THE BOOK--Playing The Percentages In Baseball

Monday, May 03, 2010

Game time regressions

Russell final BPro piece.  He’s one of the best saberists as we know, so hopefully, he’ll still be around somewhere.

***

One of my issues with regression at this granularity level is when I see something like this: “.742 * inning breaks “

Well, we know that inning breaks are 2 to 3 minutes each, depending which TV network is involved.  So, what the regression is saying is that there’s some 1.5 to 2.0 minutes that it’s removing from what we know, and distributing it to other variables, even though, in this particular case, it should be completely independent.  That is, the between inning break has no relationship whatsoever to any other event.  But the regression is finding some relationship.

***

Cutting one minute in the non-action between inning will save some 17 minutes of game time.  The players loaf around too much by their own admission.  But, as one of the players recently admitted on his blog “we got to gets paid”. 

So, this is really the issue: how can you cut down on game time while not touching the non-game time.  Which is a very weird thing to try to optimize from a fan experience. 

Indeed, what’s to stop MLB from increasing between inning game time, even if we reduce the actual game-time, so that we are always going up the same hill? Sisyphus anyone?

Friday, April 23, 2010

Unwritten rules that don’t need to be written?

There is one unwritten rule in hockey that everyone observes, regardless of the level of play: if you have the puck in the offensive zone, and the play has been whistled dead, you do not shoot at the goalie.  This one is so strongly recognized that even if you are in a windup for a big slapshot, you are expected to hold your position and not shoot.  If it is that prevalent, why not codify it?  Or, is the idea that since everyone respects the game so much as to not break this unwritten rule, that there’s no reason to write it?

What would be the equivalent in the other three sports, a rule so prevalent, so well-adhered to, that there’s a gentlemen’s agreement to respect the unwritten rule, with no ambiguity?

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

A very good article by Sky A. on batter tendencies (ability to hit the fastball, curve, etc.)

Here is the URL of the article:

http://baseballanalysts.com/archives/behind_the_scor/

And here is the concluding paragraph:

Overall, this has been a somewhat sprawling piece on a tricky topic, so I’ll sum up. Looking at the evidence, it appears that when trying to identify a hitter’s strengths and weaknesses against particular pitches, looking at how he actually did against those pitches is not a particular useful measure. More indicative is the frequency which a batter was thrown each pitch. The better a hitter is against a particular pitch, they less often he will see it. This entire issue of selection bias is an important one to consider, especially when doing pitch f/x analysis or other pitch-by-pitch studies.

Basically, he starts out looking at the range (SD) of results for all batters against all different kinds of pitches, using a runs per pitch metric. He wants to see who is a good fastball hitter, who is not, etc., or at least what is the spread of talent among batters against each type of pitch.  If some batters are good fastball hitters, others are good curveball hitters, etc., we should see a spread in talent with respect to each of those pitches, right?  Uh, wrong…

First, here is how he found the spread of talent:  He used the wonderful method which Tango has been touting for years.  Take a sample of results, compute the variance (square of the SD) among players (say, weighted by opportunities per player) and then compare that to the expected variance by chance given the number of elements in your sample (number of batters), and the underlying sample size (number of pitches) for each element. The difference is the spread of talent, more or less (there are sometimes other small sources of variance besides talent and chance).

What sky found, and not surprisingly so, is that there was little or no spread of talent, when looking at runs allowed per pitch or per 100 pitches (or whatever) for each type of pitch.  Of course he explains why, which is same reason I wrote, “Uh, wrong...” above.  Those of you familiar with game theory and its implications already know why.  If in fact there IS a spread of talent among batters with respect to pitch type, according to the tenets of game theory pitchers will throw fewer and fewer of the pitches that a hitter hits well and more and more of the pitches that a hitter does not well (to that hitter of course) until the results of all those pitches are equal!  And that is why Sky finds virtually no spread of talent when he looks at the results of each kind of pitch.  There is a spread in talent but it “disappears” when pitchers adjust their pitch frequencies, as it should (if pitchers and batters are acting reasonably optimally).  The reason that this happens of course, is that the more a batter expects a certain kind of pitch, by virtue of how often it is thrown to him, the better he will do against that pitch, regardless of his “talent” at hitting that pitch.  If a batter is a great fastball hitter but not such a great curveball hitter, if hardly ever sees the fastball, he won’t be so good at it anymore.  Similarly, if he sees lots of curveballs, he is going to be better at hitting them.

