from Amazon
Sunday, October 18, 2009
What was Izturis thinking?
Chance of home team winning
0.7283: Bottom of extra innings, runners on 1b, 2b, 1 out, tie game
0.674: Get the out at 1b, leave runners at 2b, 3b, 2 outs
0.661: Get the out at 2b, leave runners at corners, 2 outs
0.8408: bases loaded, 1 out
Are you kidding me? Are you !@#$% kidding me? There is virtually no difference between getting the out at 1b or getting the out at 2b. You don’t go for a .013 win gain, when the chance for disaster is possible.
The tradeoff was this: suppose you throw to 1B, and you have a 95% chance of getting the out. That leaves you with .682 chance for the Yanks. In order to throw to 2B instead, Izturis needs to have at least an 88% chance of getting the out. (Or, if you think 90% at 1B, then at least 83% at 2B… 7% difference.)
There was zero chance of getting the DP. Even if the chance for an error was the same whether throwing at 2b or 1b (hard to believe), a wild throw toward 1B (and by extension getting the catcher to come out, and the pitcher to cover home) would make it harder, I would think, for the runner to try for home than a wild throw past 2B (and by extension) past 3B. That makes the breakeven point even closer (that is, if 95% chance of getting the out at 1B, then at least 90% chance of getting the out at 2B).
How hard is it for these guys to know what to do if a ball is hit to their left and to their right? Shouldn’t it be by rote (i.e., fundamental baseball)?
***
What the principals said:
Scioscia: “Izzy tried to do too much there… an out at any base and we’re in good shape. The force gave us no advatage.”
Izturis: “I’m not afraid to be aggressive. I was being aggressive. Sadly, it cost us the game.”
Scioscia was thinking, and Izturis wasn’t (and still isn’t).