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Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Do players who sign with their own teams age better than those who don’t?

By , 02:15 AM

About 3 weeks ago, Matt Swartz wrote an article on BP that concluded fairly emphatically that players (pitchers and hitters) who sign multi-year deals with their own teams aged and performed significantly better than those who did not.  To be honest, I did not re-read the article carefully and it is not real clear what the criteria were for the various groups of players.

Here is what he wrote at the end of the article:

What appears to be happening is that teams seem to have some sense of the aging curve of individual players, especially if they are already in their organization. There are probably a variety of reasons that this subset of players aged well, but the team knowledge about the player’s medical and scouting information appears to contribute to the decision to give a player two-year deals. This is important to keep in mind when we hear of a player signing a new contract and look to a projection system to figure out how smart the deal was. Chances are that there is additional information—especially about aging—which teams have that we may not.

Today, he wrote a long article telling us why the Ryan Howard contract might not be as bad as some analysts are making it out to be.  One of the reasons he cites that it may not be so bad is that because Howard is signing with his own team, he may age better than we think (using comparable players, the traditional aging curves, etc.).


Now, when his first article came out, I must say that I thought that the results were fascinating, if not ground breaking.  In fact, it should have gotten much more attention than it did. The idea that one, teams may know a lot more about players who have been around in the majors for a while than do analysts, and that two, our projections can be vastly improved using this new found knowledge, is, well, fascinating and groundbreaking.  One could even say that it is one of the most interesting and significant things to come out of sabermetrics since DIPS.

I must also say that I was highly skeptical of the results.  I forgot who said it - maybe no one in particular - but in science, when one gets surprising results from an experiment or from research, although in this case they are not necessarily counter-intuitive, one should be very careful before one draws any conclusions from the data.  I don’t think Matt was nearly careful enough. There are so many things that need to be looked at before you can declare his thesis to be true.  For example, sample size (I realize that he said that his results were very significant), ages of the players, do teams tend to sign their own players after a particularly good or bad season.  What about other teams?  What about park effects?  Obviously for players that sign with other teams, park effects have to be considered.  What about the fact that players who switch leagues might automatically do worse until they get used to their new opposition (the opposite is actually true for pitchers)?  Maybe a team is better at determining whether a bad or good year was a fluke or not, so we are just seeing other teams tending to sign players after a flukey good year and teams signing their own players after a fluky bad year (and thus, it would APPEAR that when teams sign their own players, they get “better” the next year)?

As you can see, there are all kinds of things to look at before you declare that teams are much better at projecting their own players because they know their character, makeup, work habits, and health more so than anyone else.  Of course, what he proposes is not necessarily surprising.  What surprised me was the magnitude of the results. I would have expected little or nothing to “show through” in the data.  Keep in mind that I am not in any way shape or form saying that Matt’s thesis is not true or if it is, to what extent.  I’m just saying that I am skeptical of his results, and I think that there is much more to look into before you can draw conclusions with any kind of certainty.

Not being satisfied with just being skeptical, I decided to do a little quick research myself.  Keep in mind that I did some quick and dirty things, and that my research is probably less comprehensive than Matt’s, although I took a much different approach.

First I looked at all player years since 1980. I broke players down into 2 groups:  Both groups has at least 7 years in the majors, with no min playing time in any year.  One group played at least 3 years straight with the same team after their 6th year, and they were with that team in at least the 5th and 6th years.  That was my proxy for players who “signed multi-year deals with their teams during their FA years.” The other players were those who switched teams in their 7th year.  Those are my “players who signed with other teams”.  Obviously it is not the same as using a contract database, but it is close enough for government and sloppy sabermetric work.

The first thing I looked at was the overall aging curves of both groups of players using all of their major league years, not just those after the 6th year.  I used my usual delta method corrected for survivor bias (by filling in the “year x+1” for players who dropped out after year x).