Keep in mind that this “shifting in the quality of the results” against each type of pitch, according to how often (percent per pitch) the batter sees each type of pitch, is not because a batter gets used to certain pitches (or not) and thus improves his ability against that pitch (or not), although that is certainly true to some small extent.  It is the anticipation of a certain pitch at a certain count that drastically affects a batter’s results on that pitch.

Anyway, I spoiled Sky’s great article to some extent, but I really wanted to emphasize this point about game theory, because it is important and fascinating, in my opinion.  In fact, all batters, pitchers, coaches, and managers should take at least a basic primer on game theory…

Tuesday, March 23, 2010

The importance of player makeup

There is no doubt that player makeup is important, if not critical.  This is true not just for ballplayers, but for you and me in our day job.  Without the desire to reach your potential, you’ll be a hasbeen or neverwas.  Which is fine, if that’s what you want.  Some people prefer to reach their potential at other things:

Following the 1982 season, a young Anthony Lachowetz called it a career after a brief three-year stint in the Dodgers system. The epitome of the early ‘80s five-tool player and an the impressive right fielder, he was infinitely talented, possessing excellent power, blazing speed, range, patience, intelligence and a howitzer of an arm. In 1980, he stole a phenomenal 36 bases in just 212 at-bats in rookie ball. In 1982, with high-A Vero Beach, he clubbed 15 homers in 393 at-bats, walking 54 times. He was destined for stardom. He could have started in right field for one of the most prestigious franchises in major league history. He had everything a scout could dream of, except the desire to put his life on hold for the minors. So he gave it all up. As Dr. Lachowetz once told me…

There are two categories of skills for a player: physical tools and mental/emotional tools.  Both are inputs to the output, his actual on-field production.  This is the important thing: once you have the production, the output, you are not going to double-count one of the inputs.  The production is a manifestation of the combination of his physical and mental skills.  For the given production, it is what it is.  We don’t count Pedroia’s MVP season more because he made more of his limited physical skills than others did.

But, for forecasting, then it may very well be that player makeup has a better forecasting path than physical skills.  As a saberist, I don’t dismiss the idea of player makeup.  It’s there, it’s real, and it could very well be the most important attribute of a player.  Much as it would be in a regular day job.

It’s interesting how little minor leaguers are paid, and how talented players, with limited drive, are weeded out.  Imagine instead that minor leaguers are paid half the MLB minimum (200,000$ a year).  Now, those leagues could see a shift of players with more physical tools than mental/emotional ones.  And, that might not be the best thing.  Indeed, it’s very possible that the low pay and rough life is part of the process of becoming a MLBer.  In the NHL, Canadians make a big deal about the Sutter brothers, players with limited physical tools but huge on heart and determination, players who worked on their parents’ farm in the offseason, and on their own.  When it comes to player makeup, it’s possible it’s an important attribute.  Certainly in the lower leagues.  And that’s at least one place where scouting has a leg up on performance analysis.

Monday, March 22, 2010

Pizza on baseball’s american culture

His take:

A batter, it was thought, didn’t really deserve credit for a walk. He was just a passive bystander while the pitcher made four mistakes. In American culture, there’s a great deal of value on people who take action and get things done, not those who wait for things to come to them. We have plenty of leadership academies and business schools, but few teachers of patience. So walks are, in a sense, un-American. I’d argue that, at some level, the reason that the A’s were able to exploit the market’s inefficient valuation of OBP was, that at some level, they recognized the cultural assumption and, on further reflection, realized that it was silly.

