THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

Why is Napoli batting 8th? He’s arguably Texas’s best hitter.

On the 3-2 pitch to Cruz with 2 outs and runners on 1 and 2 in the 1st inning, McCarver said he is going to throw a slider and it probably won’t be a strike.  Again, if that is true, and McCarver knows it, then certainly the batter knows it as well.

I hate to keep harping on pitcher predictability and game theory, but what is the point of throwing an off-speed pitch in a fastball count if you throw it a high percentage of the time.  Then it no longer becomes a fastball count in that situation!  The idea of throwing an off-speed pitch in a fastball count is to surprise the batter or at least be more unpredictable than just throwing a fastball 80% of the time.

And it looked exactly like Cruz was expecting the slider (he didn’t even flinch on the outside pitch).

With good or great pitchers, you CANNOT guess their pitches unless the game and count situation dictates a certain pitch at 80, 90 or even 100% frequency.  That should not have been the case with the 3-2 count to Cruz.  Jackson should have thrown the fastball around 50% of the time and the slider (or change-up) around 50% of the time.

These are the kinds of things that commentators, especially ex-catchers or pitchers, should be taking about, rather than trying to impress us with how often they can guess a certain pitch…

Zack, same reason he batted 7th or lower in all the other games.  Wash does not want to upset the apple cart, and managers are not very astute at understanding lineup construction, especially the concept that the higher in the order you bat, the more PA you get, and that makes a difference even in one game. Can you imagine the blank stare you would get from a manager if you said to him, “You know, if you bat so-and-so 8th rather than 4th, he is going to get .34 fewer PA per game on the average...”

That is just amazing to me.

Even if you use “traditional theory” in regards to lineup construction and the #2 hitter, Napoli is their best hitter with 2-strikes, y’know giving the guy at 1B a chance to steal and still being able to produce when behind in the count.

Wouldn’t you prefer Andrus down in the order so that his speed and/or stolen bases can occur with a less powerful hitter (singles type) to reduce the risk involved? I would imagine sabermetrics supports this as well, but don’t recall any specific studies off the top of my head.

The only thing I can think of with having him down in the order is that it essentially gives them “two cleanup hitters” (as the traditional thinking might term it), but I don’t buy into that at the ML level. In youth travel baseball (where all players on the roster bat) or even JH/HS, perhaps.

MGL, Amen to that about managers and lineup construction. It simultaneously annoys, bewilders, and entertains me at how many 1-2 guys are “fast, little, and scrappy” but have sub-.700 OPSs when they will lead the team in plate appearances.  So much production is given away.

Did Yadi even run that ground ball out?  Ah, it’s only the 4th game of the World Series.  There will be plenty more games to run hard…

MGL,

One thing that was surprising to me was that batters were fooled by Lohse’s changeup.

Watching the replays, you could easily see the “circle” being made by his fingers as he brings the ball down and behind his body. In other words, he doesn’t hide the ball well.

Now, to you or me with our vision and reflexes, it’s no big deal we can;t see it or hit it anyway.

But, to hitters that detect all sorts of things such as wrist angle, finger on top or on the side of the ball, I would think that it would be a huge giveaway. AJ has been talking about pitchers giving away their pitches by whether they look up or down or have their tongue in or out, “showing the circle” would seemingly be a big no-no.

MGL,

I agree. Even Yadi isn’t that slow. My opinion without evidence (Heh Heh) is that he thought it was a single, as did I. Yadi may even run down the line on defense in case of a bad throw to 1B faster than he got down the line on that play.

Kinsler really is the “Chase Utley” of the American League ... the opponent you should hate, but he’s just so damn good and plays the game so hard and well, that you couldn’t hate him even if you tried to.

So how many sliders is Jackson going to throw in “fastball counts” before he realizes that batters can think too?

Seriously, McCarver is obsessed with throwing off speed pitches in fastball counts.  That does that mean?  It means you have enough command and confidence in your off-speed pitches to throw them in fastball counts maybe 30, 40, or 50% of the time, depending on the batter and the situation, rather than 80 or 90% of the time.

One of the reasons Jackson, who has very good stuff, and was a great prospect a few years ago with the Dodgers, has not become an elite pitcher, is probably at least partly due to his pitch selection.  He is too predictable…

MGL:

The other reason Edwin Jackson has fallen short of his lofty prospect status is 35/40 command.

Is it wrong for me to really like Edwin Jackson?

He’s had 3.6-3.8 WAR seasons over each of the last 3 seasons, and even saberists treat him like a dog.

