Thursday, February 24, 2011
Forecasting the past
Buster, wanting to forecast the past, must have talked to a dozen scouts, until a minority of two said what Buster was hypothesizing, and then presented the view of those 2 (and to the reader it’s 2 out of 2, as Buster is obviously not going to report on the 10 that disputes him ):
A couple of scouts say this: they saw wainwright’s arm angle dropping down the stretch last year, a sign of trouble.
This is called confirmation bias. But, this is 2011. And last year is 2010. The data is so easily available. And Jeff looked at it. And Mike looked at it. And they report that the data shows nothing of the sort.
Why not hypothesize that his speed was down, his break was less, his pitch selection less varied, and the time between pitches is longer (all of which are legitimate hypothesis), and then… ask a couple of scouts? Why would you need to ask scouts about counting numbers? You ask the number counters instead. You test your hypothesis. You don’t assert it with selectively sampling the scouts who happen to agree with you.
I love scouts. I’d hire at least 10 scouts for every one saber person. It’s guys like Buster Olney that gives scouts a bad name.


There are certain things that scouts can see for which we have no data, or our data is at such a level of abstraction and/or requires such a large sample size that it’s hard to apply to individual players in short time periods. Our data is catching up quickly on that front, though.
But there are another large set of things where the scout’s value is seeing quickly with his trained eyes what the analyst can see in his data but doesn’t think to look for. The analyst can act as a force multiplier for the scout in this case.
Eyes and training and brains and numbers and technical skills all work best when they are working in concert.