Monday, March 15, 2010

Not in MLB?

Sportsmanship, as opponents carry player around the bases:

If there’s a youtube of Moises Alou, watch it, as he’s rounding first base as his bone cracked and was sticking out of his leg, and he’s writhing on the ground in pain, as Gregg Jefferies the 1B was so disgusted by what he saw, he had to walk away… after of course going over to put the tag on Alou.  To me, it was a despicable act by Jefferies. 

You have college girls who could have saved themselves a run, but didn’t.  And you have Jefferies, who sets aside sportsmanship in the name of winning.  The question is: what would you do?  Bonus: what would you do if this was Game 7?

Glove-slap: Neyer.

Friday, January 08, 2010

The Ichiro interview

Part 1 and Part 2:

I am definitely not the kind of person where people would say, he’s a nice guy, he’s a great guy. I am definitely not that guy especially because if I felt something was wrong I would definitely fight over it and I am not a nice guy to everyone. I think if you look at the friends, the kinds of relationships I have, I am not the kind of guy who has many shallow relationships. I think you could say I am the kind of guy who has a few relationships, but those are very deep.
...
“If you could trade places with anybody in the history of the game for one day who would you like to trade with and why?” (Becomes very animated) There’s not really a certain who that comes to mind but I think I would like to become a really fat player.
...
I don’t like the rule that if you write a line in the batters box, I don’t think you should be ejected for that. I would like to change that. Yellow card maybe, but no ejection. Instant red card? I don’t think that is right.
...
(laughs) When I see Junior I always think he should sleep at home rather than at the clubhouse. I always think if he was able to that he could have easily hit seven hundred homeruns by now.

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

Chance of injury by playing out-of-position

Will Carroll says:

One of the most misunderstood issues with changing positions is the injury risk that’s entailed. Over the past five seasons for which I have detailed injury data, players moving to a new position had a 30 percent greater chance of injury. This was across the board, whether the move was simple—like switching from left field to right—or more complicated, like going from the outfield to second base, as Kelly Johnson did a couple of seasons ago. (And that was after coming up as a player who was playing the left side of the infield in the minors.)

It’s a bit counterintuitive that no single position is higher risk than others, even one like second base, where the second baseman’s back is to the double play in most situations. However it also clearly points to the major cause of these injuries: unfamiliarity.

On a related note, I can confirm, and have shown, that there is a familiarity factor with switching positions in terms of performance.  Something on the order of losing 4 runs per season by playing someone out of position at a related position (2B/SS/3B, or LF/CF/RF), and 8 runs by playing out of a position at an unrelated position (IF to OF).

Now, I can believe that the injury factor will also go up.  30% sounds insanely high though.  I would love for Will to present the data (or send me the data) to verify the claim.

Friday, August 07, 2009

Brian Bannister keeps talking, we keep listening

More of the same from Banny:

Bannister’s story is well known in baseball’s sabermetrics community. He’ll often talk about Bill James, a pioneer in the world of advanced statistics. “If Bill James had a 90-mph fastball, he’d be me,” Bannister says.

If I can use a real-life analogy, Bannister is a test pilot or astronaut, and we’re coming up with the engineering to try to make some sense of how to fly.  The mainstream, until they actually see a test pilot willing to go into a flying machine, thinks that we’re nothing but crackpots who require empirical evidence, not theoretical b.s.

I can’t think of a better spokesperson for saberists than Banny.

Friday, March 20, 2009

Changing the qualities of players

Pizza Cutter wants us to think-inside-the-head.  He talks in part about game theory, which MGL gave it a good once over in The Book.  Pizza says:

Consider the now-famous post on U.S.S. Mariner concerning Felix Hernandez’s pitch selection.  To simply say that King Felix likes to throw a lot of fastballs early in the game is descriptive (and true).  To point out the obvious that hitters were going to eventually pick up on it is changing the pitcher himself.  Now, his past behavior doesn’t predict his future behavior because of the awareness of the past behavior itself.  I have to wonder how many other pitchers fall into patterns (fastball-then-slider) without thinking about it, patterns that could be uncovered with just a little sleuthing through the data.  Make a pitcher aware of his pattern, and you break the pattern.  Suddenly, he’s a different pitcher.  If you know the answer to the question, it changes the question.