Both curves were fairly typical of the average player, shape-wise, however there were some significant differences.  The players who stayed with their teams peaked about a year later (age 28) than those who did not, and the rise from age 20 or 21 was much steeper for the same-team players.  In fact, the same-team group gained around 27.5 runs (lwts per 500 PA) from age 20 or 21 to their peak at age 28, while the switched-team, group only gained around 17 runs to their peak at age 27.  After that, both groups declined at about the same rate, although the same-team group declined a little steeper.  So there seems to be something going on there, but I am not quite sure what it is.  As I said, there are so many variables and factors that one needs to look at before drawing any cause-effect relationships, at least in my opinion.

Next I looked at the same aging curves, but I only started each player at year 7.  So the first year of aging deltas for all players was from year 6 to year 7.  For the same-team players, they were obviously with the same teams, and for the new-team players, the 7th year was the first year with their new team.

Again, the overall curves were similar.  Again, the first group (same-team) peaked a year later than the second group.  Both groups peaked early though - 26 and 25.  The first curve was very smooth and looked exactly as you would expect from a typical player, without the normal steep rise from age 21 to 27 or so.  Obviously not many players in either group were less than age 26 or 27 since we were starting in their 6-7 year interval, so for the two curves, most of the curve is in the decline phase.  For the first group, there is no suggestion that the players aged particularly well or got better after age 26.  There is a smooth decline from age 26 onward for both groups.  For some reason, the second curve, the players who switched teams, is very choppy even though overall it is a normal decline-phase curve.  Maybe that has to do with park effects, which I am not controlling for. I don’t know.

There is one interesting difference between these curves for the two groups.  Remember these are aging curves starting with every player’s 6-7 season interval. Both curves start at around age 24-25, although there are only a few players in that interval of course, so any inferences made from the first part of these curves is suspect at best.  Anyway, there is a sharp drop after the age 25 peak for the switch teams group, while the same-team group’s curve shows somewhat of a plateau from 24 to 28 (a small decline).  After age 28, both groups show the same rate of decline until about age 34, at which time the switch-team group drops sharply again.  This could also be a small sample size fluke, but perhaps the inference here is that teams know much more about the future development of their young players than do teams that sign them after they are let go.  Maybe.

Finally, I looked at the same curves, but this time I restricted them to players who were at least 29 in their 7th year when they either stayed with their old teams or moved on to another team.  These are most of the players of course, and certainly players like Howard fit into this group.  With these players, we are obviously not talking about teams knowing how well a young player is going to develop.  If anything we are talking about whether teams know how well a seasoned player will age, which is pretty much what Matt is talking about in both of his articles.

Here is where it gets interesting.  A comparison of the two curves is exactly the opposite of that of the younger players. For the same-team group, the players decline from the get go (we are starting at age 28-29 for these curves), as expected.  For the switch-team group, they actually improve from age 28 to age 29 and then decline.  After age 30 or so, the declines in both groups are very similar, although the curve of the switch-team group is once again choppy while the same-team group’s is smooth.

Basically, I don’t see a whole lot of evidence that the aging patterns of the two groups are significantly different although one can make some inference that for younger players, the ones that stay with their teams do much better than the ones who leave, at least for the first few years after their 6th MLB season.  For older players, which are most of the sample, either they appear to age the same after their 6th season or the players who switch teams do better, again, at least for a few years into free agency.

As I said, I think there is a lot more work that needs to be done before we draw the sort of conclusions that Matt did.

#1    dcj      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 05:21

"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” - Carl Sagan (though he wasn’t the first to say it)

Interesting results, and as you say, hard to draw any definitive conclusions. A related question is whether traded prospects do worse than we’d otherwise expect. I always think of Andy Marte, but of course that’s just one data point.


#2          (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 06:31

Yes - I read that article from Matt. If true, you’re right MGL, it’s groundbreaking.

Matt’s work was reasonably anecdotal and he didn’t control for much. For me, the biggest issue I think is that I suspect ‘good’ FA (3 to 5 WAR) have higher odds of being being retained by their team.

This could conceivably cause 2 issues:

1/ Better FA players are more likely to be younger so still progressing UP the aging curve

2/ These players are likely to potentially age better because of the skill-set of that player.

On top of that you then have the small sample size issues which are probably a bigger problem.

