THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

You’re right, and one example I would offer is Asian professional baseball, which, as people might already know (or can guess), bunting is employed more often than in the states.
But in Asian culture the father, and here the manager, has absolute authority, and is even more egotistical than his North American counterparts. It’s one reason teams in Asia bunt more often. Another reason is they’re in general, much better at it.
But this egotism shows up in the other predicable areas...pitching changes, substitutions (even mid batter in Korea), visits to the mound, IF/OF positioning...you get my drift.

The A’s had standing orders on Art Howe regarding bunting and reliever usage.  The problem is that this was strictly between the manager and the GM.  The media, as far as they were concerned, think it was all on Howe.

Not only does the GM have to reward the manager, but he has to publicly support him and take most, if not all, of the blame.

As MGL noted, there’s blame to go around.  The manager doesn’t want it, and if the GM insists on tactics, then the GM has to take the blame.  This of course may even undermine the manager’s standing with the players.

The A’s had standing orders on Art Howe regarding bunting....

I’ve heard this said about Francona in Boston, too, though I don’t know if it’s true. Nevertheless, the team has always been near the bottom of the majors in sacrifices during his tenure, ranking as low as 30th and never higher than 27th.

I’m not sure it is the managers wanting to look like geniuses, but I’d agree it is the managers wanting to influence the game.  Bunting and the intentional walk feel like decisions that were made..however not bunting or not issuing an intentional walk feels like inaction. 

When stuck in traffic, how many people try to switch lanes, go local or otherwise try something to get to their destination faster?  Even in the end if they didn’t really get there faster, they felt like they at least tried something.

MGL, I think you were 100% on the mark with this post. I think that blame deferral is a major factor affecting coaching/managing decisions in all sports.

Gregg Easterbrook, who writes a weekly NFL column on ESPN.com, often writes about coaches punting on 4th-and-short instead of going for it, and he attributes it to blame deferral. If the team goes for it and gets stopped, the coach gets blamed. If the coach punts and the defense allows a TD, then the players didn’t step up and do their part.

I’m not even sure that coaches/managers do it intentionally. I think it may just be a natural instinct

My guess is the “avoid criticism” factor is stronger than the “look like a genius” factor (except maybe for LaRussa!).  And the biggest problems are those where the blame is asymmetric:  manager will be blamed for badcome on choice A, but player will be blamed for bad outcome on choice B.  In those cases, B will be selected more than it should.

That’s likely a problem on the sac bunt.  A failed bunt attempt will lead sportswriters and broadcasters to blame the player for failing to get down a “simple” bunt, and bemoan the failure of today’s players to learn the “funamentals.” But a bad outcome on no bunt is the manager’s bad call—assuming it’s a situation where bunts are common.  The problem here is the journalists failing to understand that bunts can’t be a sure thing.

I don’t agree, though, that the IBB to Hunter fits this pattern well.  With Vlad on deck, I don’t see Francona getting criticized for pitching to Hunter.  It’s not like Hunter is Pujols, the “one player on this team you can’t let beat you” (ugh).  In either scenario, Papelbon will take the heat.  So I have to think Francona just believed this was the right move.

I think a better example is Street pitching to Howard.  Nothing makes a manager safer from criticism than “sticking with his closer.” Even if bringing in the LHP is the right move, the manager has zero risk of criticism if he leaves the closer in.  If they lose, the closer failed to do his job.  But if he takes out the closer and then the outcome is bad, the manager is in for a world of hurt. 

As Tango says, the key is to better align the manager’s incentives with the team’s incentives.  You need to tell the manager you will back him even when an unconventional choice fails.  Your GM should push back on journalists in these situations, and explain the organization’s philosophy.

The four most powerful words in the English language are “It’s not my fault.” My favorite example is the third base coach.  Teams have a 90% success rate on most “advancement” plays (going from first to home on a double) when the break even point is usually somewhere in the 70% range.  The problem for the 3BC is that if he sends the runner and he gets thrown out, the 3BC takes the blame for having a windmill arm.  If the runner scores, the fielder made a bad throw or the catcher missed the tag or the runner is just. that. good.  It’s never “The 3BC did a good job sending him.”

