially means bunting a guy over two bases)?

In any case, the outfielder would have to know the chance that the runner will go from 2B to 3B on the catch.

this is what i am remembering now from the broadcast, so all apologies if i am off base:
- the guys in the booth commented that mookie wilson would have indeed let it drop. 
- gary, keith, and ron all favored making the catch
- one of their arguments for making the catch was that pagan was not likely to go to second on the play.  in that case, the pitcher can get out of the inning with a gb and a double play.  i think they said the pitcher (dunn) had gb tendencies which might add to that.

Was the runner still on 1B, or was he halfway?  And exactly where was the ball hit and was the outfielder running?  And was he running away from the runners (i.e., back to them)?

I have no recollection of where the runner on first was. And the runners would have to be among the slowest to have been thrown out tagging because the outfielder was running toward the fence along the right field line and he would have been running as he made the catch (maybe one-half to two-thirds of the way down the line from first base to the wall).

From the article at MLB.com, which Michael linked, everyone assumes the runners would have tagged. And that is the basis for the manager disagreeing with the player. Sounds like the player made the right call and the manager has ensured he won’t do so again.

In hindsight, should Cousins have made the catch?

Opinions are mixed.

“He overthought that play,” manager Edwin Rodriguez said. “He should have made that play. We already talked about it. I understand what he was thinking. Both guys would have tagged and advanced, but I would have walked the next guy and played for the double play. But he wasn’t thinking about that.”

Had Wright been out there, and both runners moved up, the Marlins would have intentionally walked Carlos Beltran to face Chin-lung Hu with one out.

Cousins based his decision on the belief that reliever Ryan Webb would get Wright to ground into a double play.

“Looking back, yeah, I probably should have made the play,” Cousins said after the game. “In the moment, I thought I did the right thing.

“I decided to let the ball fall foul for a strike. I had all the confidence Webb was going to get a ground-ball double play with the next pitch.”

Wright felt Cousins made a heady play.

“It’s a pretty good play, I would imagine—with Webb, with that kind of stuff, on the mound, to trust him to get an out,” Wright said. “You’ve got to give him credit for being heads up. Because there’s a good chance if he catches that ball it’s just like laying down a bunt. Angel on first, Reyes on second, that’s some pretty good speed.”

http://atmlb.com/feECus

In a sense, then, the WE question is one between runners on first and second with no outs (WE of 0.297) or one of bases loaded and one out (WE of 0.356).

What never ceases to amaze me are the percentage of otherwise smart or fairly smart people in the “industry” (commentators, players, managers, coaches, etc.) who think they know the answer to something that they have no idea what the answer is and there is no way for them to know what the answer is, unless the “numbers” are run.  That truly amazes me.

If one time, just one, singleton time, a TV commentator or a manager were to say, “You know, I have no idea what the correct play is there. It is complex and someone has to run the numbers for us to have any idea.  And it is not a matter of opinion - it is a matter of fact. No one’s opinion matters.  Now, I can take a guess as to what is the correct answer, but I really have no idea...”

If that was ever uttered, I would fall flat on my face in disbelief.

BTW, that same thing goes for “real world” problems and especially for politicians.

Someone taught me that one of the three most productive words in the English language are “I don’t know (but I will try and find out).”

That is the only way for problems to get solved.  First you have to admit that you don’t know the answer.  It is like beating an addiction.  First you have to admit that you have a problem…

Someone taught me that one of the three most productive words in the English language are “I don’t know (but I will try and find out).”

And there’s what I consider the corollary rule to that, about the three most productive words in a relationship: “Maybe you’re right.”

Absolutely.  One of the worst things to try and be in a relationship (any relationship, not just a romantic one) is right…

As the article mentions, one of the most important things in the decision to catch a foul ball or not in situations like that is the count.  If the WE tables say that it is close, it is almost always a no catch when the count is in the pitcher’s favor (after the foul ball) and almost always a catch when it is 2-0 or 3-0 (since a drop would make it 2-1 and 3-1, good hitter’s counts).