I’ll disagree with his point here:

If there’s one mistake that the Sabermetric movement has made over the past few years (perhaps not intentionally, but certainly, it’s been made) is that we’ve reduced players to glorified, if quite advanced, Strat-o-matic cards.

I think that’s the best thing we could have done.  It’s taken me a long while to get to where I am in terms of understanding how to use the numbers.  It’s not for lack of effort or inspiration.  It’s more in terms of exploration.  Bill James and Pete Palmer had to do their Columbus.  Then the next group of us came along and did our Magellan.  It was all part of the growing pains.  Eventually, someone else will be our Neil Armstrong (and Zefram Cochrane).  But, the road had to be paved for them.

I think by doing the work we did as coldly as we did, we’ve set the landscape.  And I agree that the next step is the warm-hearted work, the game theory, the tendencies, physical characteristics, and behaviour of humans.  But, we needed to get past our numeric stage.  I think we’re close to making the jump. 

All of the defenders of the “world is flat” simply don’t stand up to the scrutiny.  They make lazy excuses, or simply want to remain in a pool of ignorance because it gives them comfort to keep doing things their way.  Good.  The world is big enough for all of us.  Join us if you want.  Just don’t stand in our way.

Friday, February 27, 2009

Nick Punto trying to decide between a team of scientists and a stopwatch

Sliding head-first into first often is unnecessary and greatly increases the risk of injury. Punto isn’t so sure. “For some reason, I think it’s faster,” he said. “For all the people who have told me it’s not, I still think it is. “We’ll never know. Until there is a swimming pool at the end of the 100-meter dash, we’ll never know. Who’s going to dive onto a corked field on a 100-yard dash? Nobody.”

When timing batters who run through first base, and those who slide into the base, scouts have determined that sliding slows down the runner. “I’ve heard that, too,” Punto said. “I think people are slower when you slide, feet-first. I think when you dive, it’s quicker, as long as you hit the bag before you hit the ground, or simultaneously.”

He should hire a team of scientists to test his theories. “I would like to, actually,” he said. “As much as I’ve dealt with over the last 10 years of my career, I would love to get somebody on it. I’ve gotten a lot of mail from people saying it’s not faster.”

Can’t Nick Punto do a dash from home plate to 1B, running through, five times and get the first-base coach to record his time with a stopwatch.  And then, can’t Nick Punto repeat that same dash five times, but this time sliding head first.  Why would you need a team of scientists, and reading and talking about this all your life, when you can answer this question with ten runs of 4 seconds each?  40 seconds of running time for him, 20 seconds for the coach to write down the answer, 2 minutes of rest in-between, and in less than 30 minutes, Nick Punto will have the answer that has vexed him since he was 8 years old.

(Hat tip: Repoz)

Tuesday, December 16, 2008

Sabermetrician Curtis Granderson

He said:

If I did happen to move throughout the lineup, my approach would only change depending on the situation that time at-bat. When I’m leading off, I only lead off once a game. The rest of my at-bats deal with the score, outs, and if there are runners on base.

Exactly the way I think.  If Granderson is typical of his peers, this whole “I’m a leadoff hitter” cr-p is, well, cr-p.  As he correctly surmised, it’s not important where in the batting order you are, but what the game state you are faced with.  (Though, I will include that you’d like to know who is on deck and how fast the runners are, two things that can be inferred by your batting slot.)

In any case, this is what baseball is about.  Figure out the game state, figure out how much impact a strikeout, walk, single and HR have relative to each other for this game state (including the count) and adjust accordingly (while your opponent also adjusts, and you adjust to his adjustments as he does as well).