***

Just on the Howard deal - I don’t buy the inside information theory because if that was true why wouldn’t the Phillies wait 12-18 months to get more and better information. It’s not like they inked Howard to home-discount deal is it? You’d need to believe rampant inflation to lock him up now.

Saying that I do think the idea that team decisions to renew a contract or trade a player is information that should alter our prior. So I think there is something in this but not as much as Matt claims.


#3    Kincaid      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 07:05

I haven’t seen Matt’s work since I haven’t got a BP prescription, but it doesn’t seem that surprising that the same-team group would have a later peak than the switch-teams group in this particular study.

A lot of players start their careers as mid- or late-season callups and end up being optioned to the minors at some point, which means those players likely won’t earn a full service year for every year in which they played.  For a player to be eligible for free agency after his 6th season (without putting a minimum on playing time in any season), he would have to have a permanent roster spot from his first season, so they will likely be a disproportionate number of such players in the group of players who switched teams in the 7th year.  I would imagine it’s likely that players who are full-time Major Leaguers from Opening Day of their first year are more likely to be early peakers than players who expend option years at the start of their careers and still stick around 7+ years.

Furthermore, if the same-team group requires 9 seasons (at least 3 after their 6th year), and the switch-teams group only requires 7, there could be some selective sampling that the same-team group peaks later or ages better just because they have to stay around at least 9 years to be in the sample.

With the effect of those two things, the same-team group peaking a year later might be expected from this particular study even if there is no effect of the teams knowing more about how their own players age.  I would think the sampling would at least lead to some difference in peak age, but I don’t know how much.  One year sounds reasonable, but that might be larger than the sampling quirks would predict.


#4    CJE      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 09:52

To follow up on @3, what if the second group included players who were on the same team for at least years 7 and 8? That way you have players signed to multi-year contracts. If a player switched teams after year six, and then again after year 7, they likely would not have commanded a multi-year deal from their original team anyway.


#5    Matt Swartz      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 10:35

Just a little sidenote-- please switch the spelling of my name up there.  I get it ALL the time (to the point that I literally have to tell people my name by saying “Swartz...it’s S-W.").  Anyway, just wanted to make that request first since I hate having my name is spelled so that no one can find discussions about my work, even critiques.

Firstly, please be careful not to use the word “emphatic” to describe my statements about my result.  The quote you cite is littered with “maybe"s and “chances are"s and “could be that"s, which I wouldn’t want to be mischaracterized.  I do NOT think that I have formal evidence.  I think I have a mildly strong indication of team-specific knowledge that should at least be taken into account when constructing error bars around estimates of production.  That is really not the same thing as emphatically claiming I had a conclusion.  My opinion is that any generic aging method, even one that adjusts for an individually player’s characteristics probably has a very low R^2 when used to approximate changes from one age to the next.  I don’t think that anyone would dispute the fact that there is a large amount of unexplained variance when it comes to aging of players.  Much of that unexplained variance is simply unknowable, but there is undoubtedly some information that can be obtained by even a casual fan following a team that could provide a clue.  A simple injury that the player is playing through, visual clues about changing bat speed, etc.-- these all are things that would not going into the R^2 of a delta method but can explain some fraction of year-to-year changes in performance.  Thus, it seems plausible that teams know more information than the fans or media, considering they have scouts charged with this.  Again, this is still probably a low R^2, but you can at least do some Bayesian updating on your prior of a projection system or a delta method or whatever you quantitatively at your disposal. 

Thus, it would seem plausible that players’ own teams do have more information about their players than about other players.  They’ve seen them practice.  How much do you update your prior, based on this type of information?  It’s a good question, and one that I do not feel has been answered by either one of us.  I think what we have is a suggestion that there may be a lot. 

The error bars on projections, especially several years into the future, are so incredibly wide that making emphatic statements declaring people incompetent at running their own business is just silly.  What happened after Ryan Howard’s contract was signed is exactly that.  There were a plethora of emphatic statements declaring the deal to be indefensible.  To me, that’s preposterous.  I’ve watched the Phillies with a sabermetric eye for several years, and one thing I’ve learned is that they consistently know what they are doing much more than I have given them credit for.  Thus, I wrote an article in which I said-- and please, please do not mischaracterize this statement as others have done-- that while I would guess that this is an overpriced contract, I cannot say so with any statistical certainty, and I cannot say with any statistical certainty at all that this is a disaster as so many people have done.  The error bars on Howard’s projected performance are just too wide to declare anything like that with certainty. 