Granted he is frustrating in situations where he follows a beautiful 1-1 changeup to Hammy making it 1-2 with a fastball that misses “in the zone”.

But, in terms of WAR for Dollars, he’s been one of the largest values over the last 3 years, and he doesn’t get much attention for it. He’s been providing “double the value” in terms of WAR/$.

Last 2 years 7 WAR for 13M as a starting pitcher. Go to last 3 years and it’s something like 11 WAR for 18M.

Sure.  I think with his command, even though not elite, and his stuff 94-96 FB, plus change and slider, he should be better than he is, which is around a league average starter…

Yeah, probably does not get as much love as he should.  Plus, he has gotten better with age, which is fairly unusual for pitchers…

Circle Change:

Separate discussion/argument but I can support/applaud your value evidence for Edwin.  Would never be a guy for me (especially now that he’s hitting contract maturity years) because I’d rather pay for the SP who gives up 3 runs every 6 or 7, very consistently, as opposed to the one who gives up 1 or 2 on more occasions but 5+ more often as well.  I prefer being “kept in the game” more often by the SP that you’re paying 4 for 40 or whatever to.

ESPN Radio just said that, per TLR, Punto got the start tonight because he’s 3-for-5 against Holland career. I truly can’t come up with snark worthy of belittling that right.

” because I’d rather pay for the SP who gives up 3 runs every 6 or 7, very consistently, as opposed to the one who gives up 1 or 2 on more occasions but 5+ more often as well.  I prefer being “kept in the game” more often by the SP that you’re paying 4 for 40 or whatever to.”

1) I don’t know that there is any evidence that “consistency” among pitchers is much of a skill.  If it isn’t, then that should not affect your decision to have him on your team unless you are going back in time.

2) I don’t know that there is much difference in overall value between a pitcher who is more consistent and one who isn’t, but that is moot if 1 is true.

I know that’s his “rep”, but if you look up his QS%, it’s right where you’d want it to be (IIRC).

Before the playoffs, he had given StL something like 10 QS in 14 Games Started.

I looked up his 2011 game log, 20 QS in 32 GS (~2/3 of the time).

For me, he’s very difficult to tell when he’s “losing it” because his command is so erratic even in his good games.

I think a case could be made that there are quite a few times when he’s simply left in the game too long because he can tolerate a high workload (which is amazing for a slider pitcher).

Even when he does give up big runs, his managers seem to keep in him the game for more innings than they “should” to save the bullpen or thinking he’ll “work through it”, and I’m not just speaking of the start for StL where he gave up 10 runs and finished 7 IP.

I agree with you in that I prefer to be “in more games” than I do the shutout here and there, by as sabermetric fans, I thought we were supposed to look at overall value WAR when valuing players?

I also wonder how the QS% of the league average starter compares.

I did some half-arse looking into it a while ago and found that SPs generally win something like 70% of their QS, and it didn’t really seem to vary based on pitcher quality (Dan haren was an outlier), and the big difference between pitchers was simply the number of QS they provided (or QS%). So, using that, EJ should win (traditional wins) 14 games. That’s pretty good for a 3-4 pitcher in your rotation, especially for 5-9M/y.

EJ is never going to be Halladay (you know what I mean), and he is going to drive pitching coaches crazy trying to figure him out, but in terms of value as a SP he’s 17th in fWAR from 2009-11. I picked those years because that’s when he seemed to “figure it out” a little bit. If one wanted to yell “sample selection bias”, I’d be guilty as charged.

MGL:

There is absolutely evidence of SP performance consistency, perhaps runs (earned or otherwise) is not the way to define it.  In fact, it certainly isn’t.  But you want to take a group of starters with similar overall performances (in yield categories let’s say) and then track start-to-start variation.  Guys like Halladay, Haren, Vazquez (in a good year) are known to me as very consistent types at their production level versus others.  Maybe those elites aren’t a good example.  But getting back to Edwin Jackson or A.J. Burnett, they’ll have fewer quality starts (or real quality starts or adjusted quality starts, whichever) than pitchers of similar production (peripheral) because of… what’s the explanation - command, approach, aptitude?  Whatever it is, it’s certainly discernible, I think.

Circle Change:

20-32 QS (even as it’s generically defined, which I don’t totally agree with) is plenty good.  But I’d be curious what his QS% was in ‘09-’10.  I’m thinking it’ll be sub-60%, and probably closer to 50%, which is vexing given his stuff, going back to my original point.  If it’s 60%+ (09-10), then I tip my cap and stand corrected about my impression of Jackson’s consistency and how it affects his value, even moving forward.