Friday, June 13, 2008

Aramis Ramirez: a new approach to hitting?

Eric takes a look.  The most stable of the output stats is strikeouts and walks.  If you see a big change there, then you know that something is going on.  Now however, we don’t have to rely on the output stats.  We can look at the quasi-input stats: how much is he swinging at pitches out of the zone (making sure to compare by count)?  How often is he taking?  All the things that lead to Ks and BBs would be based on his swing/take approach at each count.  And while you might need say 100-200 PA to achieve 50% reliability, if you look at his Ks and BBs numbers, we’d need to have fewer than 100 PA if we know his swing/take approach.  That’s why scouts are so important: their uncertainty level is much lower than the output stats at under 100 PA.

Friday, December 21, 2007

Groundballs in play: great for scoring and preventing runs!

Dave Cameron alerts us that:

...the Mariners are signing Carlos Silva because they believe that his combination of no walks, no strikeouts, and some groundballs will lead to him not giving up many runs.  At the exact same time, the Mariners have built an offense that doesn’t walk, doesn’t strike out, and hits a lot of groundballs, believing that having a bunch of guys with that skillset will lead to the team scoring a lot of runs.

Monday, August 20, 2007

Tim Raines

My favorite player of all time.  Baseball should get back to the 1980s style of baseball.

Wednesday, April 25, 2007

What about all these biomechanical experts?

I wrote this on BTF in reference to this article about the recent trend (I guess) toward biomechanical analyis of hitters and pitchers by “non-scientists.” I added the “non-scientists” as there was no mention of that in the article.  I am refering to guys like Will Caroll and Carlos Gomez.

Read More

Tuesday, April 24, 2007

Going the other way

More rolling sleeves work, as John gives us an insight into how hitters hit the other way through time.

A little nit: he shows how around 10% of HR used to go the other way.  So, for every 9 HR pulled, 1 would go the other way.  At one point in the mid 90s, it was 20%, or for every 11 HR pulled, 2.75 would go the other way.  So, it’s possible that what Greg Maddux is quoted in the article as saying is correct, that the number of opposite field HR tripled.  It’s just that the number of pulled HR also increased, but by only 20%.

And in the graphs where John splits by LHB/RHB, it’s also possible that you get different rates if you also include the pitcher’s hand (so, LH/LP, LH/RP and RH/LP, RH/RP) that might explain some of the gaps.

Regardless, great work.

Thursday, March 22, 2007

Pedro: Close your eyes, open your mind

I love Pedro.

His program for the day called for 25 throws at 45 feet, 50 at 60 feet, and 25 at 75 feet, the last distance an increase in length from what he had been doing the previous week.  Remarkably, at the two shorter distances, he threw to his personal trainer, Chris Correnti (who was formerly with the Sox as an assistant trainer), with his eyes closed. Why pretend to be blindfolded? The point was to help Martinez be consistent with his release point and feel free with his motion. It was impressive to watch him hit Correnti’s glove almost every time.

It doesn’t matter what it’s called, but what it does:

His take on the so-called gyroball, a pitch that is now in the heads of some batters and likely is more myth than substance: “I think it’s more of a backdoor slider. That’s what I think he’s throwing,” Martinez said. “If that’s what they call it in Japan, well, that’s what they call it.” Others are calling the pitch a screwball, similar to what Martinez has thrown in the past. Pedro is clearly amused by the discussion.  “The rotation I see is a backdoor slider, that’s all; it’s not anything fancy,” Pedro said again. “A screwball is more what I throw. I throw it as a changeup. It’s a good changeup. It spins away from lefties, inside to righties. According to what I saw, the ‘gyro’ is a backdoor slider. He throws it from the outside, and it burns the corner. People have a tendency to give up on that pitch. If he throws hard, and he uses it, it’ll be good. That’s the mystery.”

(Hat Tip: Baseball Musings)