Seinfeld had one of his dozens of classic bits, where the sports fan is simply rooting for laundry. I can’t confirm this is the episode, but it came back #1 on Google. Anyway, I found this amusing, by Dave Berri:
When pollsters ask Republicans and Democrats whether the president can do anything about high gas prices, the answers reflect the usual partisan divisions in the country. About two-thirds of Republicans say the president can do something about high gas prices, and about two-thirds of Democrats say he can’t.
But six years ago, with a Republican president in the White House, the numbers were reversed: Three-fourths of Democrats said President Bush could do something about high gas prices, while the majority of Republicans said gas prices were clearly outside the president’s control.
The flipped perceptions on gas prices isn’t an aberration, said Dartmouth College political scientist Brendan Nyhan. On a range of issues, partisans seem partial to their political loyalties over the facts. When those loyalties demand changing their views of the facts, he said, partisans seem willing to throw even consistency overboard.
At some point in the late 80s to early 90s, when my favorite players were traded from the Islanders (Hrudey, Lafontaine) and Expos (Raines), I decided that it didn’t make sense to simply root for whatever team I pledged allegiance to. I was rooting for the Whitesox when Raines got there. And I rooted for the Kings when Hrudey got there. And in 1993, when the Canadiens and Kings met, I rooted for Montreal, but I was rooting for them to take 40 shots and Hrudey to allow 2 goals, while Roy would allow 1.
So, do you root for laundry, or do you root for players (people)?
The most difficult would be in national competitions. If USA or Canada plays Italy or Brazil in soccer, and you are a Brazil or Italy fan, what do you do?
If your favorite player is Zach Parise and you can’t stand Sidney Crosby, and you are Canadian, what do you do? (In this last case, there’s no question you are rooting for the flag. It’s simply incomprehensible that you’d root for Parise as a Canadian, even though his dad played on Team Canada, making Parise a dual citizen, who chose team USA).
So, cultural upbringing first? (Let’s you choose Italy or Brazil over USA/Canada.)
Then flag next?
Then players/people?
Then laundry?
Or does laundry go above people?
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While I am sure I am biased, I’ll include hiring Dan Fox in the mix.
]]>Most people who were invited but could not make it sent a gift. The few who did not may not have felt it was appropriate to send a gift, which is fine. However, the two people who attended may have had their card/gift lost in the shuffle. It is rare for someone to attend a wedding and not give a gift, I assume.
How do you let someone know that you did not receive a gift from them and that it may have gotten lost in the shuffle? How about the few people who were invited and did not attend and did not send a gift. Should my son and his wife try and ask them if they sent one, or just leave that alone?
Thanks in advance.
]]>David Ortiz shows that he’s man enough to bunt. Surprisingly, this is an extremely rare occurrence, as Ortiz, in his career, has only five bunt hits on ten bunt attempts entering today, and now 6 for 11 for a 55% success rate.
The question is how often can a hitter bunt to make it more effective for him to produce runs, than to work the count and/or swing away. We know that Ortiz has a career wOBA of close to .400 when he doesn’t bunt, which is where you will find great hitters.
With the bases empty, the wOBA equation gives a weight of almost 0.9 for a single with 0 outs and under 0.8 with 2 outs. So, in order to get a .400 wOBA (and breakeven for a great hitter), a batter would need to successfully lay one down about 45% of the time with 0 outs, and 50% of the time with 2 outs.
Ortiz as I said, is a career 55% success rate. That is of course based on only a sample of 11 attempts, so we really don’t know how good a bunter he is. Any hitter who can lay one down over 50% of the time against the shift should simply keep bunting. As Jeff notes, it’s the batter’s equivalent of the IBB.
The Mariners, like most baseball teams or every baseball team, shift the infield for David Ortiz. In the fifth inning today, Ortiz dropped a perfect bunt down the third-base line for a single. Fans eat it up when players do this, even though it takes the bat out of their hands. When players get intentionally walked, they get the bat taken out of their hands, and fans can’t stand it. Fans are so weird.
Anyway, a player once told me that he could lay one down 100% of the time if the pitch were over the plate, and 50% of the time if the pitch was off the plate. That would mean that roughly 75% of the time, a great hitter should be able to lay one down. Even if this player is exaggerating, let’s say it’s 80% of the time he can lay one down if it’s over the plate and 40% if it’s not. That still sets the success rate at 60%, and that’s if the hitter bunts equally if the pitch is a strike or not.
What if we’re trying to be realistic and more complex? How about if it’s a strike, he can lay one down 70% of the time. If it’s off the plate, he can lay it down 35% of the time. And let’s say that he’ll attempt the bunt on 90% of the strikes and 30% of the balls. And let’s say pitchers throw an equal number of balls and strikes. That gives us a success rate of .9*.7*.5 + .3*.35*.5 all divided by .9*.5 + .3*.5 equals 61%.