Is there a study that indicates that unstable performance leads to fewer wins? Let’s say he’s a 2.50 ERA 75% of the time and a 5.50 ERA 25% of the time, how many team wins does that break down to compared to a “steady” 3.25 ERA pitcher?

Even if the effect exists, don’t the improved performance games offset the poor performance ones? At least mostly?

Jeff, the existence of ANY splits among players is NOT evidence that it is a skill.  It could be random fluctuation and it could be a skill.  Most splits are the former.  You have to run statistical tests to determine the amount of “skill.”

Lots of pitchers have pitched way better or worse on odd days then even days, on weekends rather than weekday, in cities that start with the letter A-L, etc.  How do you determine whether there is a repeatable skill in these splits or they are just random blips?  It is the same thing with pitchers being “consistent” or not…

Brad, you don’t really need a study with empirical data, although it would help. You can figure it out theoretically using the typical distribution of runs scored.  Tango has done this and you can find the results if you search our blog.

I think that if you are a bad pitcher, you would rather be inconsistent and if you are good, you would rather be consistent, but I am not sure, and the effect is not large, at least practically speaking…

this articlecomes to mind…

http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2009/5/3/863382/consistency-factor

This will be an interesting 3-2 pitch to Napoli.

I think that when Dave Duncan came out to talk to Jackson earlier in the game he told him to mix up his pitches more at 3-1 and 3-2.

MGL:

I agree there has to be statistical and sample vetting before it can be termed a skill.  But I also believe (in the least a 3-year capture) that “quality start” consistency/inconsistency if detected can then be termed a trait/skill for a pitcher.

Days of the week and cities that start with a certain letter are not reasonable effects to a pitcher’s performance so their data grouping is fun at best and more fairly just fodder.

Circle Change - I don’t think it offsets no, but I’ll defer to MGL or anyone else at BP that has some WE backup.  I think a team wins more games with a 3.25 SP ERA vs. 2.25 versus loses at a 5.25 ERA.  To restate more clearly, I think a 5.25 SP ERA performance is more likely to lead to a loss (detrimental) than the difference of a 2.25 to 3.25 SP ERA is going to lead to a win.

2010: 16/32
2009: 21/33

Looking through his games logs there are quite a few (IMO) times when he’s allowed 4 or 5 ER in 7 or 8 IP, which do not qualify as a QS, but games where you wonder “why is he still in?”. In other words, he may have had a QS going (3 ER or less in 6 IP, but then lost it in the 7th or 8th), or he was just pitching innings while trailing in score and saving the bullpen.

There are also, IMO, too many games where he’s been left in to absorb the abuse, 6+ ER in <4 IP.

In 2010, ARZ allowed him to give up 10 ER in 2.1 IP and then 8 ER in 4.1 IP in the following start. Granted, some of those ER could have been on hits given up by relievers.

His teams seem to let him [1] pitch too long into games and [2] absorb too much abuse. I think the case could be that as a SP, EJ has been pretty much treated like crap in terms of how he’s been used, but I admit that I don’t have a standard to compare that against.

Note: In 2009, ARZ endured bullpen injuries, RPs traded, and had the worst BP in MLB. That could be why he was used as such.

For StL, it was QS in 9/12 of GS, not including a game where he allowed 2 ER over 5.1 IP. I concede that’s SSS, but IMO it also reflects how StL has used him. He’s never pitched into the 8th inning as a Cardinal. Obviously, I cannot prove that and I wouldn’t use IP, but rather NPC or PAP or pitches with runners on base or things of that nature.

According to this article

http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/same-old-same-old/

being inconsistent leads to MORE wins than being consistent, given the same overall talent.

Jeff, it doesn’t matter whether something SEEMS like a skill or not.  One has to determine, statistically, whether it is or it is not, and then, the extent that it is, as compared to random fluctuations, for any given sample size.

The simplest way to do that is to identify the extent (using some kind of metric) that each pitcher is consistent or not over a period of several years. Then run a regression on one year to another (do this for several years) and see what the resultant correlation coefficient (r) is.

If it is a skill, then the “r” will be significantly positive. If it isn’t then the r will be low or near zero, in which case, being consistent or not in the past has no predictive value, since essentially the value of the “r” IS a measure of the amount of predictability.

When we do that for pitcher BABIP, we get a low “r” - hence very little skill in pitcher BABIP.  Same for clutch skill.  Same (a little larger “r") for platoon skill for RHB.  Same for day/night and home/road splits. 