If the pitcher is a LHP’er with low k/9 of around 6/9, and batter is Adrian Gonzalez, with Ellsbury on 2nd, and Kevin Youkillis on deck, you catch the ball, give Youk an IBB, and take your chances with David Ortiz and hope he hits into a DP (if not you have another LHB’er JD Drew up, who would probably be PH for and get you someone cold off the bench hitting). 

If the numbers are adjusted for pitcher, hitter, runner, etc, they probably agree.

Of course, if you are facing the bottom of the lineup with a high K/9 guy on the mound, and a relatively slow runner on 2nd (who would have more trouble scoring from 2nd on a single), you should probably drop the ball.

Players of course have to make decisions quickly without the benefit of crunching numbers on a computer, and there are other intangibles that may affect such a decison (eg the quality of the teams defense, the other teams closer if they should get the lead, and who will be up in the bottom of the 9th, etc).

The safe bet is to take the out, unless doing so leads directly to a run (eg, JD caught a foul last year against the Rays with a runner on 3rd that allowed the tying or go ahead run to score)

“… who think they know the answer to something that they have no idea what the answer is and there is no way for them to know what the answer is, unless the “numbers” are run.”

Some of them probably know that even after the numbers are run that the numbers are uncertain estimates, and the estimate of the uncertainty is also uncertain. 

They also know the right answer is not necessarily the true answer, assuming there is a true answer, but it is the answer that is readily available and works.

"Someone taught me that one of the three most productive words in the English language are “I don’t know (but I will try and find out).””

You can replace “productive” with “honest” and IMO be equally accurate.

----------------------------------

“Players of course have to make decisions quickly without the benefit of crunching numbers on a computer, and there are other intangibles that may affect such a decison (eg the quality of the teams defense, the other teams closer if they should get the lead, and who will be up in the bottom of the 9th, etc). “

I also question having all the information available in the dugout either in form of a laptop (even legal?) or binder. A coach or assistant would need to basically be in the manager’s ear, spouting the situations and possible scenarios, and then the manager relate the final decision to the player ... and even then the decision is going to factor in the player’s momentum, throwing arm, runners’ speeds, etc.

If one is concerned about a tag, and not just looking at the “average WE” for the various situations, I would say going sideways or coming in, catch the ball ... going back ... nope m(as a general rule).

Should we really look at an “average-based decision” and essentially assign those values to all situations? There are likely some situations where the defense should be begging the OF the catch the ball AND the runner try to tag from 2B.

"Some of them probably know that even after the numbers are run that the numbers are uncertain estimates, and the estimate of the uncertainty is also uncertain.”

A. That still doesn’t mean that they know the correct answer. It is likely that if the answer is difficult for a computer to ascertain, it is impossible for a human being (unless it is a captcha of course! ) So the fact that a computer does not necessarily know the right answer does not in any way, shape or form change the fact that the correct response from a human being should be, “I have no idea.”

2) We’ve said this a million times, and it is important.  When you “run the numbers” using league average inputs or approximations, be it for a bunt, whether to catch or drop a fly balls, etc., that gives you an excellent starting point.  The other thing it gives you is this:  Often times the differences are so great, that all the tweaking or uncertainty in the world won’t change the answer.  It also gives you upper and/or lower “boundaries.” For example, let’s say that you run the numbers for a “catch/no catch” on a fly ball and it says that it is a no catch with lots of uncertainty.  Now suppose that the only unknown or uncertainty is the quality of the batter and pitcher.  Well, if the batter/pitcher is below average but you are not sure by exactly how much and exactly how it affects the answer, then you don’t care about that at all - the answer is still going to be a no catch!

Like I said, that happens all the time - that once you “run the numbers”, even with lots of uncertainty, the answer becomes crystal clear and unequivocable.  People who dismiss the process because of uncertainty don’t understand the methodology.