Again, I’m leaning against the deal, but I cannot even begin to call it an “immediate albatross” as so many have.  At this stage, we know that you can only get far enough with the numbers to declare him about a 4.5-win player in terms of skill level.  That means that we know that the mean of the best sabermetric analysis would have him at 4.5.  It does not mean that we know he is a 4.5-win player.  I just wanted to make my point clearer before I addressed this study.

Firstly, let me explicitly say what I did.  I looked at all multi-year contracts given out to players which extended into the 2007, 2008, or 2009 seasons.  This includes players who did not actually play in those seasons, but whose initial contract terms included these years.  Then I looked total WARP3 in each deal, and divided it up by “year of contract” for 2-year contracts, 3-year contracts, and 4-year contracts separately.  I found that especially for 2-year and 3-year deals, there was a large difference between re-signed and newly-signed players in terms of the distribution of their WARP3 across their contract.  In a subsequent article, I confirmed something that Rally had written in a very underrated article about the CHONE projections which is that players underperformed their CHONE projections by about 15% in the first year of their contract.  This was also true by about 15% for players underperforming their PECOTA projections.  I separated this out-- distinguishing the first year of deals performance vs. projection for re-signed players and newly-signed players and I did not find strong evidence of a difference.  The combination of these two results implies that teams do not seem to have much extra information about the first year of the free agent deal but appear to have a better sense of future performance in years down the line.  This would be a very important conclusion if true, and should be looked into further.

I do not think that MGL’s study is looking at the correct sample.  Firstly, so few players play in the majors for the entirety for their first six seasons of play.  There are many, many players that are making an appearance in their seventh MLB season who have less than six years of service time.  Instead, I think there needs to be some correction for service time even if you cannot obtain exact service time data.

Nextly, even finding players who played for their team in the first year after free agency eligibility would not actually be a good proxy for who teams think will age well.  Players signed to one-year deals after reaching free agency would actually be the exact opposite.  I think that the variable that distinguishes the samples should absolutely focus on “the players on their own teams that those teams expect to age better than other teams expect” and “the players one their own teams that those teams expect to age worse than other teams expect.” I think in this study, you have removed this fact and are only looking at players who do and do not switch teams.  This is just not right.

Additionally, while I am sympathetic with the delta method, I cannot help but notice that the correction for survivor bias that you use seems very problematic for this particularly analysis.  Since we are looking for something that would describe whether a player’s original team knows that they are going to fall of a cliff, simply filling in the “performance” of players who did not continue to play major league baseball removes the exact dependent variable that this type of work should hope to describe.  We are not looking at a generic aging curve here.  We are looking at a team’s ability to infer the most likely outcomes among the entire set of possible aging curves, including those that hold performance steady and those likely to drop off a cliff in two years.  This is going to make the rest of the analysis and subsets that you look at mask the exact effect that we should be looking for.

Also, you look at aging curves from year 6 to year 7 and find little difference.  Even assuming that this is the point at which a player reaches free agency, you are actually only getting the same conclusion that I did for this part-- both sets of players appear to (under)perform their projections similarly in the first year of their new contracts. 

The question-- which I cannot ask loudly enough-- is whether teams are better able to infer which among their own players should be in the subset that get multi-year deals better than other teams are able to infer which among those players should be in the subset that get multi-year deals.  That is not what is being answered when you only look at players who did not switch teams.  A team going year-to-year with a player after reaching free agency should not be a proxy for that team expecting the player to age well. 

This problem is going to be most problematic for players who are at least 29 when they reach free agency, since this group is less likely to be offered multi-year deals than players who are younger.