So, we should be setting our expectation that a great hitter would lay one down and be successful 60% of the time, which would give them a wOBA of .500 to .550, and turn them into Barry Bonds.
That we don’t see this happening is a huge inefficiency among great hitters who are shifted. These batters, when shifted with no runners on, should bunt, bunt, and then bunt some more.
Among average to poor hitters, the breakeven point is that much lower. Whereas the breakeven point for a great hitter is 45% to 50% success rate on bunts, for an average hitter, it’s all the way down to close to 40%, and for a bad hitter, it’s around 35%. And, we’d expect average hitters to be able to bunt better than great hitters (because of experience), and similarly, the bad hitters may be the best bunters (because they need to learn whatever to survive as hitters).
So, to shift against an average or worse hitter is about the worst defensive alignment you can imagine, and the average or worse batter needs to bunt any chance he gets, when the bases are empty.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=xCSzysu_flY
]]>Phil looks at the variables into a study that showed that there was no statistically significant reason for a differing in card value, but the card values of the black players was almost 10% lower. The most obvious reason is the one pointed out: the year of the rookie card. I don’t know if it was a variable, but it seemed to not have been.
]]>Doesn’t this sound alot like the way they were pitching espnW:
]]>They describe their site as a sports talk-show for women, “Sex in the City” meets ESPN. They bill their banter as “sports from a woman’s point of view” with talk about the game and players or coaches “in need of a makeover.”
This is the LibraryThing in Maine. They have no idea who I am, so don’t even bother going that route.
]]>My first job in the real world, I was working in a loading dock. And, they had very specific rules about where I can go, and where I should walk. They had different colored painted lines, the machines could only be operated by certain people, etc. Union rules that were designed at least with safety in mind (if not also job security).
While management should take a strong stand in favor of player safety, it’s always more interesting that the players themselves don’t take the lead in their own workplace safety environment, whether it’s beanballs, catcher protection, or PED. I know in the NHL, the goalies were a driving force toward safety rules for goalies (and those rules were put in place with no contact zones).
Why are MLB players so laissez-faire about it?
The “spirit” of the salary cap was broken, the NFL fined teams that went over a(n apparently) non-existing, but “secret” cap. This sure seems like a big deal, the way it’s reported.
]]>Point out that a superstar has slump-numbers enough times, and eventually you’ll be right. People love to point out the winner bet and forget all the loser bets along the way.
Anyway, so it’s reported that the last time Halladay had a first-10-start stretch that was worse than what he currently has was back in 2007. In those 10 starts, in 68 IP, he had 46K and 10 BB, which is pretty good. He had 6 HR, which is about average. He had a .321 BABIP, which is terrible. He was also on the mound for 38 runs of the 86 baserunners (44% scoring, which is way above the league average, likely indicating he had a poor split with men on base). Of the numbers that have the most meaning in terms of persistence (that is, that the skill is most associated to the outcome), it’s: K rate, BB rate, HR rate, BABIP, men on base split. Halladay happened to have bad outcomes in those things he has the least control over. But, he’s on the mound, and he’s getting ASSIGNED all the blame. Assigned as in assigned, not as in earned.
Anyway, what happened in his next 10 starts? 70 IP, 40K, 19 BB, which is actually worse than his first 10 starts. 4 HR, which is better, and a .289 BABIP which is much better. He gave up only 27 runs (30% of runners on base scored), which is pretty good. If these were his first 10 starts of the 2007 or 2012 season, no one says a word.
In his next 10 starts of 2007: 80 IP (that’s 8 IP per start!), 49K, 18BB (basically somewhere between his first 10 starts and his second 10 starts), 5 HR (right in the middle of his first 10 and second 10 starts), .287 BABIP (back to his normal self), and 31 runs scored (32% of runners on base scored), which is pretty good.
In 2012, Doc is: 70 IP, 56 K, 13 BB, which is a tremendous K/BB level. He’s at 5 HR, which is good. A .290 BABIP, which is his normal self. He’s given up 28 runs (35% of runner scored, which is not that good). In 2012, Doc has a .263 BABIP with bases empty, and .338 with men on base. If you consider BABIP to be hugely influenced by fielders, and good/back breaks, then a split of BABIP by men on base is even more so.
Anyway, place your bets against the best pitcher of his generation, because in 10 starts, he happened to be on the mound with a high BABIP with men on base. To simply ASSIGN Doc 100% responsibility of all that, and completely absolve his fielders, is ridiculous. And to not even consider random variation (good/bad breaks) means that you are ignoring how the real world works, and you think you can simply compartmentalize things into a neat little box, and think you have the world figured out.
The above is a long-winded way to say: sh!t happens.
The following is an exchange between a reader and Bill James, where the reader quotes a report in the Boston Globe to that effect, and Bill James describes a true story where a ball-sniffing dog would separate the two kinds of balls. The seam-thing is the first I heard of it, but, given different standards and different manufacturing plants, I wouldn’t be surprised.
