Filter posts by...
Baserunning
Thursday, August 25, 2011
How sure do you need to be to go for it? This reader does the work for one scenario.
Using a different Win Expectancy chart, and trying a different scenario, here’s what I got. This one is a pure sac fly, so the batter made the second out, and you have to decide whether to send the runner or not.
If it’s the bottom of the 9th: if down by 1, you have a .15 chance of winning. If you score, you tie it up, and now you have a .55 chance of winning. If you are thrown out, you are down to 0. So, when you’ve got a +.40 potential gain against a -.15 potential loss, you only need to be safe 27% of the time. If it’s the top of the 9th: down by 1, you have a .10 chance of winning. If you tie it up, you are at .38. Thrown out means 0. In this case, it’s a gain of +.28 against a loss of -.10. That’s 26% of the time.
What if it’s a single (and the batter takes second on the throw): in the bottom of the 9th, it’s .18 chance of winning with runners on the corners, .60 if you score and draw the throw, and 0 if you are thrown out. That’s +.42 gain against -.18 loss, or 30% chance of needing to be safe. In the top of the 9th, it’s .15 winning with runners on the corners, .46 if you score and draw the throw, and 0 if you are thrown out. That’s +.31 against -.15, or 33% chance of needing to be safe.
Basically, go for it if you have at least a 1 in 3 chance of scoring. Sit tight otherwise.
Saturday, August 06, 2011
Dodgers ahead by two. Bottom of the 9th, and Diamond Backs at bat. They have a runner on 2B. The tie-ing run is at bat.
The Dodgers can let the runner score from 2B, and it would not matter at all. The chance of winning barely changes. 2B, 1 out? 0.128. 3B, 1 out? 0.136. Bases empty, 2 outs? 0.017. So, if you try to get to third base (like on a passed ball, which is what happened here), you increase your chances of winning by 0.008. But if you are thrown out (and it was close enough that it could have happened in this case), your chances of winning goes down by 0.111.
That’s the tradeoff: 8 to 111. You have to be safe 93% of the time for this play to be a breakeven.
Sometimes, I think the runners just don’t think. On top of which, just a pitch or two later, the same runner almost gets picked off third base. The runner is so useless in this scenario, why doesn’t he just plant himself there?
Thursday, August 04, 2011
I’ve been meaning to do this for the longest time, so I am so glad that Jeremy did it, and did it so darn well too.
.png)
.png)
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
Good job. You also want to deal with the trailing runner and/or batter, but this is a great start:
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Good stuff by all involved. I always look for the Redsox and Rockies in these things, and if I say them on the extremes, then I’m guessing that a park factor may not have been applied yet. Not to say that it didn’t happen, but I’d like confirmation from MGL if it did in fact happen. To that end, a breakdown by team UZR at home/road would shed some light here.
Saturday, May 14, 2011
Read More
Thursday, May 05, 2011
By , 03:20 AM
That seems to be the concensus from this discussion on BTF:
http://www.baseballthinkfactory.org/files/newsstand/discussion/matthews_posadas_baserunning_gaffe_steams_girardi/
Presumably, they are arguing that he is a lousy base runner, over and above the fact that he is very slow, especially as a 39 year-old former catcher.
But, is it selective memory from observation, recent memories unfairly extrapolated to larger sample sizes, is he just very old and slow now and nothing more, etc.? You decide!
Here are Posada’s base running lwts per 150 opportunity games, as computed by me, for the last 10 years:
2001 -1
2002 -3.6
2003 -4.6
2004 -3.5
2005 -3.0
2006 -3.5
2007 -5.4
2008 -3.5
2009 -11.4
2010 -7.8
10-year average (not weighted for games or opps): 4.73
5-year average (not weighted for games or opps): 6.32
3-year average (not weighted for games or opps): 7.57
Here are the same numbers for Benjie Molina, also known as a very slow catcher and almost 37 years old, almost 2 years younger than Jorge . I have never heard anyone say that he was also a terrible base runner.
2001 -2.2
2002 -8.3
2003 -1.7
2004 -1.8
2005 -6.8
2006 -7.7
2007 -5.9
2008 -6.4
2009 -6.5
2010 -4.6
10-year average (not weighted for games or opps): 5.19
5-year average (not weighted for games or opps): 6.22
3-year average (not weighted for games or opps): 5.83
Sunday, April 17, 2011
In the second inning of the Jays Sox game, the Jays had a runner on 1B and 3B with 2 outs. The runner from 1B took off for second, but stopped halfway. The catcher didn’t look at the runner on 3B and threw to 2B. The runner from 3B scored easily. They then got the runner between 1B and 2B in a rundown. The “official” (not to be confused with correct) call on the play was a fielder’s choice for the run scoring and a CS for the out.