Plain and simply, Francona called the IBB on Hunter because of the percentages.  It made perfect sense since Hunter was 3-5 against Pap, and Vlad was almost a sure out. No excuses, nobody’s fault. Vlad got lucky with that hit. That’s baseball.

I agree that with many IBB’s, the underlying rationale is to “not let so-and-so beat you” and therefore avoiding criticism from the media.

In the case of Hunter/Valddy, I am not saying that it was a conscious decision on Francona’s part to look like a genius or avoid blame or criticism, and I truly believe that he thought that it was the right move (I think that in almost all cases, the manager “thinks” that he is making the “right” move), but in ALL cases of an IBB, the next batter makes out 65-70% of the time or so, so the manager gets rewarded for his strategy.  That is one reason why the IBB is overused.  Not to mention what King Yao and others said above about managers wanting to do SOMETHING rather than nothing, even if nothing is the right play.

As Tango and others have said, it is the responsibility of the front office to communicate with the manager and the media in such a way as to encourage proper decision-making during the game and to foster harmony among the players and their coaches and managers, and even harmony between the team and the media and their fans.  And of course you need a manager who is on the same page as the FO.  You can’t have a manager who begrudgingly heeds the front office when his heart is not really in it.

Pizza, you can’t compare the 90% success rate to the 70% break-even point.  The average success rate should be higher, it’s the marginal rate we care about.  So the question is whether, on plays where it isn’t an obvious stop or obvious send, do the runners make it about 70% of the time?

*

If the logic suggested by MGL is right, then we should expect managers to be much more interventionist on defense than offense, because the defense will “win” 60-70% of the time.  That works for the IBB. 

But is the reverse true?  Do managers fail to use offensive strategies they should, simply because they will appear to fail 60-70% of the time?  I suppose pinchhitting for the pitcher in the 5th or 6th inning is a possible example.  They appear to use the sac bunt too much, but that’s probably because it “succeeds” a large majority of the time in the sense of advancing the runner. 

Seems plausible.  But I do think the availability of another scapegoat matters too.  Managers can get away leaving in a good starter or closer, when a change is actually the right move, because he was “dancing with the one who brung him”, or “trusting his closer,” or what have you.  And in those cases, making the move would also work 70% of the time, yet managers often don’t do it.

My thesis was exaggerated of course.  My principal point was that there are many psychological influences that cause managers to make sub-optimal decisions largely on a sub-conscious level. And that it is the job of upper-level management to reduce or eliminate those errors.  Of course most teams do not have anyone in upper level management who is able or willing to do that.  Apparently even the Red Sox do not, which is disappointing - to me at least.  If I am Bill James, Theo Epstein, or John Henry, and I understand how little batter/pitcher matchups mean, I would be furious at someone - either Francona, or whoever should have told Francona about that a long time ago, but didn’t.

I mean if you supposedly run a sabermetric team, it boggles my mind that one of the very first things you would not do is go over with your manager all of the myths and misconceptions that the typical manager believes that aren’t, in fact, true.  That is probably 1 win a year right there.

"Of course most teams do not have anyone in upper level management who is able or willing to do that.”

Even worse, they could be willing, but get it wrong.  Working for Steinbrenner during his “prime” must have been like that to some degree.

“Apparently even the Red Sox do not, which is disappointing - to me at least”

Just throwing out a couple of possibilities, not that I necessarily think they are true:

a. is it possible that the Red Sox front office disagrees with you and thinks either it was an ok move, or that it was a non-issue?

b. is it possible that Francona knows to do the right thing but just made an execution mistake that maybe he doesn’t make that often (but people are prone to making mistakes from time to time even if they know better).

Just a couple of thoughts, that’s all.

Someone in upper management to look after the psychological aspect of things.  I like that idea. 

I posted a link to this thread at SoSH.  One response is from Pearl Wilson:

“Francona is a pretty poor example of a manager who wants to look like a genius. The man has no qualms about appearing to be at fault for a plan that goes awry. He takes (public) criticism in stride. He stands up and takes responsibility for his decisions. He gives reasons. They may not always be the real reasons. MGL has no way of knowing what information Tito has been given by the FO or by in-game scouting, or how the FO supports or incentivises his in-game decisions.”

I completely agree with Wilson and couldn’t possibly express it better than he/she (?) did.

I have no qualms whatsoever with Wilson’s statements and they are not in opposition to anything I have said.