I also remember one year Felipe Alou suggesting that the balls were different (might have been 1997 or 1998), that the balls were “slicker” (meaning harder for the pitcher to grip, either because of the material, or the seams).
Bill, per the Boston Globe, minor league baseballs have more pronounced seams than major league balls (which is why Dice-K uses the MLB variety in his rehab games). Is there really a difference? If so, wouldn’t every team and every pitcher be better served by using the real thing, rather adding adjustment to s different ball to all the other pressures and changes pitchers face when they reach the majors…
Asked by: greggbAnswered: 5/22/2012
The balls are different, but I didn’t know they would let you use major league balls in minor league games. I would presume there would be an economic barrier to the wide usage of major league balls in minor league games--if not an outright prohibition on it. Major league balls are more expensive.
This is a true story; the Red Sox minor league equipment co-ordinator used to have a dog that had been trained to tell the difference between a minor league ball and a major league ball. We would sort the balls into “buckets"--major league balls in one bucket, minor league balls in the other. Major league teams have dozens and dozens of buckets of balls around for batting practice and such like. Anyway, if there was one major league ball in a bucket of minor league balls, that dog would smell it, and he would remove all the balls from the bucket until he found the major league ball, put it in the major league bucket, then he would put the minor league balls back in the minor league bucket. True story.
Alan posted a letter from (.doc file) the testing facility that says:
The Major League balls are manufactured in Costa Rica and have a compressed cork sphere per the specifications. The Minor League balls are manufactured in China and have a cork center as specified in “1996 Minor League Baseball Proposal”. This cork center is the likely source for the decrease in performance, which results in a comparable Minor League ball hit of 391.8 ft under the same conditions as the Major League balls [at 400 feet].
It should be noted that an 8 to 9 foot drop in batted ball distance would lead to a 25% drop in the number of home runs. It’s all well-and-fine to say that there might be an eight foot difference in home runs due to the difference in ball configuration, and to you and me, that sounds like a small number, but the reality is that it has a tremendous impact.
There’s also this quote, that talks about how a ball could meet specifications, but would have a drastic impact:
This means that theoretically, two baseballs could meet the specifications but one ball could be hit 49.1 feet further than the other could be hit. This 49.1 feet is the combination of the increased distance of 8.7 feet for the ball being on the light side with respect to weight (i.e. 5.00 oz. as opposed to 5.25 oz.) and an additional 40.4 feet for the COR being biased to the high side (i.e. 0.578 versus 0.514). However, it should be noted that the balls investigated in this study did not exhibit this potential 49.1-ft difference. Thus, the tested baseballs indicate that the 1999 and 2000 baseballs fall within a tight range of batted-ball performance and that the 1999 and 2000 baseballs are for all practical purposes the same with respect to batted ball performance. The 49.1-ft value is purely academic—it was not seen in the balls tested.
Basically, the plants do a great job of producing balls within a tight range, but the specs allow for a huge margin of error.
]]>In every revolution, there is one man with a vision. (*)
‘I was taken aback by how quickly this thing blew up,’ says Tim Gowers, a prize-winning Cambridge University mathematician.
It began with a frustrated blogpost by a distinguished mathematician. Tim Gowers and his colleagues had been grumbling among themselves for several years about the rising costs of academic journals.They, like many other academics, were upset that the work produced by their peers, and funded largely by taxpayers, sat behind the paywalls of private publishing houses that charged UK universities hundreds of millions of pounds a year for the privilege of access.
There had been talk last year that a major scientific body might come out in public to highlight the problem and rally scientists to speak out against the publishing companies, but nothing was happening fast.
So, in January this year, Gowers wrote an article on his blog declaring that he would henceforth decline to submit to or review papers for any academic journal published by Elsevier, the largest publisher of scientific journals in the world.
He was not expecting what happened next. Thousands of people read the post and hundreds left supportive comments. Within a day, one of his readers had set up a website, The Cost of Knowledge, which allowed academics to register their protest against Elsevier.
The site now has almost 9,000 signatories, all of whom have committed themselves to refuse to either peer review, submit to or undertake editorial work for Elsevier journals. “I wasn’t expecting it to make such a splash,” says Gowers. “At first I was taken aback by how quickly this thing blew up.”
Gowers, a mathematician at Cambridge University and winner of the prestigious Fields Medal, had hit a nerve with academics who were increasingly fed up with the stranglehold that a few publishing companies have gained over the publication and distribution of the world’s scientific research.
(*) You are welcome.
]]>There’s fundamentals, and there’s technicals. This is only about the technicals.
Google opened at 100 on Aug 19, 2004 and could still be had for that price on Sep 7, 2004. That’s about three weeks. In between, the price went as high as 113, and as low as 99. After that, the run started.
That’s just one data point. Make of it what you will.
]]>A loyal reader was interested in hearing from the Straight Arrow readers:
I’d benefit from a comparison thread of phone operating systems: (iOS vs Android personally, but Windows is a viable alternative, too.
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