I agree with you wholeheartedly that way more research needs to be done before anyone can make this kind of statement emphatically.  I also think that our Bayesian prior should at least be adjusted for information that teams have, and our prior should not assume that teams know the same amount of information about the players that they do see every day as the players that they do not see every day.  The numbers I got were so large that there are probably other factors in play that people have not thought of, and I would certainly never use those numerical summaries as anything resembling an aging curve at all.  I really do appreciate your willingness, MGL, to highlight the importance of looking at something that I tried very hard to highlight, but I am simply more skeptical of a study that uses samples that are such noisy approximation of the actual sample that should be studied.  My sample was too small, but it was at least a good proxy for “the set of players on their own teams that those teams expect to age well.”

Now, to respond to the other comments--

DCJ/1:
Excellent quote.  Please interpret my article as a plea for exactly that.

John Beamer/2:
I tried to look at aging but the sample sizes were so small that I did not get any meaningful information.  I don’t have my data with me at the moment and it would take a very long time to tease out the information I was able to get, but here is my honest attempt at recalling what factor age plays.  I do remember pretty well “better performance earlier in the deal” didn’t start happening until the mid-to-late 30s for all two-year deals.  I also don’t believe I found any real distinction in terms of the average age of retained vs. non-retained players.  I will try to dig through this data later if I can figure it out.  Like MGL appears to have found, getting a nice spreadsheet of contract data is hard to do, and so my spreadsheets on this topic are a mess that I have had trouble re-visiting.

Nextly, the question of “why wouldn’t the Phillies wait 12-18 months to get more and better information” is actually the question I am answering.  If the Phillies believe that Howard is likely to age well, they probably want to sign him before other teams find this out.  It would only raise their expected price.  Future expected prices are generally priced into current prices, so the Phillies appeared to believe he would cost more later.  Whether this is true or not, I am not sure, but I think that this only strengthens the evidence that the Phillies believe that they have inside information about Howard’s aging curve.

Kindcaid/3:
I agree with a lot of your issues with the looking at players who have played in six seasons and assuming they are up for free agency.  I think that makes it more important to use the sample I did, even if it’s small because it is at least representative.  The selective sampling thing you point out may be an issue as well.  I’ll let MGL address that.


#6    JD Sussman      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 10:50

To me, the study needs to be done solely on players who are on the free agent market. If you count extensions (as Matt seems to be doing because he is talking about the Ryan Howard extension) then the resigning team doesn’t have any competition for the player.

To me, the majority of players who are getting contract extensions are are talented “youngsters” or players near their peak being bought out of free agency years. From time to time we’ll see a deal like Todd Helton’s recent $10M two year deal.
If you include these exceptional young players the results are skewed (Ryan Braun, Troy Tulowiski, Ubaldo Jimenez, Aaron Hill, Justin Upton, David Wright, Jose Reyes, Brett Anderson, Gallardo, etc. etc.).

Additionally, while Howard’s deal didn’t give the Phillies a discount for security MANY of these deals do. So a team can offer the player a lesser deal (Utley, Mauer, Pujols) and resign the player. If those guys are in Matt’s pool then the results are skewed because no other team had the chance to sign these guys (and everyone expects them to keep up their performance). On occasion you’ll get the Vernon Wells type of deal (can we now add Howard in there too?) where the contract blows up in the team’s face.

To me, the deals that should be looked at are solely the free agents. Bad (Alfonso Soriano, Mike Hampton) or good (Alex Rodriguez pt.1, Manny Ramirez, Barry Bonds).

From my read of the first piece, he is lumping the two contracts but they are really separate animals.


#7    Tangotiger      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 10:56

"Anyway, just wanted to make that request first since I hate having my name is spelled so that no one can find discussions about my work, even critiques. “

I never have that problem, which is why I prefer “Tangotiger”.  Mitchel for example has his name misspelled ALL the time (both his first and last name). 

***

Regarding the wide bars in forecasts, this is clear if you just look at a forecast for Mauer.  When I did my piece for ESPN, I had these catchers as the best young catchers (through age 27) of the last 50 years:
Piazza
Rodriguez
Carter
Fisk
Bench

Their WAR from ages 28-35 were 28 to 40.  So, you can see that the WAR range is probably around +/- 20%.  So, even if you call someone a 100MM$ player, that’s +/- 20MM$.  You can fairly characterize a deal at 80MM$ and at a 120MM$.  Those are justifiable.