BTW, everyone has a home/road and a platoon split.  A low “r” means that any deviation from the average is random and not a skill - it does not mean that everyone’s split is zero…

Circle Change:

Again, accepting that generic QS is useful enough to define consistency within this discussion, his 2010 performance and perhaps even pre-09 is the impression I’ve carried of him and worries me in paying him bigtime moving fwd.  But the 65% (circa) from ‘09 makes it at least arguable that my impression isn’t correct and/or that he could be moving into his performance prime where, over the life of his next contract, he’ll perform consistently on a high enough basis to make him more valuable than I thought before we began this discussion.  But the WAR/salary intersection of these last few years is positively instructive, I agree.

This has gotta be EJ’s last inning, doesn’t it?

I initially looked up the QS stuff in response to Joe Saunders being mocked for being labeled as a “winner” due to his W-L %.

I didn’t find him to be different than other more well known SPs in regards to the number of QS’s that he “won”, he just didn;t throw as many QS as the top guys. In other words, in the games where he was recorded as the winning pitcher, he pitched well enough to win.

Dan Haren was the one guy that I recall that was just incredibly unlucky in terms of Wins/QS. Something like 60-63% of his QS ended up as traditional pitcher wins.

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I’m not a fan of the term “effectively wild”, but in Jackson’s case I might make an exception. It hard for the batter to know where it’s going when the pitcher doesn’t.

As far as Jackson’s pitch selection and things of that nature, how often does he shake off a sign as compared to league average?

MGL:

Fair enough. What I’m saying then is I believe that if a regression analysis were run on starting pitching consistency, then the resulting coefficient found would be high enough to indicate a skill.

What do you mean that platoon skill as a RHB “isn’t a skill.” For some players it absolutely is.  Kevin Mench, Mike Napoli, just quick off the top of my head, had/have enough of an established track record splitting vs. LHP that it could be deemed a skill.  Did I misunderstand what you wrote?  While it can be random/noisy (therefore luck and not a skill) for some performers, other traits/track records for other players absolutely indicates a skill.

McCarver was saying how good one of Hamilton’s swings was.  On the replay, you can see that he is swinging all arms, with little legs and hips because of the groin injury.  That makes it look like he is swinging hard.  He is flipping his wrists like a golfer who swings all arms and little lower body.  They sometimes look like they have a high swing speed (they don’t) but the ball goes nowhere…

I wonder if McCarver realizes that Jay played 159 games this year (and 105 last year,) or that he’s a a career .298 hitter?

I don’t have the numbers in front of me (it is in The book), but for a RHB, you have to take his observed L/R splits and regress them 50% after like 2000 PA (against the lesser of RHP and LHP PA) I think.  He average platoon ratio for OPS is 1.09 for a RHB I think.  That means that it a batter has an observed platoon ratio of 1.31 (a lefty “masher"), if that occurred over 6 years, you would still have to regress that 1.20 halfway toward 1.09, to get his estimated true platoon skill of 1.20.

Again, you keep confusing someone’s observed splits and their true split talent.  Just because someone or many people have large, out of the ordinary splits does NOT mean that they are “real”. You have to do statistical tests on the whole population to figure out how much of that extreme observed split is real and how much is random.

For example, because we find very little (almost zero) correlation in clutch stats from one time period to another, even if a batter has enormous clutch splits for a few years, we HAVE to assume that it is just random and has almost no predictive value (it has a tiny amount because there probably IS a small clutch skill), thus it has virtually no relevance to making decisions regarding that player in the future.

Funny, Vegas had the over/under in last night’s game at around 9.5 runs.  Because they scored so many runs last night, even though tonight’s pitchers are arguably better, the over/under was almost a run higher.  You usually don’t see that kind of irrationality in the Vegas lines, but in the post-season you might…

Is it just me, or are the Chase freedom and sapphire cards commercials really annoying?

"Effectively wild” is a ridiculous (misleading) expression.  Either you are good with your command or you are not.  Is it possible for a pitcher to be better not knowing where his ball is going than if he were able to spot it effecively?  No, unless he was just awful are choosing locations!

Now, if a pitcher has great stuff (with good movement) than he can still be effective even if his command is not good.  But, he would be even better, of course, if he commanded his pitches more…

Jackson should not be in the game here, obviously. But contemplating Mitchell Boggs as his replacement is also baffling; Oliver has Boggs projected as the worst pitcher on the postseason roster.

....what on Earth was all that about? That is why so many people hate La Russa.

MGL, you were saying?