The run expectancy in this situation was 0.530 runs. If you end up with second and third, it goes up to 0.626, or a gain of almost 0.1 runs. On an out, it goes down .53 runs. The breakeven point is .53 / (.53+.096) = 85%. That’s the kind of breakeven point you get on “defensive indifference”. That is, the only players who steal when the breakeven is 85% is those players who really think they are going to be safe, or they think the defense won’t even try. The runner intentionally stopped halfway to draw the throw. This was not a “stolen base attempt”, not matter how you want to fit the square peg in the round hole.
When the season is over, all we are going to know about Juan Rivera is that he was CS. Instead, he should be given a big plus for being the catalyst on a run-scoring play. He was part of a play that gained +.47 runs for his team. In no way can you give +.715 runs to Aaron Hill for a “fielder’s choice”, and -.245 to Rivera for the “CS”.
And it’s not like this is an unusual play. Drawing a throw to 2B in the hope of giving the runner on 3B a chance to score is something that the offense and defense is both aware of. How the defense responds, and how the offense plays it out is part of the game.
FC and CS are a terrible way to reduce what actually happened on this play. And don’t say “Well, how else?”. C’mon dude. You create the necessary category to capture this play.
Sunday, March 27, 2011
By , 04:20 AM
I recently revamped my base running linear weights program. The results will soon be available on Fan Graphs, along with their other stats of course.
I am still working out any bugs which might be present and tweaking the methodology. I want to vet some results and methodologies with you guys so you can offer any comments and suggestions.
I don’t include SB/CS/PO numbers. I also don’t include advancing or getting thrown out on WP or PB.
Basically, I keep track of all base runner advances and outs (and not advancing of course) on batted balls.
Right now, the only thing I keep track of on ground balls to the infield is when a ground ball is hit to the SS or 3B, how often a runner on second (with no runners on 1st or 3rd) with less than 2 outs, advances to third (or home) or gets thrown out at third (or home).
I could track how often the runner on first stays out of a DP with a runner on second, less than 2 outs, and a ground ball to the IF (keeping separate track of balls to the left and right side).
For air balls, I keep track of all advances, holds, and outs on hits and outs, with each situation treated separately, and batted balls to each outfield position treated separately as well.
For air balls, I don’t distinguish the fielding location of a batted ball other than which fielder fields it (in other words, left side, right side or middle). And like I said, on ground balls with a runner on second, I only look at balls hit to the SS and 2B, and I don’t distinguish between the two.
I do a simple park adjustment for all batted balls, based on where in the OF (L,C,or R) it is hit at each park.
That is pretty much it.
So I might add in “staying out the DP” for runners on second and less than 2 outs with a runner on first.
I also might add in advances and outs on WP and PB, although I am worried that the numbers will reflect more of how often a pitcher threw a WP (or the catcher committed a PB) than how often a runner advances on a potential WP or PB. IOW, if player A advanced 5 times on a WP and player B advanced no times, I am afraid that the difference is mostly because the pitcher happened to throw more pitches that got away with player A on the bases than the fact that player A attempted an advance more often than player B. But I am not sure. It is always a judgment call on what things to include based on whether there is much of a skill element in the numbers. I suppose I can look at the y-t-y correlations in the WP and PB numbers for base runners, and if it is real low, I won’t include them.
Anyway, here are some preliminary results:
Read More
Saturday, January 29, 2011
By , 03:52 AM
I just finished my base running projections for 2011, which is basically just an estimate of true talent base running over the last 4 years. I don’t think I do any age adjustments (even though they are obviously important).
As you can see, the value of many sluggers is significantly reduced due to their slow/poor base running, and many otherwise marginal players (and good ones) have lots of base running value.
Also, there are some things that I don’t include in valuing base running speed and talent, like advancing on WP and PB, etc. So, you can probably add 20% or so to these numbers. The SD in base running skill that I get is 2.1 runs, which means that most players are plus or minus 6 runs. It also means that the very best or worst are worth a little over half a win or so, which is not insignificant. In fact, you could add or dock from a few players’ salaries 2 or 3 million (in FA dollars) a year just for good or bad base running!