#8    JD Sussman      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 11:04

I didn’t see Matt’s post until I had posted mine already.

I first want to state that I really liked both pieces of Matt’s pieces and think you do excellent work (I link your stuff all the time).

_________________
“The question-- which I cannot ask loudly enough-- is whether teams are better able to infer which among their own players should be in the subset that get multi-year deals better than other teams are able to infer which among those players should be in the subset that get multi-year deals.

I wanted to elaborate on one of my points because I don’t think it was clear enough. The reason why, in my opinion, deals like Mauer, Pujols, and Utley skew the results is because significant discounts allow for teams to take significant risks. We already know how Albert and Chase performed with a good part of their contracts, but if the Twins only get 6 years out of Mauer rather than 8, I think they live with that. Likewise if Utley and Pujols both get struck by lighting tomorrow, the Cards and Phillies still made out great with those deals (god forbid they get stuck by lighting, I’m just trying to illustrate my point).

The issue with the Howard deal is that the Phillies didn’t get a discount (though your inflation point is noted and is an EXCELLENT one) and they likely could have waited until the extension signed almost a year ago was further along. Unless the Phillies know something we don’t about the market (and they likely don’t) or the CBA (they might), then I just can’t understand this deal.


#9    KY      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 11:54

Very interesting stuff!  For me, the most important thing I learned was in this sentence from Matt:

“our prior should not assume that teams know the same amount of information about the players that they do see every day as the players that they do not see every day”


#10    MGL      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 17:20

Matt, sorry about the incorrect name spelling. I am used the Jewish version. wink (That is one of those gratuitous apologies we were talking about on the other thread.)

I’ll just make 3 more comments right now, as I don’t have much time.

I do not think that MGL’s study is looking at the correct sample.

My work above was not a “study” - just a quick inquiry, so take it for what it is worth.

Nextly, even finding players who played for their team in the first year after free agency eligibility would not actually be a good proxy for who teams think will age well.

My same-team group had to play for their original team (or at least the team they played for in years 4, 5, and 6) in years 7, 8, and 9, and not just in year 7.

Firstly, please be careful not to use the word “emphatic” to describe my statements about my result.  The quote you cite is littered with “maybe"s and “chances are"s and “could be that"s, which I wouldn’t want to be mischaracterized.

Matt, I am afraid that is a disengenous statement.  Here is one quote from your Howard article:

On the other hand, players who sign two-year and three-year contracts with new teams usually decline drastically.

There ain’t no “maybe’s” or “possibly’s,” or “we think’s” in that sentence.

I think what we have is a suggestion that there may be a lot.

I think that is patently false.  While your study may have shown a suggestion of a large difference, it was so non-correcting (or non-addressing) of so many factors that could influence the results, that that “suggestion”, I believe, is not worth much.  I mean, if I do a poor or flawed study and it shows a suggestion that there is some kind of a large effect, can I conclude, “While it is certainly not definitive, my study suggests that there is a large effect of ...” If my study is bad, who cares what it suggests?

I agree that it makes perfect sense that teams know much more about their own players.  How much that allows them to predict future performance, as compared to other teams, and compared to analysts (as reflected in their projections) is the $64,000 question. Your study suggests that it may be something observable, but that’s about it.

Matt, you are getting peer reviewed by lots of smart analysts on this site at least, which is a good thing.  You are doing exactly the opposite of what a good scientist/researcher should be doing.  You are being defensive and digging your heels in. That is not a good thing.  I encourage you to take a few deep breaths, relax for a while, try and separate emotion from science…


#11    Matt Swartz      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 18:11

Come on, MGL.  That’s not a fair counterpoint.  That one statement you have found, among a million “maybe"s and “possibly"s, is a description of the data.  That set of players did decline dramatically.  I am describing the data.  They didn’t maybe decline dramatically.  They declined.  Dramatically.