That situation had ‘Dotel’ written all over it.

Heh, on cue Phil.  On cue.

With a LI of 1.86 I was just about to ask if anyone would consider bringing in one of their “setup guys” or even “closer” in that situation.  Boggs was probably not the right call…

Yup, if Dotel had not been used yesterday…

I have Boggs rated poorly overall but with a large platoon split, so he is actually effective against RHB but horrible against LHB.

That is classic LaRussa. He has a knack for doing things that are sub-optimal because he has some goofy matchup in mind…

"That is why so many people hate La Russa.”

To be honest, people hate LaRussa often for the things he does right, like take starters out early, and use a lot of L/R matchups.  They don’t realize a lot of the stuff that he does wrong…

That was a serious “softball swing” by Napoli. Matt Stairs would be proud.

I don’t know how you “uppercut” that pitch without fouling it off, but he sure as hell did.

TLR was/is probably saving Dotel for later in the game. Now, we’ll probably see him starting an inning.

Maybe I’m thinking of the wrong guy, but I thought Dotel was the designated pitcher against Napoli? Am I just imagining that?

Well I was referring to the long “fake” of removing Jackson, followed by removing Jackson.  Baseball shouldn’t allow managers to stall that long.  It’s just annoying.

Also, apparently it didn’t help Boggs much, heh.

MGL:

If I’m understanding you correctly, and you’re remembering right that it requires 2000 PA before you can determine the statistic validity of a RHB’s platoon skill, then that is why scouting must be combined with statistical analysis to optimally evaluate players because I am not alone in observing that guys like Napoli and Mench, ooh Bobby Kielty had it too, have a platoon skill as RHBs vs LHP.

Have you ever known anyone in “real” life who does a lot of unconventional things, even when some of them are incorrect, just because they think they are smarter than everyone else and in order to prove that, they have to do things differently?  I do.

That is LaRussa in a nutshell.  I’ve said this for many years.  When I worked for the Cards and I met him for the first time, he basically laughed me out of the room (he has no use for sabermetrics or sabermetricians - none at all)…

In all fairness, he was cordial from what I can remember. I have nothing against him personally.  He also runs a great animal foundation, as far as I know.  I am an animal lover as well, and I have supported his foundation.

Ryan JL:

Absolutely:  We were talking about this last night in here.  That “game on the line” high-leverage situation, even in the 6th inning, is where you bring in your best available reliever because the game can be won or lost before the traditional “setup” “closer” usage point in the game, as it may be in this one now that it’s 4-0.  This is something that haunts ML in-game strategy to long lengths and will be interesting to see if a team/manager ever executes a better understanding of it.

Maybe Wash will move Napoli up to 7th tomorrow?

MGL/#49

That is the impression I have always gotten from LaRussa and his management style. I appreciate you slipping this nugget into the thread.

MGL:

Interesting and sensible insight from TLR, and not surprising about his anti-sabermetrician stance.  Established guard just too scared to be the 1st to submit to the power of probability that could greatly impact baseball strategy, such as lineup construction, in-game strategy, and staff management.

On the topic, wouldn’t you think Joe Maddon (who I never met in my 7 years with the Jays) would be the current manager most apt to subscribe to some of this.  He’s pretty intellectual from what I gather, including in local media (as I live in Tampa).

I don’t know why LaRussa bats Berkman so high versus LHP.  He is basically helpless versus a LHP.  Now, granted he is not going to face a lefty the entire game, but it is ironic that a guy (Berkan) with a .690 OPS versus RHP the last 3 years bats 5th and a guy with .832 (Napoli) bats 8th…

In LaRussa’s ‘defense’ (if you can call it that given I don’t like him as a manager), when everyone in baseball calls you a genius, it’s likely hard not to go along with it, especially when we as humans have a lower standard of proof on things that we want to agree with *grin*.

He’s smart because he’s a lawyer, and he’s a baseball genius because well, look at all his manager wins ... or so the commentary goes.

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I’m on record here, saying the the 5th should have been Jackson’s last inning in the form of a question, but why on Earth was he allowed to start the 6th? He already had 5 walks and was struggling with command. Even if he starts the 6th, why allow him to continue after the 1st walk? Because he’s only allowed 1 run?

"On the topic, wouldn’t you think Joe Maddon (who I never met in my 7 years with the Jays) would be the current manager most apt to subscribe to some of this.  He’s pretty intellectual from what I gather, including in local media (as I live in Tampa).”