Here are the top and bottom 5 base runners in true talent over the last 4 years, in runs per 150 games, which is also close to what we would expect in 2011.
Best
Figgins 6.8 (wow!)
Bonifacio 4.4
Kinsler 4.2
Josh Hamilton 3.5 (is this guy good or what?)
Rasmus 3.4
Worst
(Kotchmann -6.4 not sure if he is even playing anymore)
Thome -5.9 (DH’s have to run the bases too!)
B. Molina -5.5 (The 3 Molina brothers are a combined -12.1!)
Posada -5.5
Lowell -5.3
Fielder -5.1
Sunday, September 26, 2010
By , 10:42 AM
In the Yankee game last night, down 4-0, with one out in the sixth, the Yankees’ third base coach Robby Thomson waved Kearns in on a Jeter single to left. He was thrown out at the plate for the second-out, on a fairly close play.
“I thought he was going to score and he didn’t,” Thomson said. “It was a mistake.”
Now, we don’t know what Thompson was really thinking when he said that (hence the title of this thread), but it suggests (if he was being completely forthright) that he is being results-oriented, which is exactly the wrong way to be as a coach or manager, especially for a third base coach.
You also have to wonder what Girardi said to Thompson after or during the game. Surely he said something.
I was watching the game and at first it looked like Kearns had little chance of scoring (maybe 25%), but it was a good throw and the play, as I said, was fairly close, so maybe he had a 75% of scoring. I am not really sure. It could have been 50%.
I don’t, off the top of my head, know the BE point for 1 out and down 4 runs in the sixth, with those teams and in that exact situation. It is probably pretty high, maybe 80%, given the large run deficit.
In any case, that is the way Thompson (and all third base coaches) is supposed to think. Maybe they don’t need to memorize the exact (not that ANYONE knows them exactly of course) BE percentages, but they should all have proper rules of thumb for just about any situation. Again, whether Thompson or Girardi does or doesn’t, I don’t know. His comment (mildly) suggests that he doesn’t and that his thinking is not that which you would want your third base coach to have ("he got thrown out, therefore I made a mistake").
My guess also is that there are at least a few organizations that go over this stuff properly (sabermetrically) with their third base coach (among other things like that), but not too many. (And of course even if you “know” the proper numbers for every situation, you will still occasionally make an error in judgment in the heat of the battle.)
If a team does do that, I wonder how many runs/wins it would add per season. And then of course, think of the other similar things they could discuss and plan with their manager and coaches in order to optimize strategy.
The other day, Carl Crawford, I think, was thrown out at third base with 2 outs to end a game (maybe I got some of that wrong). He and the Rays were criticized for that - considering the adage that, “You don’t want to make the first or third out at third base.”
Joe Maddon was talking about that play on the radio and he said that he was perfectly fine with Crawford’s play (and I am pretty sure that he told him so). He said that it took an absolutely perfect throw to nail him, which it did, implying that there was a very high chance that Crawford would be safe if you redid that play X amount of times (again, correctly so).
He added that he does not go by the old adage mentioned above, again implying that it is all about the chance of being thrown out (going strictly by the adage, the BE point for being safe would have to be 100% with 0 our 2 outs, which it is not of course) given the outs, runners, score, inning, etc.
I don’t hate everything about Maddon, and I have always said that he is a very smart guy. I should probably also add that I think he is very knowledgeable about sabermetrics. I may even be wrong about him overall. When I say things about managers and GM’s and teams, there is a very high uncertainty level surrounding what I say, given my lack of information, the emotion of the various situations, the fact that when you see one bad play, it gets magnified, etc.
Tuesday, August 31, 2010
By , 10:25 PM
How often do you see someone try and bowl over the catcher these days, a la Pete Rose and Ray Fosse in the 1970 All-Star Game?
How often do you see that when the runner would have been safe by a mile if he had just slid in like 99.9% of players do these days?
Try and guess who made that ignoble and boneheaded play. If you saw or heard of the play, obviously you can’t guess…
Wednesday, August 04, 2010
By , 10:52 PM
For stealing third base in the top of the 9th inning, with no one else on base, 0 outs, and your team down by 2 runs?
That is what Torii Hunter attempted tonight (and he was thrown out).
Possibly the least smart thing I have seen a player do in a long time, at least in a situation where they had more than a split second to make the decision…
Wednesday, July 07, 2010
Great stuff from Jeremy.
It’ll feel good to retire one day, knowing there’s some a great group of talented and hardworking analysts out there, who have jobs where they can sneak in all this great work.