Also, you quote me saying that there may be a suggestion of a large effect, call that patently false, and then say that this is a suggestion not worth much.  It’s a clue.  You called it a suggestion ten sentences later.  It does suggest more research and it does suggest that there is a major unanswered questions.

You didn’t address my criticism which said that playing for the same team in years eight and nine (which again might be before they reach free agency) doesn’t mean the team signed them to a multi-year deal.  I assume that’s coming, but without looking at multi-year deals, you have the wrong variable to separate the samples.

I’m saying that there are reasons to be careful in this analysis.  I’ve encouraged future research on this topic, while also asking questions about your “inquiry.” I didn’t dig my heels in at all, and that is unfair characterization.  I’m trying to be open minded in an environment where I am actually being literally personally attacked by several people.  Instead, you’re accusing me of being un-calm and not separating emotion from science.  I’m trying to do so while others are not.  It makes it hard to participate.


#12          (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 18:38

my thoughts are along the lines of #6 JD’s comment.  lets say teams do know more about their own players againg curves.  lets say its a lot more.  how is that useful when negotiating a contract EXTENSION?


#13    MGL      (see all posts) 2010/04/28 (Wed) @ 18:55

"You didn’t address my criticism which said that playing for the same team in years eight and nine (which again might be before they reach free agency) doesn’t mean the team signed them to a multi-year deal.  I assume that’s coming, but without looking at multi-year deals, you have the wrong variable to separate the samples.”

Matt, I didn’t address it because I didn’t do a study and I certainly didn’t choose the groups carefully.  I just did a quick inquiry in the middle of the night.

I don’t know what else to say.  Your original article was interesting and is a good start.  I am still skeptical of the results, even more so after my quick inquiry.


#14    Davor      (see all posts) 2010/04/29 (Thu) @ 02:23

It was already said here by JD, every study that looks at players who signed a new contract with their team before free agency has serious bias. Actually, better way would be to exclude all players who signed for hometown discount, but that would be almost impossible to find.
Most teams in baseball are small and medium revenue teams. Quite often they conclude that full market price is unacceptable risk, even if they would like to keep the player. Sometimes it’s because the deal is too expensive (like CC, or Santana). Other times it’s because they have prospect who can fill in well, at fraction of price (like NYY and SEA shortstops after 1996 season).
On the other hand, if player is willing to sign for less money in exchange for earlier signing, teams practically have to accept. That means that players that stay with their clubs disproportionately consist of players who are willing to sign for less.

One place where original team has big informational advantage is health of the player. Original team has all the information from multiple seasons. New team has medical records and one physical. It would be interesting to see if someone could eliminate players who suffer non-accidental injury from the sample and then see if there is any difference between those who stayed and those who changed the team.


#15          (see all posts) 2010/04/29 (Thu) @ 02:33

Intuitively, it does seem teams should have better idea on the health and personal habits (off season work ethic, alcohol, drugs, etc) that might affect aging of that player, even if the numbers can not find evidence of it.

One of the things that make analysis of players aging so hard in recent years is knowing who used PED’s, and when did they use them.  Before PED’s, players simply did not age well as hitters.  The Hank Aarons of the world were a rarity.  This started changing in the 80’s, and really exploded in the steroid era when players were having career years past 35.

Given the known health effects of steroids (side effects, long term damage), it’s probably not surprising that some portion of PED users simply stop using after getting that big contract as a FA, and so suffer unexpected declines.

I think teams have a good idea which players on their team were using, and given the testing that started from 2004, have used that information to decide to retain or not retain such players. 

So this is problematic, since the sample of players who are known to have used, and then not used, is so small, and those who are assumed clean, may not have been so.  Also, there are players teams wanted to retain yet could not since the player was going after the best deal.

This is a hypothesis that rings true, yet finding statistical evidence would be difficult, and not conclusive even if found.

“For the switch-team group, they actually improve from age 28 to age 29 and then decline.”

The age 28 or age 29 FA are players who broke in at a young age, and may be more likely to be elite players than 30+ yo FA.  Or they may have had poor seasons in the 1-2 years prior to FA due to injury or some other reason, which is the reason they are not retained, and then rebound health wise and stat wise with another team.


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