When I said, “Look like a genius,” I am being hyperbolic, I am not necessarily referring to Tito, and I am certainly not suggesting that it is done on a conscious level or that a manager who has that inclination has to be one that is perceived as having a large ego or one that does not take responsibility for his successes and failures.

It is simply one of the things, among many, that motivates managers to make sub-optimal decisions.  “Looking like a genius” may have been a poor choice of words, but if you have any sense at all, you would know what I mean.

mgl:  You said the following:

“Despite what they say, managers are all about trying to look like they had a hand in their team winning and avoiding looking like a goat as much as possible.”

And I am saying that I simply do not agree with that statement as it applies to Tito.  Of course, neither of us can prove the other wrong, so let’s just say we have a difference of opinion.  But, it is a real difference, and your last post seemed to indicate that there is no difference.

Guy/10, the problem was even more extreme than you might realize.  The numbers were really really really skewed.  On sac flies, 97% of players who attempted to score made it, suggesting that 3BC’s only send when they are pretty much sure.  This means that there are likely some scenarios where it’s an 80% chance that the runner scores taking everything into account.  If the break-even point is 70%, he should go.  Now, 1 out of 5 times, he’ll get nailed at the plate.  My guess is that he won’t go.

I was actually able to put together a (halfway) decent model of how likely it was that the runner would score (and I calculated the break-even point in each of those cases).  I found a bunch of cases where the 3BC should have sent, but didn’t.  I found maybe three or four where he was too aggressive.  I calculated it out and found that teams would actually be better off firing their third base coach and telling their players “If it’s in the OF, just run.”

Pizza: I can’t find your old article on this.  Can you provide a link?

However, the success rate alone doesn’t tell you much.  According to an article at Baseball Analysts, on FBs to CF with less than 2 outs, runners from 3rd scored 584 times on 599 attempts—97% percent (same figure you report).  Like you, the author says this shows teams aren’t aggressive enough.  But the runner was sent 87% of the time! (599/689) How conservative can the coaches possibly be?  We can’t evaluate the coaches without knowing something about those 90 held runners.  First, I’ll bet the large majority occured with no outs, when in fact the break even is much higher.  Some were doubtless very shallow flies, others extremely slow runners (pitcher, catchers)—cases where holding the runner was clearly right.  Some doubtless came in blowouts, when the run didn’t matter.  So how many cases of excessive caution can we possibly be talking about?  My guess would be very few.....

Alan: I took MGL to be saying that managers respond to carrots and sticks, like anyone else, not making a comment about their character or integrity.  None of them make decisions they think will make their team lose, and some may accept responsibility for their decisions and handle criticism well.  But it’s simply much easier to see the wisdom in choices for which you have been praised in the past, and to steer clear of choices that generated strong criticism.  People don’t even have to be conscious of this for it to affect their behavior. 

I suppose we can’t say for sure this is true for Francona simply because it’s true for 99% of other humans.  But what evidence do you have that Fancona is unusually resistant to these pressures?  The best evidence I can think of would be a pattern of making unconventional and/or unpopular moves, which happen to be good for his team.  Does that describe Francona?  (I honestly don’t know.)

I have no idea whether Francona is more or less prone to those forces than other managers or other human beings in general.

A bad IBB in a crucial situation sure seems like a good example, though.

It has two of the elements I was talking about.  One, it is “action” by the manager (when none was needed), and two, it has a high rate of success, success being measured by how often it “works,” which is how often Vladdy makes out, which is around 70% of the time or more versus Paps.

Guy, I tried to find the link, but my old archives at StatSpeak are currently… I’m not sure what’s going on over there.  If I can access it at some point, I will link it.

My analyses controlled for speed of the runner and distance of the ball from home plate.  I wasn’t able to do arms at the time.  Distance was the biggest predictor both of whether the runner would go and whether the runner would make it.  I also had the break-even adjusted for outs and even the other runners.  Blowouts are a legit issue, and I don’t recall if I took those into account.  But, my estimate was that on sac flies alone (because that was all I was able to look at) the average team left 4 runs on the table.

Do the fans still blame the coach for going for it on 4th and short in any large degree? The few times I’ve read or heard critisism of failed 4th & short down going for it attempts it is either directed at a player not “fighting for it” hard enough or when directed towards the coach it is for selecting the wrong play.