Yes and no.  He is very intellectual and he definitely works with sabermetricians in the front office.  But he also suffers from the same ailment as TLR in that he fancies himself smarter than everyone else and sometimes makes very poor, unconventional decisions…

MGL:

I expect that’s right (your assessment of Maddon) but just thought he might combine enough of the quirk, confidence, success, and intellect to have “the light come on” and be cutting edge with employing a lot of this.

What say you?  Anyone else, a current manager that might actually understand the benefits and begin employing some of the probability strategy most sabermetricians harp on?

That’s it for Holland, right? Or do you let him pitch to Punto (or a PH), Furcal, and Craig?

Wow, not too many managers (read: none) come even close.  Even for the sabermetric teams (like Boston).  That is a big market inefficiency, IMO.  It could mean 1-3 more wins for a team having a completely sabermetric manager.

And it comes from the top. It is going to take a bold front office to start by hiring a manager who is amenable to people “telling him what to do” and then to work with him in implementing some of these things.

It will happen but it will take a while…

Nice effort by the RF’er.  Don’t want to get your uniform dirty or anything…

I kind of think that a sabermetric manager would likely be a non-player, and there is a big stigma attached to hiring a manager who wasn’t a player, I think.

Ryan/#62

I just think you would need a former player like Brian Bannister who is open to sabermetrics.

When I first got to Toronto in ‘04, Carlos Tosca was the manager and he was a non-player.  Things didn’t go well and he didn’t last long.  It’s rare but does have precedent.  Rather than player/non-player, I think it lies more with the candidate being open to sabermetrics in combination with “balls” to oppose the norm.  So many risk/game theory decisions, in life too, are made with the protection of defending failure (like “everyone does it this way").  Will be interesting.

Right there are plenty of players who have the qualifications.  And of course it is going to be much easier for someone who played or was raised in the sabermetric era.  So it will take some time…

Wow. Holland pitching the 9th.  Interesting.  I guess if you want to save your pen.

Classic situation that we were discussing in the other threads.  9th inning, large lead…

Really? Wasting Feliz in this situation?

MGL, while I agree with you about sabermetric managers, I remember that you attended the same Saber Seminar at Harvard in May that I did (you were kind enough to autograph my copy of The Book!).  Tom Tippett was questioned about moves that Francona would make that went against what he should do sabermetrically.  As I recall (and forgive me if I’m mischaracterizing Tippett’s position), Tippett seemed to think that a) the types of strategy moves sabermetricians typically analyze represent only a small portion of the responsibilities of managers and b) the manager would “lose” the players (whatever that means) if he appeared to be a puppet of the sabermetric front office.  What, if anything, do you make of all of this?

I don’t remember what Tippet said (great seminar, BTW), but those are definitely things that would have to be dealt with.

As far as in-game decisions being a small part of a manager’s responsibilities and value, that may or may not be true, but does it make any sense to deliberately ignore 1-3 wins (or even a half a win) a year because of that?  Of course not!  Now, you wouldn’t want to hire someone like me because I would not have the other, important skills required to manage an MLB team, but is it unreasonable to think that eventually you can’t find or cultivate a manager who possesses both skills or at least one that is amenable to listening to and working with the front office on that level?  Again, I don’t think so.

And as far as the players are concerned, again, that is an issue you will have to deal with. If you have the right manager (that the players respect) and it is handled by the front office in the appropriate manner, I don’t see how that would be a problem. I think that is too much hand-waving or hand-wringing, or whatever the proper expression is, by Tippett.  Many of the things that a manager would or would not do would be completely opaque to the players anyway.

In pretty much no other business besides sports could you survive as a manager (in the broad sense) by ignoring relevant statistics.  That being said, the statistics also never make a decision, they only inform a decision.  You still have to deal with actual personalities, actual instead of statistical fatigue and injury, microclimatic weather and field conditions, and your own individual sense of gamesmanship.  And sometimes in a split second.  Still, that argues for spending a lot of time grounding oneself in the statistics, not treating them like a plague.

In pretty much no other business besides sports could you survive as a manager (in the broad sense) by ignoring relevant statistics.

I would think that sabermetrics would simply say that managers are using the wrong statistics, rather than ignoring the relevant ones.

I don’t know that you can ignore something intentionally that you are unaware of.

The tough situation for a sabermetric manager is the margin for error. You better win and win right away, otherwise you’ll be hand-waved off. Even then, you need to be able to show how you’re moves pay off better than what the traditional manager does.

For example, I recall Joe Maddon IBB’ing Cabrera to get to Boesch on consecutive nights, one of those situations with a runner on 1B and a close game. Boesch ended the inning both times. How is he not a genius the fan asks?