The internet is as much about adding value to corporate america’s efficiency as it is about removing value by surfing and posting.
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Dr. Jack Moore.
Friday, June 18, 2010
I quite enjoyed this Davey Lopes interview on baserunning.
Thursday, June 17, 2010
He asks:
Scenario: You are the runner on 2nd base and there is 1 out. The score is 3 to 3 and it is the 4th inning. A fly ball is hit to right center field and the right fielder will attempt to catch the ball. As a runner you have average Major League speed. If you choose to tag, you will be safe at 3rd base, but you will have to slide. The next batter up hits in 7th in your lineup and he is a career .250 hitter with 10 HR’s and 60 RBI’s. What do you do and why?
My answer:
Read More
Thursday, June 10, 2010
Ensberg gives the blueprint.
Let’s pick one out and see what do you do if you are on second base and 0 outs. My natural inclination is to do what Ensberg says. Let’s work it out.
Runner on 2B, 0 outs is run expectancy of 1.189 runs. Let’s say it’s a 90/10 play, where there’s a 90% chance of an out, and a 10% chance of a hit or error.
Option1: You tag up, and move to 3B on the hit/error (gives you RE of 1.904). And when there’s an out, you’ll be able to advance 10% of the time. So, 81% you are stuck at 2B (RE of 0.725) and 9% of the time you get to 3B (0.983). Add it up, and the RE is 0.866 if you tag up.
Option2: You move half way, and react. On the hit/error, you score (gives you RE of 1.953… notice how this number is not very different from just staying at 3B). On the out, let’s make it that you get back safely 87% of the time (0.725), and are doubled-up 3% of the time (0.117). Add it up, and the RE is 0.825 if you move half way. Even if you are NEVER doubled-up, your RE is still only 0.848.
So, here are the breakeven points: if you tag up and there’s NO chance for you to advance, it’s the same thing as going halfway and having a 1% chance of being doubled up. So, being doubled-up at the expense of scoring is a huge killer. Huge.
That’s on a play where there’s a 90% chance of the batter being out.
***
What about on an almost sure hit? If you wait to tag up, the RE is 1.79. If you move halfway, you can get doubled-up SEVENTY percent of the time, and STILL break even.
Conclusion: the level of your lead off 2B on a flyball is going to be directly influenced by the chance that the ball is going to fall in. I think this was obvious to most of us, but I was surprised to the extent that you can just take off. This goes to what to do on line drives. If on a low line drive and the infielder has a 10% chance of making an out, you can only take off to the extent that you’d be able to make it back to 2B at least 30% of the time.
I didn’t realize I’d be so fascinated by something that seems so implicitly benign.
Friday, June 04, 2010
I *know* we’ve talked about this, and I know we’ve come up with a good conclusion. I just want to point out this:
Using the “veer to the right just before the base” approach, a typical player will take 22.2 seconds to complete an in-the-park home run. That same player using the optimal strategy of a constantly curving path can round the bases in 16.7 seconds.
22.2 seconds? How old is this typical player? The diameter of a circle that encompasses the 4 bases is 127.3 feet (square root of two times 90^2… see kids? math is useful). The circumference of a circle is 2PIr, or PId (that’s pi times diameter… see kids? listen to your math teacher, and you can write a blog like I do). So, a circle path is almost exactly 400 feet. We know that Olympic runners run 100m (328 feet… kids, please, stay in school) in around 10 seconds. 400 feet would be 12 seconds (technically you’d want to separate the first 10 m from the other 90 m, but we’re looking for accuracy, not precision). Dirt, cleats, uniform, base-touching, non-Olympic-speed runners.... bump that up to 14 or 15 seconds if you like. Who’s running 400 feet in 22 seconds?
Opposing coach:
“It took two incredible plays to get them. I understand why they were being aggressive. It took two absolute perfect plays to get people so more times than not, they’re going to be safe. It just took two incredible plays.”
If it takes a perfect throw to get the runner out, it was likely that the decision to send the runner home was correct. How often do you get the perfect throw? 10% of the time? 15%? As long as the breakeven point is at least 85%, and you reason that you need a perfect throw to get the runner out, then you send the runner, and you don’t feel bad about it.
I did not see the play, nor have I figured out the breakeven points for the play in question. Someone want to break out The Book and look at the corresponding chart?
from Amazon
Recent comments
Older comments
Page 1 of 320 pages 1 2 3 > Last »Complete Archive – By Category
Complete Archive – By Date