"But, my estimate was that on sac flies alone (because that was all I was able to look at) the average team left 4 runs on the table.”

If the data I cited from the Baseball Analyst artice is correct, there are only about 240 times a year that a runner on 3rd fails to run, or 8 per team.  And some of these runners obviously scored anyway—maybe half?  So to pick up 4 more runs, you would have to send every runner and never make an out. 

In any case, do post the link if you can. thanks.

Re Pizza/21, something definitely is screwy over at MVN.com this morning.  The link to your article is here, but it just shows the first sentence plus the comments:
http://statspeak.net/2008/04/03/how-to-make-your-team-better-by-firing-your-third-base-coach.html

The Internet Wayback Machine gives us the full text:
http://web.archive.org/web/20080407045318/http://mvn.com/mlb-stats/2008/04/03/how-to-make-your-team-better-by-firing-your-third-base-coach/

Thanks, Mike.

I have to say, I mainly don’t buy it.  Teams are only holding 12 baserunners on 3rd base per year.  If teams will gain 4 runs by sending them all, as Pizza calculates, that means something like six held runners are now stranded, but 5 of these 6 would score if sent (and one of the 6 guys who would have scored anyway now makes an out). The projected success rate is based on model using actual attempts to score and distance of FB as the predictor variable. 

For starters, the model will certainly overestimate the success rate in these cases.  It includes attempts when the FB is the first out, when only faster runners are sent (given a particular FB distance), yet the held runners will certainly be slower on average.  The model also includes cases with a runner on 1B, when a throw home is far less likely—but when the runner is held it’s almost certainly because the base and game states make a throw home likely or certain (for example, I’ll bet there is rarely a runner on 1B).  So your model needs to be limited, as best you can, to plays on which a throw was probably made, and excluding plays which likely include faster-than-average runners.

Another problem is probably relying on RE rather than WE.  A lot of these cases could be situtations in which the runner on 3B doesn’t matter, because the hitting team is behind late in the game.  In these cases, RE alone will mislead us. 

Basically, there is just a lot of information the 3BC has that the model doesn’t:  game state, runner on 1B Y/N, outfielder arm, and runner speed.  You just can’t assume these additional attempts would succeed at the same rate as other FBs of same distance.  Plus, the coach knows the pitcher and on-deck hitter, which may mean the held runners are actually more likely to score than usual (in games where the run matters at all). 

If you could look at all these cases, I think you would find disproportionate amounts of no runner on 1B, team behind in late innings, good OF arm,
and a lot of catchers, pitchers, and 1Bmen as the baserunner on 3B.  You might also find that the held runners actually scored more than they should have.  It doesn’t take much change to wipe out most of the expected gain from sending these 12 runners.  If it turns 7 would have gone on to score rather than 6, and that 8 of the 12 would score rather than 10, you’ve only gained 1 run.  I don’t think we have nearly enough evidence to know which scenario is right.

An absolutely perfect example of the general dynamic we are discussing here was tonight in the Yankees game.  It was probably 100% correct to bring in Hughes for the 8th inning and give Sabathia some extra rest in order to start him on 3 days rest.

However, had Girardi taken Sabathia out and lost the game, he would have been crucified by the media and fans, even though lots of credible commentators were suggesting that he might (take him out after 7) and that it would be a reasonable move.

If he leaves him in, as he did, it is a “no-loss” situation for him, despite it probably being incorrect.  If Sabathia finishes the inning and the Yankees win, no one criticizes him and everyone is happy.  If Sabathia gives up a hit or walk or two, he takes him out and then even if the bullpen blows the lead, it’s not on Girardi.

Leaving Sabathia in there is the perfect safe play for Girardi.  Taking him out can only blow up in his face.  He gets no extra credit if the Yankees go on to win (which they will 92% of the time or whatever it is) and he gets crucified if they lose.

Poster at SOSH noted that Vlad was -5.4 runs on 750 fastballs on the year (57.1% of all pitches thrown to him) and Torii was +16.5 runs on 1141 fastballs (59.4% of the pitches). 

Makes the move seem a lot smarter at least to me.

Read my last comment on the other thread about Francona and the IBB.

