THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

I don’t know, he induced a GB which is an out 75% of the time, but not this time. Didn’t have the BABIP gods on his side. 

In a must win game, not using Thatcher to pitch to Ethier would be a cardinal sin.  But in the regular season, games are not must win games.  Have to consider the big picture.

As for the IBB. Guys who PH are not as effective in general as when they have been playing the entire game and would be facing you for the 3rd time, so not a bad move to IBB Martin IMHO. Even though Ethier is a good hitter, as a PH’er and with a stomach problem, maybe not as good.

Forcing Torres hand and getting Billingsley out early in a close game forced Torre to use Kuo for 2 innings and 34 pitches.  This might help the Padres tommorrow if there is another close game as Kuo won’t be available.

If I am Black, after the game I consider that my team scored 0 runs, so I won’t 2nd guess myself too much.  You are not going to win without scoring a run, the best you can do is force extra innings and deplete your bullpen, and perhaps still lose without scoring a run.

Bud Black had 4 alternatives:
1. Reliever pitches to Martin
2. Garland pitches to Martin
3. IBB Martin and reliever pitches to best bat on Dodgers bench.
4. IBB Martin and Garland pitches to best bat on Dodgers bench.

He chose the worst of the options. Give credit to Torre for doing the obvious here, but Black was in control of the situation.

For what its worth in the game recap Garland is quoted as saying that it was his decision to intentionally walk Martin.

Ah-hahahahaha.  Never ever would I believe that a pitcher would call for an IBB.  I can believe the pitcher would pitch a batter a foot away, hoping for a wild swing.  But, for a pitcher to say he is the one to call for the IBB without manager consent?  That’s ridiculous.

Right.  A pitcher cannot IBB a batter on his own. Never.  Ever.

Now, a manager might ask a pitcher his opinion or even what he wants to do. But it is always the manager’s decision.  Always.

“He chose the worst of the options.”

Right.  Exactly.  The correct move by far is to have a reliever pitch to Martin.  If he wants to leave Garland in there to pitch to Martin, I have no problem with that either.

Now, bringing Thatcher in to pitch to Ethier might force Torre to replace Ethier with a RHB.  I am not sure who they had on the bench.  But, according to my numbers, Thatcher is very good against RHB also.

In the 1970 world championship of Chess, Boris Spassky prepared exhaustively for his match against Bobby Fischer. Spassky had hundreds of games that Fischer had played to study, but he noticed something odd: they all started with the same move, king’s pawn two squares forward. Spassky turned to his managing team and asked, “what if he plays queen’s pawn or a knight move?”

“Nonsense,” his manager said. Fischer would never play such a move.

The problem wasn’t necessarily that Black IBB’d Martin, it’s a twofold error that he A) assumed that Torre would not surprise him, and B) telegraphed his intention to pitch to the ninth spot. When Torre saw the IBB on, how hard was it for him to turn to Ethier and say “Hey, got a pinch hit at-bat in you?”

I think A, ruling out surprises, was the more grievous mistake. Billingsley was only on 80 pitches and was doing just as well as Garland was. Add the fact that Ethier, the Dodger’s best bench player, is a bench player due to sickness earlier in the day. No sane baseball manager would fake an illness for his best hitter to send him up to pinch hit. So, Ethier really must be sick, or at the very least, not 100%.

But there’s the problem. By that logic, Bud Black ruled out that Torre would go to Ethier for Billingsley in the 9 spot, when it was certainly possible that he might. Telegraphing it with an IBB made it worse (why not instruct Garland to just not give him anything to hit in a straight AB?). Effectively, Bud Black asked himself if he’d pinch hit for Billingsley there, decided that he wouldn’t, and assumed that Torre wouldn’t as well.

It seems like a good way to do it, but the logic is backward. A manager, or and game player, must consider his opponent’s mindset, not his own, to rule out a possibility.

And, in case you’re wondering, Fischer often played queen’s pawn in the 23-game championship match. Needless to say, Spassky lost.

Interesting about the chess match.  As I mentioned, Black’s decision is not to be evaluated based on what Torre did, the same way we don’t evaluate most decisions in baseball based on results.

The question for Black is, “What are the chances that Torre pinch hits for Billingsley and with whom?”

Again, I don’t know what the break even number would be.  Someone else can estimate it if they like…