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THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

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Wednesday, September 17, 2008

A great description and analysis of a gutless, bone-headed move or non-move by Yost

By , 02:58 AM

by our friend Joe Sheehan of BP.  I hope I am not violating copyright laws by reprinting such a large passage from his “premium content” article.  If I am, and someone lets me know, I will remove it of course.  Actually, I think this was a free article, but I am not sure it makes any difference as far as reprinting passages goes.  Anyway…


Yost has to take a big part of the blame as well, after making some of the worst tactical decisions you’ll see. In the eighth inning of yesterday’s first game, the Brewers were tied 3-3. Guillermo Mota allowed a leadoff single to Jayson Werth, and was lifted for Brian Shouse so that Shouse could face Chase Utley and Ryan Howard. (Charlie Manuel’s refusal to always put a right-handed batter between those two is a big reason why the Phillies will have trouble winning a short series.) Utley sacrificed Werth to second, setting up Shouse versus Howard.

Yost elected to walk Howard to face Pat Burrell. This was… well, it strains my vocabulary to find the right word for it. Howard cannot hit left-handers, and would be a platoon player if performance mattered anywhere near as much as reputation does. Or if he had a competent manager. Howard is at .228/.313/.458 against lefties in his career, .212/.287/.410 this year. Howard. Can’t. Hit. Lefties. Shouse, on the other hand, is in the major leagues for exactly one reason: lefties can’t hit him, to the tune of .175/.192/.289 this year, and .211/.263/.325 for his career, which includes a bunch of years when he was barely a major leaguer. Manuel sending Howard up against Shouse was a continuation of a theme for the Phillies: not hitting for Howard when he has little chance of doing something good. He was giving Yost an out, and Yost gave it right back.

That set up Shouse versus Pat Burrell, which cried out for a right-handed reliever. After all, Shouse is a pure specialist (.307/.390/.455 vs. RHB career; .293/.371/.446 this year). The only way walking Howard even might make sense is if Yost were to bring in a righty to try and get a double play out of Burrell. Burrell doesn’t have the big platoon splits he showed earlier in his career—he’s a dangerous hitter against both kinds of hurlers—but leaving Shouse in to face him was asking for trouble.

Think about this for a second. Yost had a 481 OPS pitcher facing a 697 OPS hitter. He elected to issue an intentional walk in that situation to allow an 817 OPS pitcher to face a 905 OPS hitter with an additional runner on base. That’s when you start looking around the roof of the stadium for snipers, because gunpoint is the only place where that kind of decision makes sense.

(bolding mine)

The only “black mark” in the article, which included other things, like the Cubs/Astros playing in MIL (which I think was no big deal - at all). was this:

Most of the home-field advantage stems from the tactical advantage of batting last

As far as I know, the LEAST of the HFA stems from the home team batting last (I am not sure there is any tactical advantage at all, as the defense has a nearly equal tactical advantage of “fielding last"), and Joe should know this.

Anyway, great line about the “sniper.” This was also a great line:

He (Yost) earned his firing, and short of replacing him with Dakota Fanning or something, the Brewers will be better off for his absence.

#1          (see all posts) 2008/09/17 (Wed) @ 07:26

You are correct that batting last has little to no impact.  Here’s one study (http://www.sportmedab.ca/pdf/Baseball.pdf), but I know there’s another one that got published in a journal and examined baseball and I believe cricket as well (I don’t know that game at all but for some reason it rings a bell as being in the study).  Not being a student anymore, I don’t have access to any good resources, but I’ll see if I can find it.


#2    MGL      (see all posts) 2008/09/17 (Wed) @ 09:51

Fairly interesting study, although if this is kid’s baseball, which it seems to be (there is no mention of ages in the study I don’t think), I would think that its relevance to MLB might be pretty weak.

I don’t know how many games in MLB have been played at neutral sites over the years, but I would think that including the ASG, it might be several hundred.  Surely someone has looked at these games.