This is interesting and ridiculous. You may want to also take into account that Managers actually try to win the game. If you think for a second that they factor into the situation the amount of blame or criticism as the situation unfolds - then you need to actually go coach sometime.

The move by Tito is the same as ANY other manager would have done - all based on the probable outcome. Look at the NYY vs LAA last night, they did the same thing and enjoyed the most likely result, Vald swung at really bad pitches to strike out.

As for the 3BC - the only time they are not blamed is when the idiot runner thinks they know better and runs through the stop sign - only to be thrown out at home (A-Rod).

Tom- Vlad struck out last night but this does not prove that the Hunter IBB was the correct move. Don’t let one outcome cloud your concept of probabilities.

Even if Francona were no different than the other managers, they would all be guilty of the same offense (lowering the chances of winning). It does not exonerate him.

Also, even though the two likelihoods of an out are probable, one is more likely to occur and therefore the better choice.  If a basketball player shoots 51% lefthanded and 86% righthanded, he shouldn’t shoot lefty simply because he’s likely to make it anyway.

Speaking of blame and overmanaging, I can’t believe Grady Little hasn’t been brought up yet.

Girardi ordered three IBBs late in ALCS Game 2 last night:

- Top 11th (1 out): Abreu, after Figgins singled in Matthews Jr. & advanced to 2B on the throw home
- Top 12th (2 out): Izturis, after Mathis doubled
- Top 13th (1 out): Abreu, after Aybar was sac-bunted to 2B by Figgins

In the 11th, the strategy was presumably to ‘set up the double play’.... which the Yankees actually wound up getting (5-4-3).  Girardi may also have wanted to set up a RH-RH matchup (Alfredo Aceves on the mound, Torii Hunter the batter), and avoid the more potent bat v. RHP in Abreu.

In the 12th, I’m not sure what to make of the IBB issued to Izturis.  The next batter, Matthews Jr., has a career line v. RHP (in this case, Dave Robertson) that’s nearly identical to Izturis’s.  So I have to assume the idea was to ‘set up the force at any bag’.  Robertson wound up striking out Sarge Jr.

In the 13th, it also looks like Girardi was ‘setting up the double play’, & again avoiding Abreu against the RHP (still Robertson)… again choosing to go after Hunter instead.  Hunter grounded out, but both runners advanced, creating a PA for Guerrero with two runners in scoring position.  Vlad grounded out, however, for the third out.

I understand the unintentional-intentional BB of Teixeira in the bottom of the 12th (w/runners on 2B & 3B) to load the bases—the extra baserunner has no potential consequence for the visiting Angels, and creates the chance for getting the 3rd out of the inning at any base.

However, in the Yankees’ case, obviously the extra baserunners would/could have mattered.  Was I wrong to be pulling my hair out at all the IBBs Girardi ordered?  It seemed he was putting an extra potential run on base far too often.  Was playing the same-handed matchups & hoping for the double play (& trying to set up the force at any bag in the 12th) worth the risk?  Of course, the results worked out in Girardi’s favor, so I doubt he could be convinced he was taking too many risks in any event.

One last thought (I apologize for the long post… I wanted to provide context for each IBB): by putting extra runners on base in the hopes that you ‘induce the double play’, aren’t you (at best) really playing comparable odds to seeing an extra-base hit as an outcome?  For example, in 2009 Torii Hunter grounded into 9 double plays, while belting 49 XBH (506 PA).  Even if you include line-drive double plays, I’d have to guess the average MLB hitter would more frequently deliver an XBH.

I understand the unintentional-intentional BB of Teixeira in the bottom of the 12th (w/runners on 2B & 3B) to load the bases—the extra baserunner has no potential consequence for the visiting Angels, and creates the chance for getting the 3rd out of the inning at any base.

I disagree with this fairly vehemently.  The IBB had a very serious consequence there.  The consequence was that a non-intentional walk to ARod would end the game.  It forced him to throw strikes.  How often do you really need the force out?  I’m talking about situations where the fielder can make the play at another base but he wouldn’t be able to make the throw to first on time.  I don’t think it happens very often.  Unintentional walks (and HBPs) are very frequent.  I just don’t see how the force out for no-margin-for-error trade is worth it.

Ah, good point—thanks for thinking of what I should have.  Just another reason to question IBBs.