“They also know the right answer is not necessarily the true answer, assuming there is a true answer, but it is the answer that is readily available and works.”

I have no idea what the difference is between the “right” and “true” answer.

"Like I said, that happens all the time - that once you “run the numbers”, even with lots of uncertainty, the answer becomes crystal clear and unequivocable.  People who dismiss the process because of uncertainty don’t understand the methodology.”

I should also add that often times once you run the numbers, even if the results are uncertain, two things emerge:

One, a person can now add his own inputs in order to come up with the likely correct strategy, and two, it can give you much better insight into the situation than not running he numbers at all…

"It also gives you upper and/or lower “boundaries.”

That’s actually a great point ... a really, really, really, good point.

There is no reason that a manager couldn’t be more like a football coach with a “laminated reference sheet”, with this type of stuff on it (Max/Avr/Min), for various defensive, strategy situations.

And really, this “sheet” wouldn’t need pulled out of the binder until what? The 7th inning? And then only on defense, and only in close games.

I imagine these kinds of things:

http://www.tangotiger.net/walkbondschart.html
http://www.tangotiger.net/walkbondschart2.html

Put in enough uncertainty there that the manager can play his gut, but enough certainty that the manager is going to have to explain himself if he goes against “The Book”.

Good info.

Some teenager is going to have to break those apart by inning, replace the 1B, 2B, etc with a diagram highlighting the bases that are occupied by runners, and the language needs reduced to “Yes”, “No”, “Gut”, and color-coded ... and even still it might need read to the coach.

“Baseball Guys” are not really used to looking at stuff like this, and many coaches avoid stats altogether as to avoid having them have an undue influence on coaching decisions or impression of how a player is playing. A lot of stuff is still “eye test” and “sniff test”.

There is even sort of an impression about guys that are stats-based ... almost as if they are arrogant enough to assume that they can “decode the statistics”, instead of going by what “baseball men” know ... experience.

There is also likely a desire to avoid being seen using a “crutch” or “data sheet” to manage the game. One wouldn’t want to create the impression that just anyone could read the sheet and make an important decision. (In-game managing, IMO, is BY FAR the easiest job in baseball. Seriously managers get a lot of credit and blame for how players play ... but have so little influence over it.)

There is no reason why a manager could not have a graphic like that, including spray charts, tendencies, all in a binder or on cards, that he pulls out for each inning. We, as fans, expect football coaches to do this (not doing it would be an almost firable offense), and we expect basketball coaches to have plans for “when to foul”, when to go for a 2 instead of a 3, but really, in baseball, we pretty much just expect managers to fill out the lineup card and stay awake (preferably).

In hockey, they used to make a big deal about coach Roger Neilson, as they called him “Captain Video”, a few decades ago.  Like “ha, you see that?  he’s looking at evidence!  isn’t that funny?  can’t he just watch the game in real-time?  it’s only the fastest game in the world, and he only has 18 skaters to think about, and there’s only three strength situations to think about, and...”

Of course video is now ubiquitous.

I will agree however that you can get into paralysis by analysis.  You don’t want your pitcher or hitter thinking too much, because a large part of this is game theory.  If he develops a pattern, that’s a killer.

Felipe Alou once said that the one guy he didn’t want to manage against was Bobby Valentine.  Not because he was the smartest, but because he was the most unpredictable.

My baseball coach in high school was once asked about a similar situation. Top of ninth, tie game, no outs or one out, runner on third, long foul ball. Catch it or let it drop? The obvious answer here is let it drop, more obvious (to me anyway) because catching the ball leads to a definite run. The coach insisted that you have to catch the ball, because you can’t ever not make an out in any situation.

He was a moron in other ways, too.

"Not because he was the smartest, but because he was the most unpredictable.”

Bobby would thank Felipe for the compliment. *grin*