#3    DJH      (see all posts) 2008/09/17 (Wed) @ 10:00

"Howard ... would be a platoon player if performance mattered anywhere near as much as reputation does. Or if he had a competent manager.”

The first explanation seems dead-on.  Does anyone believe that any other manager in MLB would platoon Howard?  Is this a veiled assertion that every manager is incompetent?


#4    Tangotiger      (see all posts) 2008/09/17 (Wed) @ 10:25

When I run a Markov:
http://tangotiger.net/innwin3.html

We see that entering the top of the 9th, the home team has a .522 chance of winning the game, when tied.  Entering the bottom of the 9th, they have a .655 chance of winning.

When I looked at empirical (actual) results:
http://tangotiger.net/innwin2.html

Those numbers are .519 and .649.

If anything, it might be a disadvantage.  In any case, I’ll call it a draw.

***

If the home team is up by 1, meaning that they have their ace reliever on the mound, their win% in the top of the 9th is actually .873 compared to a Markov expectation (with an average pitcher) of .853.

When the home team is down by 1, in the bottom of the 9th (meaning they are facing the opponent’s ace), the actual is .189 compared to the Markov of .204.

In both instances, the ace reliever helps by close to .020 wins, compared to an average pitcher.

The “advantage” in the ninth inning is whoever can get their ace reliever on the mound.


#5    Pronk      (see all posts) 2008/09/17 (Wed) @ 10:47

Tango, that’s interesting stuff. It seems to put to rest the notion that batting last gives an advantage - that advantage should be more extreme later in the game and your numbers show the opposite.
How does the Markov chain take into account the HFA? Does it just give a boost to the home team for every at-bat?
The empirical results seem to show that there’s a (relatively) big drop in HFA if it’s still tied after the first inning. Is it possible that starting pitchers have a little more trouble getting used to the mound on the road? But, if that’s the case, relievers should be affected, too.


#6    MGL      (see all posts) 2008/09/17 (Wed) @ 21:34

The empirical results seem to show that there’s a (relatively) big drop in HFA if it’s still tied after the first inning.

I never heard that before.  Can you give us more details?

I am not sure why anyone, let alone one of the main BP guys, would think that batting last gives a strategic advantage. How about “defending last” or “pitching last.” Common sense and anyone who watches baseball should tell us that the defensive team has as many or more options in the bottom of the inning in a close game.  Infield in.  Outfield in.  Changing pitchers.  IBB’s.  Etc.  What exactly does the home team have?  Pinch hitting and bunting or not, and the way managers utilize the bunt in late game situations (too aggressively), they probably reduce their wp anyway.  Whatever changes in approach the batters can make, certainly the pitchers can do the same (opposite, I guess).

Not to mention that road teams typically bring in their closers after going ahead in tie games or games they were losing prior to their last AB.  Home teams generally do not.  If I had to give a strategic edge to one side or the other, I think I would give it to the road team.


#7    tangotiger      (see all posts) 2008/09/18 (Thu) @ 06:50

The worse numbers in the second inning is probably because there are worse hitters batting in the second inning.  You would hope this cancels out for both sides, but I guess it doesn’t.

The 5th/6th inning change to the 7th inning is probably because of the pitching change.


#8    KJOK      (see all posts) 2008/09/18 (Thu) @ 12:47

I’d recommend the paper that can be downloaded here:

http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/wpawuwpga/0309002.htm


#9    Tangotiger      (see all posts) 2008/09/18 (Thu) @ 13:32

According to Ted’s research in the link above, it looks like we are talking about a .001 win difference (in some direction).  Against that is all the other things that are not modeled, as mgl says, based on what the fielding team does.

And, like I said, my empirical results more or less match the Markov expected.

In the Olympic-rule for extra innings, batting last would be preferred, since you have two guys on base, and you have to know how valuable is that runner on first base.


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