I mentioned this in another thread only because it’s interesting but Pujols has been IBB’d 3 times in the playoffs, all 3 times the inning has ended at Matt Holliday and no runs scored. Again, it;s difficult to explain to a team or fan how that reasoning is “wrong”?

I’ve been trying like heck to get my dad to understand that Theriot is not good. Then he goes out and gets 7 hits in consecutive LDS games against Philly.

#70, very well said!

#71, right on the money!

Larry Dierker was a veteran MLB player and Astros manager, who wrote a book where he highlighted his pro-saber stance, even having to argue with Brad Ausmus on one play when he lost the dice roll.

http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=neyer_rob&id=1577994

Because of the way Dierker preferred to manage, he might have been subject to more criticism from his players than if he’d been more conventional. In his book, Dierker writes about the usefulness of OPS (on-base percentage plus slugging percentage), and he even includes a matrix listing the various run-scoring probabilities, depending on the number of baserunners and outs.

Where did Dierker come by this information?

“When I was broadcasting,” Dierker remembers, “there was a guy named Steve Mann who came down here to work in our baseball operations department, and he was deeply involved in what the club was doing. I made friends with Steve, and we spent many a night having a beer and talking about the game—about which strategies were antiquated, and which ones were still applicable. I also read a lot of the Bill James stuff, and so I learned what people who didn’t have a personal investment in the game had to say about it.”

This is, for most baseball players, revolutionary stuff. And Dierker knew it.

“When I became the manager, I kind of knew what were the smart things to do. But I also knew that if I did all of them, it would be at the expense of my credibility with the players. With that in mind, I just had to use my instincts to both win the game and keep the whole team in the spirit of pulling together. I didn’t want to come off as an egghead guy who was just looking at numbers and ignoring people, and sometimes those considerations ran into each other.

“For example, Brad Ausmus felt like we should walk the eighth hitter most of the time, with the pitcher coming up next. As an ex-pitcher, I’d rather have the pitcher leading off the next inning. So Brad and I had different opinions a lot of the time. The eighth hitter would come up, he’d look into the dugout for the sign, I wouldn’t do anything, and I could see that he wasn’t real happy about it. I remember once, we retired the eighth hitter 10 or 15 times in a row. And then Kelly Stinnett reached out and slapped an outside pitch for an RBI single, and Ausmus was really mad.”

And this little nugget:

“Whenever I was in a flip-a-coin sort of situation,” Dierker says, “I’d usually make the move that I thought the players wanted me to make, because it really doesn’t make that much difference, one way or the other. And you have to consider what the players are going to think.”

***

I wouldn’t be surprised if Morgan Ensberg would be our kind of guy.  He’s always wanting to know about the breakeven point (i.e., the percentages) on everything.  Where to stand as a fielder, how much of a lead to take as a runner with a flyball based on the angle/distance, etc.  And of course, he’s a former MLB player.  He’s also very personable, and always seems to have positive things to say.  Really, just a good all-round guy.

It’s funny reading through this, because there are two points MGL makes about Jackson that I think tie in together.

The first, is that he is too predictable with the pitches he makes.

The second, is that “effectively wild is a ridiculous (misleading) expression”.

The first implies that if Jackson had less control over which pitch he was throwing (like if his arm just randomly picked the pitch for him) he’d be more effective.

The second is that there is no way he could be more effective by having less control over the placement of the pitch.

Aren’t those two ideas conflicting?  If he’s too predictable with what pitch he’s throwing, wouldn’t he likely be too predictable with placement?  Isn’t it possible that he’s more effective BECAUSE of the randomness of the placement? 

It’s not probable, but I definitely think its possible.  But it’s like you said, he would have to be “just awful are choosing locations!”

But, even assuming he’s terrible at choosing locations, its not like he’s trying to throw it in the middle of the plate.  So its very unlikely he’s actually better because of his poor command.

I guess I’d say something like this - You could say he’s effectively wild, because his poor command doesn’t hurt him as much as it might hurt another pitcher, because it makes up for his predictability and works well with his stuff.  So, he’d be better with better command, but not to the same degree that another pitcher would be better with better command.

Those two things are not at odds with each other.  You’re not understanding how game theory works I don’t think.

Selecting a pitch and a location is actually a two part process although pitchers and catchers probably do not approach it as such.  First you determine the optimal percentages given the batter, count, game situation, the pitcher’s repertoire, etc. 

Once you do that you randomly choose one of the alternatives at the proper frequency.  For example, if you determine that you should throw a fastball 80% of the time then you mentally roll a 5 sided die and if it comes up 1 you throw an off speed pitch. Otherwise you throw a fastball. 

Same with location.

That kind of random selection is completely different than the randomness of being wild.  Being wild (not having good command of your intended location) causes a pitcher to be sub optimal in terms of those frequencies most of the time. 

For example, let’s say that you determine that throwing the fastball outside 80% and inside 20% is correct.  Now what do you do if you have little command?  If you throw to the outside 80% of the time (by mentally rolling that 5-sided die, you will probably only hit the outside 40% of the time so you actually have to intend to throw outside maybe 100% of the time and even then the resultant percentages will be wrong. 

In addition, and perhaps the worst part of being wild is that no matter where you aim you will throw too many center cut pitches and other “mistakes” (locations where you want to hit near zero % of the time). 

So unless you are comparing to a pitcher who intends to throw in the middle of the plate and has good command there is simply no such thing as being “effectively” wild.  It is always better to have good command than bad command. There are no exceptions!

Take the classic example of a pitcher with great stuff and little command.  While it may be better for him to aim in the middle of the plate and let his pitches go all over because if he aims at the corners he will throw too many balls, it is still way better if he could command his pitches. By aiming in the middle of the plate even if his pitches go all over, two bad things will happen:  one, he will throw lots of center cut mistakes because the center and mist dense part of a pitcher’s spray pattern will always be his intended location (unless there is a “bias” in his delivery), and two, he will hit all kinda of spots other than the center that he really does not want to hit with any frequency at all. 

So, can a pitcher with good stuff be wild and still effective?  Of course.  Is it ever better to be wild than not?  No, unless the pitcher and catcher are completely brain dead as far as choosing locations.

In addition, and perhaps the worst part of being wild is that no matter where you aim you will throw too many center cut pitches and other “mistakes” (locations where you want to hit near zero % of the time).

This is exactly right. Walks are not necessarily as bad as a pitcher that misses “in the zone”.

When I watch Jackson, he seesm to miss out of the zone with his slider, which is good. You can tolerate that because there’s quite a few guys that chase a low and awya slider. But man, he misses in the zone far too often with his 2-seamer that runs center cut. That’s NOT good. He gets away with it more than he should only because he throws mid 90s with good movement.

Last night 2-2 to Hammy, Molina wanted it in (moving back over the insider corner) and Jackson grooved it that JH fouled off. If he starts that in (i.e., between buckly and corner) and it runs over the inside corner, it’s an unhittable pitch. It’s one of those pitches that “knocks the batter’s pinkies off”.

But, we also have to look at the situation, we’re basically saying that Jackson, a guy with plus velocity and plus movement on multiple pitches doesn;t have better command. So, basically, “Why isn’t he perfect?” I With his stuff and Halladay’s command, he might be Pedroesque. That’s not fair to put on anyone.

Most pitches have a “designated area” so to speak. No one throws changeups up or in. They’re either down and/or away. Curveballs are generally away. Sliders/Cutters are so damn effective because they can be used on both sides of the plate. Splitters, etc are down.

I have NO idea why Freese and Craig aren’t being pounded with inside fastballs and cutters/sliders. Seriosuly. I also have no idea why anyone would throw Molina anything below the letters with 2 strikes. Just throw it, he can’t resist.

"I also have no idea why anyone would throw Molina anything below the letters with 2 strikes. Just throw it, he can’t resist.”

Game theory.

You simply can’t throw anyone the same pitch/location a really high percentage of the time.  All his manager would have to say is, “Never swing with 2 strikes unless the pitcher makes a mistake, or if you can’t tell the difference, simply never swing.”

Then what?  No matter how bad a batter looks on certain pitches, no matter how stubborn they seem to be about not laying off a terrible (for him) pitch, you still have to mix up your pitches for obvious reasons.

And here is one of the interesting parts about randomization and game theory.  Let’s say that a certain batter really can’t seem to lay off the breaking pitch in the dirt on an 0-2 or 1-2 count.  And let’s say the proper strategy is to throw that pitch 80% of the time.

Do you think it is ever “correct” to throw him a fastball 3 times in a row (in 3 different PA I mean) in that same situation?  How about 10 times in a row?

My guess is that Molina has been chasing high fastballs with 2 strikes since little league ... just like Soriano has probably always chased breaking pitches low and away.

If they could stop, they would ... wouldn’t they?

Circle, yes we know that some batters have some extreme weaknesses.  But that isn’t my point, is it?